DISSERTATION VI.
On the Foreknowledge of Future Events.

From the knowledge of God according to Himself and the knowledge of simple intelligence or of possibilities, we proceed to the knowledge of future events, about which there are more serious difficulties. First, regarding the knowledge of absolute futures, then the knowledge of conditional futures, and consequently about middle knowledge, which is the most celebrated question among the Fathers of the Society on one side and a few outsiders, and all other theologians, especially Thomists, on the other. Thus, in this dissertation we explore: 1° generally, what the future is and how many kinds there are; 2° concerning absolute futures, whether God knows them and all things certainly and infallibly; 3° how they are present to Him in eternity; 4° by what means He knows them. Concerning conditional futures, we ask: 1° whether God knows them; 2° by what means He knows them, and whether middle knowledge exists according to the sense of the Fathers of the Society?

ARTICLE I.
WHAT IS THE FUTURE AND HOW MANY KINDS ARE THERE?

I say first that the future is correctly defined as "that which is determined in its causes to have existence in subsequent time". This definition is not admitted, but rather is vehemently attacked by defenders of middle knowledge, as they see it as undermining their system. Nevertheless,

Proof 1° by the authority of St. Augustine, in book 6 of On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, chapter 17, says: "To make futures is nothing other than to prepare their causes." And in tractate 68 in John: "God makes futures by predestining them." St. Thomas in Q. 2 of "De Veritate," article 12, reply to objection 7: "When it is said that this is to be a future event, it designates the order which is in the causes of that thing for its production." In this part, Q. 16, a. 7, reply to objection 3: "Everything that is to come was before it existed, because it was in its cause to be made"; not in cause as merely possible, for this denotes only the possible; not in cause as currently influencing, for this denotes an existing act: therefore, in cause as determined to produce in subsequent time. And from this the fundamental reason is derived. Therefore,

Proof 2° by reason: Being future is a real denomination, not intrinsic, for this does not suit a non-existent thing, but extrinsic, and therefore derived from some real external form: but this cannot be other than its cause as determined to grant it being in subsequent time: for it cannot be a cause as merely potential to produce, for this denotes only the possible, nor as actually producing, for this denotes an existing thing: therefore.

Confirmation: the future must be established by that through which it is extracted from the mass of possibilities, and distinguished from the possible and the existing: but nothing else is assignable by which it obtains this, other than the determination of that cause: therefore, Prob. minor. The possible is indeed contained in a potential but undetermined cause for producing it, the existing is outside of causes: therefore, the future, which mediates between both, is established in a middle way, not by a merely potent and indifferent cause, not by a cause actually producing, but by a cause determined to give it being for a subsequent time.

Opponents respond that the future is established by its relation to being for a subsequent time, or from the fact that it will be.

But against this: I ask from where does the contingent future, about which the question mainly arises, get its relation to being, or have what will be rather than not be? From itself or from a cause: not from itself, otherwise it would not be a contingent future but necessary, and it would be future in every sign of reason before it could be conceived as possible or God existing. If from a cause, not from a cause precisely potent to produce it, since this cause is indifferent to producing or not producing, does not give a relation to being rather than to non-being, but merely establishes the possible, as stated; nor from a cause as actually producing, because, as I also said, this makes it actually existing: therefore, from a cause determined to grant being.

According to our view, it could happen that something in fact existed that had never been future, namely if before it occurred, the cause had not been determined to produce it; and conversely that something was future which never occurred, if indeed the determined cause was prevented from producing: but these two seem absurd: therefore.

Response: these two can happen with respect to secondary causes and this is not inconvenient; but not with respect to the primary cause, because nothing exists in time that was not eternally determined by God, and what is determined by God, infallibly follows to exist in time.

From the stated it spontaneously flows that there is no contingent future independently of the determination of the primary cause, because with the primary cause remaining undetermined, no secondary cause is determined, otherwise it would not be a secondary cause, but the primary. And hence the system of middle knowledge is fundamentally overturned, as will be evident from the following.

I say secondly, some futures are necessary, others contingent: necessary is that which by its nature seeks at some time to be, and is not naturally preventable, like the sunrise tomorrow. Contingent, if broadly taken, is indeed that which by its nature seeks at some time to be, but is naturally preventable by the concurrence of other causes, like a long life from a robust constitution. Contingent, properly and strictly taken, is that which by its nature is indifferent to being and not being, such as things that depend on free will. The properly contingent future, some absolute, some conditional. Absolute is that which does not depend on any condition, unless perhaps on a condition to be posited; because if the condition is to be posited, although apparently and in mode it is a future conditional, in reality it is absolute, like Peter's conversion, if Christ looks upon him. Conditional is that which depends on a condition not to be posited, like the conversion of the Tyrians and Sidonians if the Gospel is announced to them.

Again, a conditional future, some relevant, some irrelevant, or disparate. Relevant is that which has some moral or physical connection with the condition, like the conversion of the Tyrians, if the Gospel is preached to them, the salvation of Judah if he repents. Disparate is that which has no connection with the condition, like if a goat jumps, a tree will bloom; or that of Elisha to King Joash in 2 Kings 13: If you had struck five, six, or seven times, you would have struck down Syria until its end.

ARTICLE II.
DOES GOD KNOW ALL ABSOLUTE FUTURES, CONTINGENT AND FREE, CERTAINLY AND INFALLIBLY?

Although in previous discussions we proved that God knows everything, without exception, there is a special difficulty concerning futures that depend on our free will, due to the need to preserve the concept of freedom. Therefore, we have established a special question about this.

Cicero, in book 2 of "De Divinatione," when he could not reconcile the foreknowledge of future events in God with our freedom, chose to preserve the latter by denying the former. From the same principle, conversely, the Stoics, and after them a Hussite at the Council of Constance session 15, in order to preserve in God the foreknowledge of future events, denied free will. Marcion denied in God the foreknowledge of future events because he allowed Adam to sin, which, if he had known, he should not have created him: Socinians hold that future events that are free are known by God only conjecturally, believing that they do not possess objective truth, and thus are not knowable in general. Against all these views,

I say that God certainly and infallibly knows all absolute futures, contingent and free, without compromising freedom. It is a matter of faith.

Proof. The first part of the argument is from Holy Scripture; Psalm 139: You have understood my thoughts from afar, and foresaw all my paths; Isaiah 48: I know that you would deal very treacherously, and were called a transgressor from the womb; John 6: Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who should betray him; and elsewhere frequently. As is evident, these texts deal with free futures. Nor should you say, with the Socinians, that this signifies only conjectural knowledge: for this is incompatible with the most perfect Being, the primary Truth, and the highest Intelligence: either indeed some futures are known by God but not all; for there is no reason why, out of many futures, He would know one rather than another, as will be clear from the following reasons: therefore, He knows either none or all.

Moreover, God revealed many things about contingent futures in Holy Scripture through the Prophets: hence Tertullian in book 2 against Marcion, chapter 5 says of God's foreknowledge that it "has as many witnesses as He made prophets." Indeed, foreknowledge of the future is assigned in Holy Scripture as the most certain sign of divinity. Isaiah 41: Tell us what will happen in the future, etc.; then we shall know that you are gods. And thus, by common human sense, those who predict the future are called divine, and their predictions, divination, as this signifies something proper to God. Hence Tertullian in "Apologeticus," chapter 20: "A suitable testimony of divinity, the truth of divination"; and St. Augustine, "The City of God," book 5, chapter 9 against Cicero: "To confess that there is a God and to deny foreknowledge of the future is the clearest madness." I refrain from citing more Fathers, as they are ubiquitous.

Proof 2° for multiple reasons. 1° God's knowledge, as it is associated with his will, brings about the future, as I have mentioned before: therefore, he knows it. And granted that God's knowledge does not cause the future, it is certain at least that these do not occur without God willing or permitting them: Therefore, he knows them in his will as in their cause. 2° A future contingent, e.g., this: the antichrist will exist, has a determined truth therefore it is known by God who understands infinitely. Prob. ant.: this proposition, the antichrist will exist, has its truth in existence, and at some time it will be as signified by it therefore it is determinately true, no less than a proposition about the past which had its truth in existence, like this: Peter sinned. 3° God knows things as he actively brings them into existence externally: therefore, he knew them beforehand, otherwise his knowledge would be changeable. 4° Although contingencies, as considered in secondary causes, cannot be known for certain, because in that way they are undetermined, yet when they are present, they can certainly be known: but what is future to us is present to God, as his

knowledge, measured by eternity just as his being, encompasses all distinctions of time, thus his gaze extends to all things which are in any distinction of time as if they are present to him: therefore. To all these, add that the supreme and most perfect intelligence should be attributed the most perfect knowledge, which is the certain and infallible knowledge of all futures.

Nor is it an objection that predictions of freely determined futures are sometimes expressed in Scripture with the particle 'perhaps' or 'maybe'. This particle is not used to indicate any uncertainty in God; rather, Scripture speaks in human terms, and signifies that what is predicted is always uncertain with respect to us and freely determined by us; sometimes it is also used to indicate the difficulty of the matter.

It is also no objection that some prophecies read in Scripture were not fulfilled, such as the destruction of Nineveh, Jonah 3; the death of King Hezekiah, Isaiah 38. These prophecies were not absolute, but conditional, as are ordinarily threats and promises. Thus, the destruction of Nineveh was predicted if they did not convert, and Hezekiah's death if the ordinary course of secondary causes, which God wanted to change, remained.

When you hear some Fathers deny God's foreknowledge, understand foreknowledge in terms of the term, because what is future to us is present to God, as just mentioned, he does not have foreknowledge of them properly and strictly speaking, but knowledge.

The second part is also a matter of faith, as will be proven elsewhere hence although our finite mind might not grasp how both can be reconciled, neither can be denied. But it is also proven and the ways in which our freedom can coexist with divine foreknowledge are explained.

1° From the principle already set by St. Thomas, God sees the future not only according to the state they have in contingent causes before they occur, but he sees them in the now of eternity according to the state they have in their presentness: but the knowledge of something present is certain and infallible, and its contingency does not hinder it; for when I see Socrates sitting, my knowledge is infallible and certain, yet this imposes no necessity on Socrates to sit: therefore, God knows all things that are past, future, or present to us, as if present, infallibly and with certainty, yet without imposing any necessity on contingencies to exist.

2º God foresees and provides for future events, not only in terms of their substance, but also in terms of their mode of necessity and contingency, as St. Thomas often emphasizes: therefore, from the fact that He certainly and infallibly knows contingent futures, it does not follow that they will occur necessarily, but rather it follows for certain that they will

occur contingently and freely, otherwise His foreknowledge would be mistaken; thus, this foreknowledge does not harm the contingency of things.

3º Certain and infallible foreknowledge, precisely understood under the function of foreknowledge, changes nothing in future things or their causes, but merely knows what will happen and how: therefore, notwithstanding this, what is contingent will occur contingently, and what is necessary will necessarily occur, and it suffices for this certain and infallible knowledge that there is a certain and infallible medium through which the future things are represented to Him; for the state of things in the mind of the knower is different from their state in themselves, and just as things that are necessary in themselves can be known contingently, so too can things that are contingent in their causes be known certainly, if indeed the medium of knowledge is certain. Necessity or contingency is in things and from things, but the certainty or uncertainty of knowledge is in the mind due to the medium: therefore.

From this, the well-rehearsed argument that long troubled the ancients and drove them into opposing errors is resolved, namely: "If God knows future contingencies and free events certainly and infallibly, then they are no longer contingent and free, but necessary; and if they are free and contingent, then the foreknowledge is not certain and infallible: because certain and infallible foreknowledge cannot be mistaken, and the events it foresees cannot occur otherwise." It is clear, I say, from the above that both parts of the assumption must be denied, and the proof required from the certainty and infallibility of foreknowledge equally does not prove either part. 1º Because according to the second reason, foreknowledge is not only about the thing, but about the mode of contingency, and so, while it is certain and infallible, the event will certainly occur contingently. 2º Because according to the third reason, the certainty of foreknowledge is derived from the medium of knowledge, whereas the necessity or contingency of things comes from the things themselves, and thus it does not imply that a contingent thing can be known with certainty. 3º Because according to the first reason, the vision of something present, such as God has of the future, is completely irrelevant to its necessity or contingency. It is indeed true that while God sees something as present, it must exist as it is subject to such a vision; just as when I see Socrates sitting, it is necessary that Socrates is sitting as his sitting is subject to my vision; because what exists, as long as it exists, must necessarily be; but such necessity, as is evident, is only hypothetical and consequential, not absolute and consequent. That is, if I see Socrates sitting, it necessarily follows that he sits, but it does not follow that he sits necessarily. Hence, when it is added in the argument that what is foreseen certainly cannot occur otherwise, it is true in a composite sense and consequent potential, because it cannot be that I see Socrates sitting and he is not sitting, otherwise he would simultaneously be sitting and not sitting; however, it is false in a divided sense and

antecedent potential, because while I see Socrates sitting, he sits freely in such a way that he could not sit. More on this elsewhere.

ARTICLE III.
HOW ARE FUTURES PRESENT TO GOD IN ETERNITY?

Note: The presence of futures to God in eternity can be understood in two ways: objectively or intentionally, and physically or really.

Objectively, insofar as they are represented in divine cognition as present according to the real existence they will have when they are produced.

Physically, insofar as they actually exist in eternity. For although eternity is indivisible in itself and all simultaneous, it nevertheless possesses a kind of virtual extension, or parts virtually distinct, analogous to the different parts of past, present, and future time; just as divine being, although it is the simplest, corresponds to several dispersed and distinct perfections in creatures.

Thus, the question is whether futures are present to God not only objectively and intentionally but also physically and really in eternity, not in its entirety, but as it virtually corresponds to that temporal difference in which the futures will be produced and exist. Therefore, the question is not whether futures are really present to God through their anticipated production in eternity, which is distinct from that by which they are produced in time; this is a crude understanding and contrary to faith, as it is certainly a matter of faith that nothing has been produced from eternity, but everything in time. However, as mentioned, whether they are really present to God through the virtual co-extension of His eternity to that temporal difference at some future time.

It is unquestionable that futures are objectively and intentionally present to God in eternity, since God contains within Himself all ideas and reasons which future things will possess in time, and He knows them according to the real existence they will have when they are produced; which is to have them present objectively and intentionally.

I say that futures are present to God in eternity, not only objectively and intentionally, but also physically and really. This view is common among Thomists, joined by others from the Society such as Molina, Fonseca, Tiphanius, and others.

Proof 1º from authority: St. Augustine in his "Lib. 2 ad Simplicianum, Q. 2", Pope St. Gregory in "Lib. 20 of Moralia, Chap. 23", and many others, assert first that in God there is no

foreknowledge in the strict sense; secondly, they deny that anything is future to God; thirdly, they deny as utterly absurd that God would know anything anew in time that He did not previously know. Yet, if futures were only objectively and intentionally present to God, and not physically and really, first, He would have foreknowledge in the strict sense regarding them, as is evident in the Prophets, who, despite the objective presence they have of the futures, still have foreknowledge in the strict sense regarding them; secondly, futures would be absolutely future to God, since not objective presence, but only real presence removes the rationale of true futurity; thirdly, He would finally know something new in time that He had not previously known, namely things that physically exist: therefore.

Regarding St. Thomas, he seems entirely in favor of this opinion although some ancient and many more recent interpreters understand him differently. Particularly noteworthy is his statement: "Eternity, existing simultaneously, encompasses all time, hence all things that are in time are eternally present to God, not only in the sense that He has the reasons for things present within Himself, as some say," indicating objective presence; "but because His gaze from eternity extends over all things as they are in their actuality without any real doubt, since there is no intermediary between objective and real; and especially what he had just stated there that 'God knows all contingencies, not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one is actually in itself'": for objective presence is not the manner in which each thing is actually in itself, but as it is in the intellect. In I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, o: "Therefore, since God sees all times with a single eternal, non-successive intuition, He sees all contingencies at different times from eternity as presently existing, not only as having existence in His cognition": therefore, as having existence in themselves. The entire article should be consulted.

Furthermore, the Holy Doctor frequently refers to eternity in the cited places and in question 2 of "De Veritate", article 12, in "Contra Gentiles", chapters 66 and 67, and elsewhere, which encompasses all time and by which His knowledge is measured to prove that things are present to God. However, if he were considering only objective presence, there would be no need to refer to eternity as the measure of His knowledge, since an actually absent thing can still be objectively present to time-measured cognition. Also, in the same locations, he proves that things are seen intuitively by God because they are present to Him in eternity. But if he considered only objective presence, he would be proving the same by the same, namely, that things are seen by God because they appear so; therefore.

Proof 2º from reason. First, eternity is an infinite duration in terms of duration, indivisible, and all at once, as is clear from the commonly accepted definition derived from Boethius:

indeed, by virtue of its infiniteness, it encompasses all durations—past, present, and future; by virtue of its indivisibility and simultaneity, it contains them, even though they flow successively, in an indivisible manner at the same now, without any succession. Therefore, all times and time-measured events are really present to God by virtue of eternity. Hence, Saint Bernard in Sermon 80 on the Song of Songs says: "Times pass under it (eternity), they do not pass to it: it does not await the future, does not recall the past, does not experience the present," the experience being transient.

Opponents argue that eternity indeed lacks intrinsic and substantial succession but not extrinsic succession derived from things that succeed each other and are successively coexistent with eternity itself. Thus, they compare eternity to a tree planted on the bank of a river, whose parts of flowing water become successively present without any change or succession on its part.

Sed contra: However, from this response, it would follow **firstly** that eternity would not be infinite in terms of duration, just as immensity would not be infinite in terms of vastness, if it could not coexist simultaneously with all conceivable locational differences. Secondly, it would follow that there would not be a total and perfect possession, as is commonly defined: wherever the defect in actual possession arises, whether from the intrinsic nature of the possessor or from the part of the thing to be possessed, there is not a simultaneous and perfect possession, as is evident in someone who does not possess riches due to their absence. Therefore, eternity might better be compared to a tree planted in the middle of a river of such extent that it encompasses the entire river, coexisting simultaneously and at once with all parts of the flowing water, and not needing to wait for their passage to possess and measure them; such is eternity. Or, as St. Thomas compares, God in eternity is like a person standing on a high watchtower from which he sees the entire road and all those passing by it; although one follows another, and the earlier does not see the later, the one in the watchtower sees and has all simultaneously present to him. Similarly, God has all things, even past and future, present to Him in the watchtower of eternity, although they succeed each other and cannot coexist simultaneously in their own duration.

Secondly, since God's knowledge is most perfect, it must be unchangeable; yet it would not be unchangeable if He did not see future things as really present in His eternity; therefore, second minor proof: if things were not really present to God in eternity, He would begin anew to see them as really present in time, specifically at the time they are produced. Thus, as St. Augustine argued earlier, He would know them twice, first as future, then as really present, and something new would occur in the time of that knowledge, thus it would change, just as God's will would change if He began to will something now that He did not will before; therefore.

Objection: It is unintelligible that something exists in eternity that does not exist in itself, as it is prior to exist in itself rather than in another; however, future entities do not exist in themselves now and from eternity, e.g., the Antichrist does not currently exist in himself, therefore he does not exist in eternity. Confirmation: It implies a contradiction for a place to coexist with divine immensity unless it first exists in itself; therefore, by the same reasoning.

Response: Commonly, we distinguish the lesser point that futures do not exist in themselves now in their own duration, I agree. They do not exist in themselves now in the higher duration of eternity, I disagree. Eternity, due to its virtual extension, contains the time difference in which, for example, the Antichrist will exist in his own duration.

To explain further and remove ambiguity, it should be noted as per our John of St. Thomas in Disputation 9, article 3, that eternity does not measure created things immediately by assuming they are already passively unchanged and produced. Instead, it measures them precisely as they are contained in the divine action by which created things are reached and regarded as its endpoint. Thus, created being here should not be considered either as it is virtually within God and is God himself; nor precisely as it is in omnipotence and in created causes as possible; nor as it is in the will to produce as future, but as it is reached through the action of God. The action of God is eternal and yet has an effect in time, according to St. Thomas in Q. 1 de Potentia, article 1, reply 8: "The power of God is always connected to operation, but effects follow according to the command of the will. Hence, it is not necessary that it always be connected to an effect, just as it is not necessary that creatures have been from eternity." And in I, part q. 46, a. 1, ad 10: "In the eternal action of God, an eternal effect does not follow, but such as God willed." In other causes, once the action is set, the effect immediately follows.

Thus, there is something special in the action of God that it is eternal and its effects are passively changed in time. Therefore (and this is the crucial observation), the effects of God's action can be considered in two ways: in one way as passively unchanged and produced, thus founding their own duration and not being from eternity; in another way, precisely as termini connoted and regarded by eternal action, and under this aspect, they are drawn to a higher measure and are from eternity, because they are measured by the same measure as the action of which they are the terminus, not as changed by it, but as connotated by it. Thus states the profound theologian, with a few additions.

Therefore, according to this explanation, the minor distinction of the argument that futures do not exist in themselves now and from eternity as passively changed and produced

effects, I agree with the minor conclusion; as termini connotated by the actual eternal action, I disagree with the minor conclusion. And from this also the response to the confirmation is clear: for immensity to occupy some place, it must touch it by the contract of power acting upon it, as we have said elsewhere, in places that do not exist, it does not act. But for futures to coexist with eternity, it suffices that they will sometime be future, because from this very fact they become connotated termini of eternal action, and thus are measured by eternity just like the eternal action itself. Add that immensity is infinite only in the capacity of placing, from which it follows that it must fill all differences of present locations, up, down, left, right, etc. However, a place as future or past in this regard is not from the line of immensity, but of eternity.

If you insist: The effect, precisely as a terminus connotated by eternal action, is nothing real outside of causes; therefore.

Response: I distinguish. Nothing is real outside causes in the sense that it is not passively changed, I agree. In the sense that it is only possible or future with respect to God, I disagree; because as such it is no longer considered within the divine essence, as merely potent or willing to produce, but as actually producing, from which it is understood to have a created existence outside of causes, not indeed as passively changed, nor yet as in the first act possible or merely future, but in the second act as connotated by an action actually existing as its terminus; and thus we say it is really present in eternity.

According to this understanding, which Contensonus also follows, it seems that the difficulty evaporates and reduces to a question of naming, and at the same time, it preempts many difficult objections, which we therefore omit.

From these statements, you will gather: **1°** Possibilities are not present to God in eternity, because they are not termini of eternal action. **2°** When we say that God sees futures as present in His eternity, it does not mean that He sees them immediately in themselves independently from the essence or attributes previously seen, since, as is clear from the solution to the objection, He sees them to the extent that they are connotated termini of His action, and thus He knows them through it, therefore as present in His essence as the acting agent, although they are not passively changed except in time according to the pleasure of the divine will.

You might ask first whether this presence of things in eternity is necessary for the certainty and infallibility of divine knowledge, as we have said it is necessary for its invariability?

Response: That the real presence of things in eternity greatly contributes to the certainty of divine knowledge is beyond doubt, because from it the things contract a certain necessity, namely hypothetical; what exists, as long as it exists, must necessarily be, as the common axiom states. However, supposing that it were impossible for things not to be really present in eternity, and yet the divine decree measured by eternity remained, it would more probably preserve, by reason of this decree, the certainty and infallibility of divine knowledge, because since it is measured by eternity, efficacious and unimpedible, it is infallibly connected with a definite future; thus there would be certain and infallible knowledge of it, if not by reason of the object at least by reason of the medium. Thus says John of St. Thomas, Gonet, and many other Thomists against the Salmanticenses and others.

You might ask secondly whether the real presence of things in eternity is necessary for their divine knowledge to be intuitive?

Response: Affirmatively. This is the common view among Thomists. The reason is that the only difference between intuitive knowledge and abstract knowledge is that the latter abstracts from existence as exercised in the object it regards; however, intuitive knowledge essentially requires being terminated at an object that is really and actively existing. Hence, St. Thomas says that "vision adds something beyond simple cognition which is not of the genus of knowledge, and that is existence", not indeed objective and intentional existence, since this exists in the understanding intellect, and consequently not outside the genus of knowledge; therefore, it is physical and real.

He also says: "The knowledge of vision in God is named by analogy to bodily sight, which views things positioned outside itself."

Confirmation: Objective and intentional presence is common to all cognition, both abstract and intuitive, since no object can be known by the intellect unless it is present to it through an intentional species; therefore, intuitive knowledge is distinguished from abstract knowledge not by intentional presence but by real presence.

If you argue that intuitive knowledge is distinguished from abstract knowledge because: **1)** intuitive knowledge is clearer, abstract knowledge more obscure; **2)** intuitive knowledge is through its own species, abstract knowledge through the species of another. Against the first, God sees possible things most clearly, and yet this knowledge of His is not intuitive. Against the second, God intuitively knows the future, present, and past, not through their own species, but through His essence as carrying the roles of species. Also, things through their own essence can be equally known under the state of being future or past as under

the actual exercise of existence: therefore, they can be known abstractively through their own species.

You might say that the infused knowledge given to Peter in Paris about John existing in Rome, reaching John as existing with all his individual accidents, is intuitive, and yet John would not be locally present to Peter: therefore, real presence is not required for intuitive knowledge.

Response: Perhaps the premise could be denied; but, granted it, I distinguish the consequent. Therefore, real local presence is not required for intuitive knowledge, let that pass; real presence in some duration is not required, I deny the consequent. The reason for the distinction is that without local coexistence, knowledge can terminate at an object as existing outside causes, which is required for intuitive knowledge, but it cannot do so without coexistence in some duration.

ARTICLE IV.
BY WHAT MEANS DOES GOD KNOW ABSOLUTE FUTURES, CONTINGENT AND FREE?

Although we have stated in the previous article that absolute futures are present to God in eternity, because they do not exist in their own duration but are future in themselves, and because, according to us, things are not known by God immediately in themselves, and the presence of a thing in eternity is not the medium in which it is known—as some mistakenly believe, but rather the mode of the known object; we now inquire by what means does God know absolute futures, especially contingent and free ones? On conditioned futures, see the following discussion. This question is of great importance from which many others depend. Indeed, from the principles set forth, we can resolve it not too difficultly: if, as said before, God does not know things other than Himself in themselves, but in Himself as in their cause, and since He is the cause of things in the first act through His essence by which He can do all, and in the second act through His will by which He factually wills these rather than others to be, it is clear that just as He knows possibilities precisely viewed in His essence, so too He knows futures determined in His essence through His will, or in the decree of His will.

However, because this doctrine paves the way for the assertion of intrinsically efficacious grace and the overturning of middle knowledge, it is vigorously opposed by the Fathers of the Society and their allies. But when they are pressed to assign another medium by which God knows the future, they are reduced to difficulties and diverge into various inventions. Molina assigns the supercomprehension of secondary causes; Suárez, a future decree;

Theophilus Raynaud, a secondary cause left to itself. Among more recent thinkers, some attribute it to the formal truth of propositions, others to objective truth; the recent Molinian writer Honoratus Tournely, in Q. 16 on the Knowledge of God, art. 3, conclusions 3 and 4, assigns the divine essence as the intelligible species in representing the infinite. Another older opinion close to this attributed to Giles of Rome, according to which God knows the future in His ideas. Therefore, we will first challenge these various opinions and then establish the true position. From whence it follows

§ I.
Less True Opinions Are Rejected.

I state firstly: God does not know free absolute futures in His essence as it has the nature of an idea or intelligible species before the decree. The first part is against Giles of Rome, if indeed he understood ideas excluding the decree, which is unclear; the second part is against Tournely.

Proof for both parts: In a cause indifferent to futurity and non-futurity, a future effect cannot be known more than a non-future effect, as is clear from the terms: because the essence of God as it has the nature of an idea or species before the decree is indifferent to a future or non-future effect; it is indeed the cause of things in the second act freely and through His will, such that things are not future unless He wills it, and therefore before the decree it represents them indeed as possible, but not as future; therefore.

Nor does it matter that the divine essence is infinite in representing, for it cannot represent what is not representable; before the decree, nothing is representable as future, because it is not future.

I state secondly: God does not know contingent futures in the *super-comprehension* of secondary causes before the decree. This is against Molina who had few followers in this view.

Proof by the same reason: because neither comprehension nor *super-comprehension* of any cause can grasp in it what it does not contain: but in a secondary cause before the divine will's decree, the effect is not contained as definitively future, but indifferently to being or not being; for a secondary cause cannot be determined to futurity more than non-futurity before the decree or determination of the primary cause; therefore. This is clear from what was said in article 1 of this dissertation and will be even clearer from what will be said.

Objection: St. Thomas in I, Contra Gentiles, chapter 67 says that just as a necessary effect is certainly known from a necessary cause, so from a contingent cause not impeded, a contingent effect is certainly known; therefore.

Response: I interpret St. Thomas as speaking about a contingent cause taken in a broad sense or as not free, which, although it acts necessarily, can nevertheless be naturally impeded by the concurrence of other causes, such as the burning of fire: and in such an unimpeded cause, the effect can be certainly known. But it cannot be known that such a cause will not be impeded except by decree.

You might insist: According to Thomists, God certainly knows futures in secondary causes through the decree or determined premotion; yet, under the decree or premotion, secondary causes remain indifferent; therefore.

Response: I distinguish the minor. Secondary causes under the decree or premotion are indifferent with potential and passive indifference, which implies the suspension of the act, I deny the minor. Active indifference contained in the act itself, whereby the secondary cause acts such that it might not act, I agree with the minor. For at the very instant when the premoted will to act is understood, the agent is understood, yet in such a way that it can choose not to act: hence, whoever foresees the motion, certainly foresees the act, yet freely to be enacted.

I state thirdly: God does not know contingent futures in a secondary cause left to itself under these or those circumstances. This is against Theophilus Raynaud. Proof: To posit that God knows contingent futures in a secondary cause left to itself under these or those circumstances without any concurrence of God, is to suppose that the secondary cause is God; for it is proper to God to act independently from any other. Moreover, if contingent futures cannot be known in secondary causes with simultaneous concurrent assistance, as we proved against Molina, then a fortiori, not in those left to themselves.

I state fourthly: God does not know contingent futures in His foreseen decree as future. This is against Suárez.

Proof 1º: The decree of God, as it is eternal, cannot be conceived with a foundation in reality or virtually as future; therefore. Supporting argument 1: because eternity, being whole and indivisible, does not know past and future; Supporting argument 2: because just as real futurity requires a real priority of existence and in which, and not just a priority of dependency and from which, as is clear in properties which, although they depend on essence, are not themselves future, so for virtual futurity a virtual priority of existence and in which is required. However, in God, a priority of existence or in which, cannot be

conceived with a foundation in reality, since all things in God exist through a single and indivisible existence, and they transcend each other mutually; therefore.

Proof 2º: Even if we gratuitously concede that the decree could be conceived as future, at least so that in it God would know the futures, there must be a medium in which this decree as future would be represented, since in that prior understanding it is not understood as existing, it cannot be known in itself: but before the decree there is no medium that represents it as future; therefore. Supporting minor argument: in that prior instance, God is indifferent to making or not making that decree, since the decree is that by which He determines Himself; therefore. Suárez resorts to the objective truth of the futurity of the decree but this is to resort to another medium, about which we are now discussing: hence

I state fifthly: God does not certainly know contingent and free futures before the decree in their truth, whether formal or objective. This is against more recent professors of the Society.

Since the Jesuit Fathers now well understand that all mediums of knowing the future that they have devised are inept and insufficient, they have turned to another novelty, unheard of in schools to this extent, namely the truth of propositions about the future: hence they argue. God is omniscient, and no truth is hidden from Him: but before the decree, one of the two contradictory propositions is determinately true, the other false; therefore, God knows this truth before the decree from eternity. They distinguish two types of truth, one formal of propositions, the other objective of things; if, as they contend, it was true from eternity that what now is, so was the proposition affirming the future true; they call this truth formal, the first objective, because it is the object of this second. Therefore, some say that God foreknows the future in formal truth, others in objective truth, but both modes of saying nearly fall into the same category. So, I will conclude if I prove that there is no truth, whether formal or objective, of the futures before the decree, and even if there were, it would not be a medium in which futures could be known. Therefore,

Proof of the first conclusion: before the decree of God, nothing is determinately future; therefore, no truth of the future, whether formal or objective. The consequence is clear because truth follows being as its property. Supporting argument 1 from authority; St. Augustine in Tractate 68 on John says: "God makes futures by predestining them." And in Book 26 against Faustus, giving reason why he does not know if something is going to happen, he says: "I do not know because what God's will has about this matter is hidden from me; however, I undoubtedly know that it will happen if it is God's will." St. Ambrose in Book 5 on the Faith, Chapter 8: "God made what is to be... because... what He commanded to be will be." St. Thomas here in Q. 16, Art. 7, countering a principle of opponents in the

third place, namely, that what is true in the present was always true to be future, replies: "To the third, it must be said that what now is, was future before it existed because it was in its cause to be made, whence without the cause, it would not be future to happen. Only the first cause is eternal. Hence from this, it does not follow that it was always true that those things were to be future, unless as far as they were to be future in the eternal cause; which cause is God alone." However, God is not the cause of things except through His will; therefore.

Proof from the previous reason: Firstly, the future consists of what is determined in its causes to have existence in subsequent time, as evident from the statements in article 1 of this dissertation. But before the determination of the first cause, no secondary cause is determined; otherwise, the first would be the second, and the second would be the first.

Secondly, If, before God's decree, something was determined to be in the future, it would either have this determination from itself or from some cause not itself, because what does not exist cannot give itself existence, let alone future existence. Moreover, if it were future from itself, it would not be a contingent future, which is the primary issue here, but necessary, such that God could not decree otherwise. It wouldn't be from any cause, because before the determination of the first cause, all secondary causes are neutral and undetermined concerning becoming future or not.

Thirdly, That which causes the futurity of things first determines the principle of their possibility: But the divine decree is the first determining principle of the possibility of things; therefore. Prob. min.: The principle of possibility for things is the omnipotence of God; however, the first determinant of God's omnipotence is the decree of his will, as God, being a free agent acting externally, consequently does not act except as he wishes; therefore.

Prob. 2º conclusion. Granted that propositions about contingent future hold formal truth independently of God's decree, they nevertheless would not be the medium through which God could know what the future holds; therefore. Prob. ant.
What depends on another for its truth, borrowing it from that other, cannot be a medium to know that other, because a medium to know something else must be known before that other thing; indeed, what depends on another for its truth and borrows it from that other must be known before that other, as it is knowable in the way it is true: But the truth of a proposition about the future, if given, depends on the future event and borrows from it; therefore, it cannot be the medium in which God knows the future event. Prob. minor: An event is not truly future because the proposition stating it to be future is true; on the contrary, the proposition is true because the event is truly about to happen, since from the fact that a thing is or is not, the proposition is said to be true or false, as the common

principle holds: therefore, the truth of propositions about the future, if given, depends on the future event and borrows from it.

For this argument, which seems to us invincible, many of our opponents, abandoning formal truth, resort to objective truth, and say from the fact that an event is now in time, it was truly future from eternity, and in that truth of futurity or in that future being, God recognizes what is presently what will someday be.

However, against objective truth, the same argument made holds: What depends on another in its truth and borrows it, cannot be a medium to know that other thing: But according to our opponents' doctrine, the objective truth of futurity depends on the truth of being present, no less than the formal truth of a proposition depends on the objective truth of futurity: therefore, just as the formal truth of a proposition cannot be the medium in which God knows the objective truth of futurity, so the objective truth of futurity cannot be the medium in which God knows the present being that it will have in time. Prob. minor: Opponents say the event was truly future from eternity because it is now, or because it will someday be in time, that is, from that present being it has when it exists or will have in time when it exists, it was truly future throughout the preceding duration: therefore, according to our opponents' doctrine, the objective truth of futurity depends on the truth of being present, just as the formal truth of a proposition depends on the objective truth of futurity. See Goudin in his posthumous work on the Science of God, where he discusses this argument extensively and learnedly.

I add, in confirmation of the conclusion, that this medium is new, and no trace of it exists, whether in the Scriptures, the Church Fathers, or ancient theologians. Hence Vasquez himself openly admits in his works that he found no mention of this medium in ancient sources, except for Scotus, from whom, however, he produces no testimony.

Objections are solved.

I will briefly touch on the objections of the opponents, as almost all of them aim to prove the truth of propositions about contingent future events before a decision is made. These are typically presented and resolved in Logic, and although they might demonstrate what the opponents claim, they would not achieve anything against our conclusion, as is evident from the second proof.

Objection 1: The proposition about the future that states what will be, or that conforms to its object, is determinately true; for example, the proposition "the antichrist will exist" states things as they will be; therefore, it is true. This is evident because, as faith assures us, the antichrist will indeed exist at some time.

Response: I deny the minor premise. In proving this, distinguish the antecedents: indeed, the antichrist will exist at some time by virtue of a decree made in the subsequent sign, I concede to the antecedent; by virtue of the arrangement made in the prior sign to the decree, I deny the antecedent. For then the antichrist is still in a state of suspension and indifferent to being or not being, and consequently, a proposition stating what will be is neither determinately true nor false.

To demonstrate how weak this argument is, upon which the opponents so rely, I turn it against them. A proposition stating what will be is true insofar as it will be what it states; however, before God's decree regarding the future antichrist, it is uncertain whether there will or will not be an antichrist; therefore, it is also uncertain whether the statement about that future is true.

You will insist first that the nature of a proposition about the present is such that it refunds its truth into two other propositions, one about the future and one about the past: thus, from the fact that something is now, it will be true to say for the entire duration that follows that it was; similarly, from the fact that something is now, it was true to say in the entire preceding duration that it will be.

Response: I distinguish the antecedent. The nature of a proposition about the present is such that it refunds its truth into propositions about the future and the past, verifying them depending on the determination of the thing in itself, I concede to the antecedent; showing them to have been or will be true independently of the determination of the thing in itself or in its cause, I deny the antecedent. Therefore, the truth of a proposition about the present does not make a proposition about the future true by the truth it would have had in itself before the event or determination in its cause, but by the truth which is refunded into it by the present event or its determination; or what is the same, a true proposition about the present does not show a proposition about the future to have been true, but verifies it by the effect of the present, in a similar way, a recent Thomist says, as a subsequent marriage legitimizes children born before it, not indeed showing they were legitimate (for they were illegitimate), but legitimizing them such that according to the law they are understood to have always been legitimate.

To the consequence, I deny the parity: the difference from what is said is that a proposition about the past presupposes its object as invariably determined; for what once was or has been, it is impossible was not. But a proposition about the future does not presuppose its object but awaits it, hence if it is supposed to be indeterminate to be or not be, as it is before God's decree, the proposition about it remains equally indeterminate and indifferent to truth or falsehood.

You will insist second that the proposition "the antichrist will be" does not affirm that the antichrist is determined in itself or in its cause, otherwise it would be about the present, but simply that it will be, however it may exist in its time: therefore, for the truth of this proposition that the antichrist will exist, no determination of the antichrist in itself or in its cause is required.

Response: I distinguish the consequent: it is not required for the antichrist to be the object stated, I concede to the consequent; as the foundation of a true statement, I deny the consequent; for a proposition about the future to be true, it is not sufficient that the thing will at some time have existence, as this can be verified of a merely possible thing, but it is required as a condition without which not, that it will have existence by virtue of the arrangement made in that sign in which it is announced as future.

You insist thirdly: From what has been said, it follows that every affirmative proposition about a contingent future before God's decree is false, and every negative one is true. The argument goes: an affirmative proposition, e.g., "the antichrist will be," asserts that the antichrist will exist in the future; a negative one asserts he will not exist in the future. According to us, before the decree, the antichrist is not going to exist; therefore...

Response: I deny the consequence. In examining the proof, I distinguish the major premise: the proposition "the antichrist will be" asserts that the antichrist will have a future existence, as it is given now in the determined futurition of the antichrist, I deny the major premise, for in this sense, it would not be about the future, but about an impossible present; that is, the antichrist will at some time have existence, I concede the major premise. In this sense, I distinguish the minor premise: but according to us, before the decree, the antichrist is not going to exist, that is, the futurition of the antichrist is not determined, I concede the minor premise; that is, the antichrist will not at some time have existence, I deny the minor premise; for this is uncertain and pending, consequently, the proposition stating this is uncertain and indeterminate as to truth or falsehood.

Objection 2: The law of contradiction dictates that one of two contradictory propositions must be determinately true, the other determinately false. Yet, these propositions, "the antichrist will be" and "the antichrist will not be," stated before God's decree, are contradictory; therefore... Confirmation: This disjunctive proposition, "the antichrist will be or will not be," is determinately true before God's decree; however, for the truth of a disjunction, it is required that one part be true; therefore.

Response: I deny the major premise, universally taken; however, the common law of contradiction is that they conflict in truth and falsehood, or that they cannot both be true and simultaneously false, based on the principle upon which it is founded, that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, for which it is sufficient that one part be indeterminately true, the other indeterminately false; however, it is not required that one be determinately true, the other determinately false. And, I ask, of these two propositions: "Peter will convert," "Peter will not convert," why, by the nature of contradiction, would the affirmative rather than the negative be ascribed truth, or vice versa, when they are equal in contradicting?

Moreover, if the determined truth of contingent futures and propositions about them arose from the force and nature of contradiction, it would follow first that there would be necessary truth, not contingent, as it would be founded on this necessary and immutable principle: It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. It would follow secondly that propositions about the future would be true not only before the decree, but for every conceivable prior, such that something future could be conceived before it could be conceived as possible, indeed before God's existence could be conceived, because this principle, "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not be," on which the law of contradiction is founded, holds for every imaginable instant.

To the confirmation, similarly, I distinguish the minor premise: For the truth of a disjunction, it is required that one part be indeterminately true, I concede the minor premise; determinately, I deny the minor premise; as this disjunctive is necessary and of eternal truth, and yet neither part is necessary; so, for the determined truth of it, it is not required that one be determinately true rather than the other, but that both cannot be simultaneously false, for which it suffices that one part indeterminately be true. Add that if from the truth of the disjunction followed the determinate truth of any part, the absurdities we deduced in the previous solution would recur.

I omit further discussion, both because, as I mentioned, it has become customary to treat these in philosophy when discussing propositions about contingent futures, where they can be seen; and because, granting for the sake of argument that propositions about contingent futures are true before God's decree, we have nevertheless demonstrated that they cannot serve as the means by which God knows the future.

§ II.
The true opinion is asserted.

I say that God knows the absolute future contingencies and free actions by determining their future existence in His decree, whether in His essence such decree is determined.

Proof 1º from the authority of Scripture and the Fathers; In Isaiah 14, God, predicting through the Prophet the wars that the Assyrians would bring upon the Israelites, subsequently the free future actions and the destruction of the previous, adds: "The Lord of Hosts has sworn, saying: 'If it does not happen as I have thought, and as I have planned in my mind, so it shall be: that I will crush the Assyrian in my land... This plan which I have devised... The Lord of Hosts has decreed, and who will nullify it?'" In these words, God clearly bases the certain foreknowledge of these future events on the decree of His will. Also, the Apostle in Romans 11, discussing the foreknowledge of God regarding the conversion of the Gentiles and the unfaithfulness of the Jews, therefore about free actions, after exclaiming: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God;" he adds as a reason for this incomprehensible knowledge: "For from Him and through Him and to Him are all things," as if to say, because He orders and does.

St. Hilary in Book 3 of On the Trinity: "*What God has decreed to do, He knew in His will.*" St. Augustine in the Book on the Predestination of the Saints, Chapter 10: "*By predestination God foreknew what He Himself was going to do*"; and further: "*When God promised Abraham the faith of the Gentiles, it was not from the power of our will but from His predestination: for He promised what He Himself was going to do*," where the discussion is clearly about the free futures, namely about the conversion of the Gentiles.

The Mind of St. Thomas is Expounded.

St. Thomas consistently establishes two principles from which our conclusion is derived. First, that God sees nothing outside Himself, but all things in His essence as their cause. Here, in q. 14, a. 5, 1, contra Gent., cap. 68, which begins as follows: "It must be shown that God knows the thoughts of minds and the wills of hearts by virtue of being the universal principle of existence," which, after proving with five arguments, concludes the entire chapter as follows: "The dominion that the will has over its acts, by which it is in its power to will or not to will, excludes determination of power to one and violence of an externally acting cause, but it does not exclude the influence of the higher cause from which it has its being and operating, and thus causality remains in the first cause, which is God, with respect to the movements of the will, so that by knowing Himself, God can know such things." Compare with the previous article of this dissertation. According to the second principle: that He is the cause of things by His will, here in q. 14, a. 8, and elsewhere in q. 19, a. 4, and elsewhere. From these, I say, two principles are established: that God knows all future events, even contingent and free ones, in His will, which is our conclusion. Furthermore, in 1 d. 39, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5, he says: "Although existence and knowledge in God

are the same in reality, knowledge follows the will as commanded by it, but existence does not: therefore, His existence is not subject to the freedom of the will, as operative knowledge is to creatures." We omit many other things to avoid being lengthy.

However, two objections are made by opponents from St. Thomas: first, that the Holy Doctor here expressly does not mention decree in a. 13 and in 1 d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, regarding the knowledge of future contingent events, but resorts to their presence in eternity; secondly, that here in a. 13, he teaches that a contingent future cannot be known with certainty in its cause.

Regarding the first, I have often marveled at the significance some attach to this argument, as if St. Thomas, by grounding certain foreknowledge of future events in their presence in eternity, were excluding decree and not rather assuming and asserting it. However, future events are not present in eternity except because they are future in their own duration. But according to St. Thomas, they are future in their own duration only through God's will, or, as we said in the previous article, they are not present in eternity except insofar as they are the terms determined by the divine will and simultaneously actually produced. Consequently, to see future events as present in eternity, according to the way of St. Thomas, is to see them in the divine will. This is even more true because, according to St. Thomas, God does not see things immediately in themselves, but in Himself as their cause, and He is the cause of things through His will. Therefore, decree and the presence of things in eternity are not two means by which God knows the future, as some falsely imagine, but only the decree of the divine will or the divine will itself, willing and actively producing, is the medium by which God knows the future. However, the presence of things is not a medium but the object itself or the mode of the object as represented in the will, actually producing, and thus it is the reason under which the thing is known, not in which it is known.

Furthermore, it is false that St. Thomas does not expressly mention decree in the cited passages. Here, in article 13, he says: "All things that exist in time are present to God from eternity, not only in the sense that He has the reasons for things present in Himself, as some say," but practical reasons for things are ideas determined by the decree of the will. And in the later passage: "God does not only see from eternity the order of a thing to itself, from whose power the thing was to become future," here is the decree. "But He contemplates the very existence of the thing," here is the presence of things in eternity.

You insist: If it is true that all knowledge of future events depends solely on decree as the medium in which they are known, then why does St. Thomas, in the cited places, make so little mention of decree and focus entirely on establishing the presence of things in eternity as the foundation of that knowledge? In this case, he certainly seems to have been remiss,

especially since Thomists themselves, on the contrary, discuss the presence of things in eternity sparingly and vigorously strive to establish decree.

Response: St. Thomas does not discuss the medium by which God knows future contingent events in the cited passages; he had already addressed this adequately in article 5, teaching generally that God sees other things in Himself as their cause, and in article 8, that He is the cause of things through His will. He deals instead with reconciling the certainty of divine foreknowledge with the contingency of things. And although the certainty of divine foreknowledge, while preserving the contingency of things, can be proven partly from the medium and partly from the object, St. Thomas was more concerned with proving it in terms of the object than the medium. First, because, as I pointed out, he had already said enough about the medium; secondly, because the certainty of knowledge, while preserving the contingent thing known, is more clearly proven from the presence of the known thing than from its determination in its causes. For when I see Peter running before me, it is clearly perceived that my vision is certain, yet the contingency of Peter's course is not thereby removed; indeed, it would be more difficult to conceive of my certainly foreseeing Peter's course, and nevertheless this course remaining contingent. Moreover, divine knowledge has its measure in eternity, but it does not have its cause from itself, but from the will. Therefore, since St. Thomas proceeded from his own principles, he proves here the certainty of divine knowledge from the presence of things in eternity rather than from the divine will, reserving that for q. 19, where he deals with decrees. So why do we Thomists insist more laboriously on proving decree than on proving the presence of things in eternity? The answer is readily available: because our adversaries deny decree more vigorously and stubbornly than they deny the presence of things in eternity, precisely because they understand that their system of middle knowledge and versatile grace is fundamentally overturned by the assertion of decree. However, let it not escape your notice, as I mentioned earlier, that for St. Thomas, to see things as present in eternity is to see them in His will from eternity, willing and producing them.

Regarding the second objection, it is responded that when St. Thomas says that future contingent events cannot be known with certainty in their cause, he speaks of the created cause considered in itself, with respect to which the effect is contingent and future, not of His will, to which nothing is future and contingent, but all things are present and infallible in eternity.

You insist that St. Thomas, in the place already cited in 1. d. 38. q. 1. a. 5., makes this distinction between necessary and contingent future effects, that the necessary ones can be known with certainty in their causes, but not the contingent ones. However, this distinction cannot hold if the prescience of future events relies on a decree, for either St.

Thomas speaks of causes in themselves abstracted from the decree, or not. The first cannot be said in the Thomistic opinion, because according to them, even necessary effects require a decree and physical predetermination. Neither can the second, because according to Thomists, effects can be known with certainty in secondary causes, as they are subject to divine decree.

The response is to deny the minor. To prove this, I say that St. Thomas speaks of secondary causes in themselves, apart from the decree. As for what is objected regarding necessary effects, I say two things: first, that although according to Thomists, necessary effects, such as the rising of the sun, are not considered to exist independently of God's prior concurrence, because they are owed to them naturally, and cannot be denied except by a miracle and by the extraordinary power of God, they can be said to be absolutely future and known with certainty in their causes, apart from the decree, not by denying it, but by not paying attention to it; because what is certain to happen according to God's ordinary power can be said to be absolutely future and known as such with certainty. Second, according to the interpretation of many, St. Thomas establishes a distinction between necessary and contingent effects, that the necessary ones are determined at least as to species in their causes, but not the contingent ones. Consequently, the necessary ones can be known with certainty in their causes at least as to species, even apart from the decree, but not the contingent ones; because a decree or physical predetermination is required both for the species and for the individual of a contingent effect, but only for the individual of a necessary effect, since necessary causes are determined by their nature to the species.

The conclusion is proven by reason.

The fundamental reason for our conclusion is none other than that which was proposed above from St. Thomas, namely this: God knows things other than Himself in Himself as their cause; but He is the cause of future contingent events through the decree of His will. Therefore, the major premise is evident from what was said in the preceding articles of this dissertation, and the minor premise from the third article of the same dissertation, and it is common and found throughout the Holy Scriptures: Ephesians 1: "He works all things according to the counsel of His will"; Wisdom 11: "How could anything remain if You did not will it?"; Revelation 4: "You created all things, and by Your will they exist and were created."

The second proof arises from the refutation of other opinions. God does not know future absolute contingencies in His essence as if they had the nature of an idea or an intelligible species, not in the comprehensive understanding of secondary causes, not in secondary causes left to themselves, not in the future decree, not finally in the formal or objective

truth of future events, but in His decree. The consequence is clear from a sufficient enumeration.

Confirmation: The decree of the divine will has all the requisite conditions to be the means by which God knows future contingencies. Therefore, the medium by which God knows future contingencies must be eternal, because God does not begin in time to know what He did not know before; it must be efficacious and infallible, otherwise He would not know it with certainty. However, the decree of the divine will is eternal, since God does not begin in time to will something He did not will before; it is efficacious because He is omnipotent, and as Scripture says, no one can resist the divine will; yet it could not be, because God freely willed whatever He willed externally, so that He could have not willed whatever has been, is, or will be in the world. Therefore, to all these.

Adversaries respond to all this in two ways: 1) It is proved that God knows in His decree future events that depend solely on Him, but not free ones that depend on human choice; 2) Even if God were to know these in His decree, it does not follow that this decree is pre-determining. Moreover, it seems truer that Scotists, who admit that God knows free future events in His decrees, reject pre-determining decrees.

To the first response, 1) Scripture and St. Augustine speak of future free events, as is clear from the cited texts. As for St. Thomas, he says that God knows all things in Himself, leaving nothing out: "He sees other things in Himself, not in themselves," and he specifically mentions free acts in proving the conclusion. 2) Our free acts are no less caused by God than anything else, for He is the cause of all being and works in us all that we do, Isaiah 26; and specifically our free acts: "For it is God who works in you to will and to act," Philippians 2.

Regarding the second response, by pre-determining decree, we understand nothing other than the decree of the divine will effectively and infallibly determining the future event, sweetly, however, because it also determines the free mode. Therefore, it is called pre-determining for two reasons: 1) because it causes the future; 2) because it causes it freely, certainly, and infallibly. But this alone, and nothing else, can be the means by which God knows future events with certainty and infallibility. Therefore, if it is indifferent to the future event or not, to positing consent or not, it cannot, as is clear, certainly and infallibly lead to the knowledge of consent rather than non-consent. And if it is only concomitant, it will not be the cause of future events, for a cause naturally precedes its effect. Thus, everything we have proven above recurs, that nothing is future except by the decree of God; moreover, this concomitant decree will not be the means of knowing the future more than the future will be the means of knowing such a decree. As for the objection concerning the Scotists: Do they speak consistently with their principles? Not us, but they

themselves will see.

Objections are resolved.

Objection 1º with Honoratus Tournely: That decree cannot be a prior known medium in which future free events are known, which cannot be conceived and known before the very creatures to which it pertains. Such is the free decree of God, for it implies that the free decree is known before the things by which it is constituted as distinct from the necessary act; but it cannot be known as distinct from the necessary act before the creatures to which it pertains are known, since it is distinguished from the necessary act solely by that connotation to creatures. Therefore, creatures are not known in the decree as in a prior known medium.

Response 1º: Molinists concede that God knows future events, which depend solely on Him, with certainty in His decree, as we have seen above. Additionally, they admit that God knows free future events in an absolute decree, assuming the foreknowledge of conditionally future events. Let Tournely then wield his sword against his friends and prove to them that their decrees are not mediums in which God knows future events, because they cannot be known before the creatures to which they pertain. Their defense will be ours. Meanwhile,

Response 2º: We must distinguish the major premise. That decree cannot be a prior known medium in which future free events are known, which cannot be conceived and known by reason and nature before the very creatures to which it pertains, I concede the major premise. That decree cannot be known before the creatures in time, I deny the major premise. Furthermore, the free decree of God, although it is simultaneous in time with the creatures to which it pertains, is conceived prior by reason and nature because, as the objector himself admits, it is the cause of the creatures. But a cause is known by reason and nature before its effects.

You will insist: The free decree of God signifies two things: the divine substance and a rational relation to creatures. As substance, it does not represent the future more than the non-future; as a rational relation, it cannot represent anything really, because a rational being cannot have any real effect: therefore.

Response 1º: As before, this argument must equally be solved by the adversaries regarding the decree of creating the world, as well as the decree of cooperating in free acts assuming the foreknowledge of future conditions, in which, according to them, God knows these future events. It can equally be objected that it could not represent the future, neither as the substance of God nor as a rational relation to creatures.

Response 2º: The divine decree does not represent future events, neither precisely as the substance of God, nor formally as a rational relation in our intellect, but fundamentally as a relation to creatures. It is fundamentally a relation to creatures insofar as it can eminently produce, without a real relation, whatever an act newly elicited would do, which we explain by a rational relation.

Furthermore, whatever the nature of the free decree of God and wherein it consists, which is very difficult to define in any theory, as we shall see below, it is at least certain among all theologians that it is something sufficient for the production of all creatures, and a fortiori for their cognition.

You might argue secondly: In a universal and remote cause, the effect cannot be known with certainty and infallibility because the power of the universal cause is modified by the particular cause and can be impeded by it. For instance, the flowering of a tree cannot be known with certainty through the power of the sun alone, because it can be impeded by a defect in the generative power of the tree. However, the decree of God is a universal and remote cause whose influence is modified and determined by secondary causes. Hence, St. Thomas, in 1. d. 38. q. 1. a. 5, compares God's influence to the motion of the sun and proves that God, through necessary secondary causes, produces necessary effects and, through contingent secondary causes, produces contingent effects. Therefore, it follows that future events cannot be known with certainty through God's decree as a prior known medium.

Response: We must distinguish the major premise. In a universal and remote cause, which is not universally primary, the effect cannot be known with certainty, I concede the major premise, because it can be impeded by others. In a cause which is universally primary, such as God, I deny the major premise. For such a cause, being of infinite and universal power, accommodates other causes while also subordinating and subjecting them to itself, so that it cannot be impeded by them. Regarding St. Thomas, he does not compare God's influence with the influence of the sun in the sense that, just as the efficacy of the sun's influence can be impeded by the defect of a particular cause, so the efficacy of the divine influence can be impeded by the defect of secondary causes. This St. Thomas explicitly denies in q. 19. a. 8, but intends only to prove that the infallibility of divine knowledge does not harm the contingency of things, because although God is an immutable cause of things through His will, He so adjusts His cooperation with secondary causes that He moves necessary things in the manner of nature, and free things in the manner of freedom, leaving them the power to act in opposition. In this sense, God's cooperation and causality are said to be modified and determined by secondary causes materially and objectively.

You might argue: According to this doctrine, the knowledge of vision will be an attribute distinct from the knowledge of simple intelligence (which is not commonly admitted) because each will have a different virtual medium or motive. The medium of the knowledge of simple intelligence will be omnipotence; the medium of the knowledge of vision will be the decree; and knowledge is distinguished by different media or motives.

Response: I deny the consequence. In proof, I say that the decree is not a formal or motivating medium properly speaking, but only a condition applying the medium, and the medium is the divine essence or omnipotence. Therefore, omnipotence is the medium of both kinds of knowledge in different respects: considered in itself, it is the medium of the knowledge of simple intelligence; as determined and applied by the decree, it is the medium of the knowledge of vision. Hence, I said in conclusion that God sees future events in His decree or in His essence as determined by the decree.

Objection 2: If God knows future free events with certainty and infallibility in His decree, that decree must be efficacious and infallible; but thereby freedom is destroyed, and future events cease to be free; therefore.

Response: I deny the minor premise. Rather, freedom is thereby affirmed because the decree pertains not only to the substance of the thing but also to its mode, namely, freedom. Hence, from the fact that it is efficacious and infallible and that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only do those things happen which God wills to happen, but they happen contingently or necessarily, because this is how God wills them to happen. Similarly, St. Anselm, whose authority the Molinists misuse in this matter in Concordia, predest. cap. 1, says: "Because what God wills cannot fail to be, if God wills that the human will be free and not coerced or prohibited by any necessity, then it is necessary for the will to be free and to be what it wills." But on this argument, I will speak more extensively in philosophy concerning physical premotions and below concerning the efficacy of divine decrees.

Objection 3: At least sins are not known by God in His decree, since He neither wills them nor decrees them; on the contrary, He detests and forbids them.

Response: Indeed, although God does not will sins to occur, He nevertheless wills to permit them: nothing happens unless God wills it to happen or permits it to happen, as stated by St. Augustine in Enchiridion chapter 95: "Nothing happens unless the Almighty wills it to happen, either by allowing it to happen or by making it happen." And St. Thomas here, article 9, reply to objection 3: "Only those things are future which God permits to be or wills to be." Therefore, God knows future sins in His permissive decree, that is, in the decree of withholding or denying the help needed to avoid sin.

You might argue: This decree of denying the help to avoid sins does not have an infallible connection with the sin; therefore, sin cannot be known with certainty in it. The proof is that if it had an infallible connection with the sin, a will lacking such help would always sin, which is false: 1) otherwise, it would be determined to evil and consequently, by its nature, evil, which is the heresy of the Manichaeans; 2) because according to the Thomists themselves in the treatise on Grace, a created will sometimes acts rightly with only the general concurrence given to it according to the common laws of Providence.

Response: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish: if it had, etc., the will lacking such help would always sin in those cases in which, due to bad dispositions, it requires to be moved to an act accompanied by a defect according to the common laws of Providence, I concede; in cases where it does not require this, I deny. I say, therefore, that in those cases where God decrees not to aid the created will with special help, and yet to move it as required by its present dispositions, to an act accompanied by a defect, it will certainly sin, and in this decree, partly permissive and partly positive, God certainly knows the future sin. How and when the created will requires to be moved to a defective act, we will discuss when speaking about divine decrees.

You might counter: According to this solution, sin is not infallibly connected with the permissive decree unless a positive decree is added concerning the entity of the sin; but in this hypothesis, the permissive decree is unnecessary for God to know the future sin, therefore. The proof of the minor premise: if a positive decree concerning the entity of the sin, which inseparably includes its malice, such as the act of hatred toward God, is posited, then the sin of hatred toward God will certainly occur; therefore, the permissive decree is unnecessary, and "the Thomists deceive," says Tournelius, "when they propose it to avoid the harshness of such an opinion."

Response: I deny the minor premise. To the proof, I distinguish the antecedent: if a positive decree concerning the entity of the sin is posited, the sin will certainly occur by the power of this decree, I deny; by the power of the created will failing itself and permitted by the suspension of special help, I concede. Therefore, God, by decreeing the entity of the sin, neither decrees nor causes its malice, but merely tolerates and permits it, and in that permission, which is always presupposed for an effective decree, with that decree joined, God certainly knows the sin. Confer what I will say in dissertation 7, article 5 at the end.

You will reply: One who applies fire to flax would be inappropriately said to permit the combustion of the flax; therefore, similarly (God cannot be said to permit sin if He decrees the act).

Response: I deny the consequence. There is a disparity:

1º The combustion of the flax follows from the application of the fire as it is applied by a human, but the malice of sin does not follow from the entity of the sin as it is from God, but as it is from the created will. Therefore, God is said to permit and not to will the malice of sin, just as the soul moving a crooked leg is said to permit and not to will the limp, because the limp is not connected to the movement of the leg as it is from the soul, but as it is from the crookedness of the leg.

2º Another disparity is that in the fire applied to the flax, there remains no potentiality for the flax not to burn, whereas in the human moved to the act of sin, there remains the antecedent potentiality not to commit the act, and even more so not to commit the malice. This suffices for God to be considered as permitting the malice, of which He decrees the act. As in the opinion of the Molinists, God places a person in circumstances where, by His middle knowledge, He foresees they will sin; although they cannot avoid sinning by consequent potentiality and in a composite sense (otherwise God's knowledge would be fallible), they can avoid sinning by antecedent potentiality and in a divided sense, so God is considered only to permit and not to will the malice of sin.

3º There is nothing in the flax that moves a person, as a general provider, to apply fire to the improperly disposed flax, as the improperly disposed created will objectively moves God, as a general provider, to move it to the act of sin, having left it to itself and permitted it. This clearly includes a permissive decree.

From these points, it is evident that Thomists are not being deceptive, nor are they proposing the permissive decree to avoid the criticism of their seemingly harsher opinion. Therefore, Tournelius is wrong to reproach the Thomists for this without due consideration. But more on this when we discuss decrees in greater detail.

ARTICLE V.
ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF CONDITIONED FUTURE EVENTS: DOES GOD KNOW THEM CERTAINLY?

Note 1º: A conditioned future event, as we have observed before, is something that in reality will not happen but would happen if something else were to occur. It can be understood in two ways:

1) In an illative sense, such that "if" means "therefore," explaining the connection between the antecedent and the consequent.

2) In an enunciative sense, where "if" merely indicates the coexistence of the terms.

A conditional proposition taken in the illative sense is necessarily true or necessarily false, because its truth consists in a good inference; it is impossible for the antecedent to be true and the consequent to be false in a good inference. Thus, all contingent conditional propositions taken in the illative sense, such as: "If she is a mother, she loves her child"; "If Peter enters the court, he will sin"; "If Judas holds the purse, he will betray Christ," are false, because although both terms may be true, the consequent does not follow well from the antecedent by form, but only by matter. Conversely, those that are impossible, such as: "If a human is a horse, he is neighing"; "If a human flies, he has wings," are necessarily true, because even though both terms are false, the consequent follows well from the antecedent by form.

Conditioned future events taken in this illative sense are certainly known by God through His simple intelligence, there is no doubt, since, as I said, they are necessarily true or necessarily false. Therefore, the question concerns conditioned future events taken in the enunciative sense, where "if" only implies the coexistence of the terms. These can be distinguished into three types:

1) Those that have a necessary connection with the condition, such as: "If Peter sins, he will lose grace"; "If fire is applied to flax, it will burn."

2) Those that have only a contingent connection with the condition, such as: "If the Gospel is preached to the Tyrians, they will convert."

3) Those that have no connection with the condition at all, but are entirely disparate, such as: "If King Joash had struck the ground seven times, he would have destroyed Syria."

No one doubts that God certainly knows necessary conditioned future events, since we ourselves know them. Therefore, the difficulty remains about contingent and disparate conditioned future events.

Note 2º: Some of the older Thomists are said to have denied God certain knowledge of such conditioned future events, granting only conjectural knowledge, a claim propagated by the proponents of middle knowledge, who assert that they finally compelled the Dominican Fathers to admit this in the famous congregations on divine assistance, claiming victory on this point. However, our John of St. Thomas defends the older Thomists against this calumny, proving that they indeed admitted that God certainly knows the conditioned future events mentioned in Scriptures and those necessary for the governance of this

universe, though not all possible combinations, because they believed that God decrees nothing about them, and that God could only know them as future through His decree. Ledesma correctly stated that this was the common opinion among true Thomists, consistent with the Molinists in this respect.

The conjectural knowledge admitted by Thomists regarding these possible combinations, excluding decrees, does not pertain to God's knowledge but to the nature of the known object; that is, God knows the futurition of these combinations to be conjectural and probable, considering the order of secondary causes. But God knows this certainly, not conjecturally, just as He sees me forming an opinion and the object of my opinion, but He does not Himself form an opinion; rather, He certainly sees my opinion and the opinability of the object.

Even if we concede that one or another of the older Thomists held this view, it is certainly false that the Dominican Fathers upheld this view in the congregations on divine assistance; indeed, it is false that there was any controversy over this opinion in those congregations. This is clear from the rescript of Clement VIII presented to the congregation, which states: "Is it the opinion of St. Augustine that before the absolute decree of the divine will there is in God a certain and infallible knowledge of contingents dependent on a free cause, such as Molina attributes to God through middle knowledge?" You see, the question is not whether God certainly knows conditioned future events, but whether He knows them before the decree. And when Father Bastida, arguing for the Jesuits in the 33rd congregation, dwelt excessively on the abstruseness of this knowledge of conditioned future events in God, Father Thomas Lemos, representing the Dominicans, responded that Father Bastida had missed the crux of the difficulty, which lies in whether the knowledge of conditioned future events in God is before the absolute decree of the divine will, as Molina claims, which was also stated by Cardinal de Monopoli and Archbishop Armachanus.

Therefore, the Molinists falsely boast and claim a fictitious triumph in this matter. See John of St. Thomas at the cited place and Father Graveson, volume 3, letter p. 87.

I say: God certainly knows contingent and disparate future conditioned events. This is contrary to Cornejo, Curiel, Thyphanius of the Society, etc., who admit only conjectural knowledge in God regarding these matters.

Proof 1º: God has foretold many future conditioned events in the Scriptures that have no connection or only a contingent connection by themselves; however, it is blasphemous to say that God affirmed something as certainly future that He did not know to be certainly

future: therefore. Proof of the major premise: 1 Samuel 23, in response to David asking the Lord whether the Keilites would surrender him to Saul if he remained with them, the Lord responded: "They will surrender you" (that is, if you remain); 1 Kings 14, the Lord said to the sons of Israel: "You shall not go in unto them (the daughters of the nations) for they will surely turn your hearts after their gods"; 2 Kings 13, Elisha said to the king of Israel: "If you had struck the ground five, six, or seven times, you would have struck Syria until destruction"; Matthew 11, Christ said: "Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes." Add to this the promises that God made regarding transmitting original justice to the descendants of Adam if he did not violate the covenant; confirming the kingdom in the house of David if his descendants kept the law, and many others: therefore.

Confirmation: It cannot be denied that God had some knowledge of these future events; however, it was not conjectural or probable, as these are uncertain and subject to error, and thus unbecoming of God: therefore it was certain.

Proof 2º: From St. Augustine, in his book "On the Gift of Perseverance" chapter 9, where he says: "Can we say that even the Tyrians and Sidonians would not have believed or would not have repented if miracles had been performed among them, when the Lord himself testifies that they would have done penance in great humility if such signs had been performed among them?" Therefore, St. Augustine acknowledges that Christ certainly knew the conversion of the Tyrians if signs and miracles had been performed among them.

Proof 3: By reasoning: there are no conditioned future events in the Thomist view except through God's absolute decree on the part of the subject and conditional on the part of the object, as we will explain below; however, such a decree is certain and infallible: therefore, God, in that decree, knows these futures certainly and not conjecturally.

Objections are Addressed.

Objection 1: When the Holy Scripture speaks of future conditional events, it often uses phrases like "perhaps" or "possibly," as in Matthew 11: "If the miracles done in you had been done in Sodom, it might have remained until this day"; similarly elsewhere. These and similar phrases do not denote certain knowledge but only conjectural knowledge; therefore.

Response: To the major premise, in many instances, these phrases are not used. Sometimes, the opposite is used, such as "they will certainly turn your hearts." Deny the minor premise; these phrases, in these cases, do not denote doubt but rather either God

speaking in our manner, the mutability of free will, the contingency of secondary causes, the magnitude or difficulty of the matter, or reproof. This is taught by St. Jerome on Isaiah 26, and St. Augustine in Tractate 37 on John. Thus, when God said to Moses in Exodus 24, as if doubting: "You shall not take wives for your sons from their daughters, lest after they have played the harlot, they cause your sons to play the harlot with their gods," repeating the same in 1 Kings, He asserts it as certain: "They will certainly turn your hearts." From this, it is evident that phrases which literally imply doubt are not always taken as such in the Scriptures. Compare Article 2 of this dissertation.

Further Objection: The future conditional events mentioned in the Holy Scriptures can be considered as spoken tropically and with exaggeration. Thus, when Christ said in Matthew 11: "Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida," etc., as above, He did not mean to assert the future conversion of the Tyrians and Sidonians if the Gospel had been preached to them; He only intended to reprove the hardness of the Jews in comparison to the Tyrians and Sidonians, who would have been less hardened than they. Just as if a preacher said to Christian listeners: "If I were to preach among the Turks, they would be moved by my words," or as Christ Himself said in Luke 10: "If these (disciples) were silent, the stones would cry out"; He did not predict the future outcry of the stones, but intended to reprove the Pharisees, who were harder than stones, because they were not moved to praise God despite seeing so many signs and miracles as the disciples were. In such exaggerations, there is no lie, but a trope and a rhetorical figure. Therefore, nothing compels us to understand future conditionals mentioned in the Scriptures differently.

Response: This interpretation regarding the place in Matthew about the Tyrians and Sidonians is contrary to St. Augustine, who in the cited place says that the Tyrians and Sidonians would indeed have been converted if the Gospel had been preached to them, and that Christ attests to this: therefore, it is to be taken as certainly true and not as an exaggeration. Although it cannot be denied that God often uses metaphors in the Scriptures in the manner of men, nevertheless, with respect to future conditionals, some are predicted as certain, such as the apostasy of the Jews if they intermarry with the daughters of the nations. Furthermore, there are many instances where there is no place for tropes and metaphors. For example, what figure can be imagined when God said to David that the Keilites would surrender him to Saul if he remained with them?

You might respond: Some things predicted in Holy Scripture by the Prophets as future events were not truly future events but were predicted as future only to declare the disposition of secondary causes or to indicate some danger or similar occurrence. For example, in 2 Kings 20, Isaiah said to King Hezekiah, who was sick: "Set your house in order, for you shall die; you shall not recover." Yet Hezekiah lived for fifteen more years. Similarly, in Jonah 3, Jonah said: "Forty more days and Nineveh will be overturned," yet Nineveh was

not overturned. In these cases, nothing truly future was designated, but rather it was indicated that the king's illness was fatal and that the sins of the Ninevites deserved the destruction of their city. Therefore, one might argue similarly about other future events revealed in which we insist on. For example, in 1 Samuel 23, when David asked if the men of Keilah would surrender him to Saul if he stayed with them, the Lord answered, "They will surrender you." He did not mean to signify a future betrayal of David, which did not happen, but only the present disposition and will of the citizens who were contemplating betraying David.

Response: Distinguish the antecedent. Some things in Holy Scripture were predicted by the Prophets conditionally as future events, which indeed were not future; concede the antecedent. Some things were predicted simply as future events, which indeed were not future; deny the antecedent. This can be explained by St. Thomas: Prophecy is a participation in divine foreknowledge impressed upon the intellect of the Prophet through revelation. Divine foreknowledge considers future events in two ways: as they are in themselves, inasmuch as God sees them present; and as they are in their causes, inasmuch as God sees the order of causes to their effects. Future contingents, as they are in themselves and present to God in eternity, are determined to one outcome; but as they are in their causes, they are not thus determined and may happen otherwise. And although this double knowledge is always joined in the divine intellect, it is not always joined in prophetic revelation, because the impression made by a free agent does not always correspond to its power. Thus, sometimes prophetic revelation impresses a likeness of divine foreknowledge as it regards future contingents in themselves, and such events happen as they are prophesied, as in Isaiah 7: "Behold, a virgin shall conceive." Sometimes, however, prophetic revelation impresses a likeness of divine foreknowledge as it knows the order of causes to their effects, and then sometimes the event happens otherwise than prophesied, yet the prophecy does not involve falsehood. The sense of the prophecy is that the disposition of inferior causes, whether of natural causes or human actions, tends to produce such an effect, and such are the conditional prophecies mentioned in the objection. Therefore, the word of Isaiah saying, "You shall die and not live," means the disposition of your body is such as to lead to death. Similarly, Jonah 3: "Forty more days and Nineveh shall be overturned," means this is what its sins deserve, that it should be overturned.

Furthermore, the predictions of future events on which we insist are not thus conditional. For example, when the Lord told David that the men of Keilah would surrender him, it was not a threat but an answer to David's question. David did not ask whether the men of Keilah were considering or willing to surrender him, but whether they would actually surrender him: "Will the men of Keilah surrender me?"

Objection 2: St. Augustine, in the book "De Praedestinatione Sanctorum" chapter 14, explaining these words: "He was taken away so that wickedness might not change his understanding," says: "This is said according to the dangers of this life, not according to the foreknowledge of God, who foresaw what was to be, not what was not to be." And in "De Anima et ejus origine" book 1, chapter 12: "Foreknowledge is completely nullified if what is foreseen will not be." And St. Prosper, in his letter to St. Augustine, speaking of the Semi-Pelagians, says: "They invent future events that are not future, and in their new kind of absurdity, deeds that will not be done are foreknown, and foreknown deeds are not done." Therefore, [your argument is false].

Response: St. Augustine and St. Prosper do not simply deny the foreknowledge of conditional future events but only in the context of the Semi-Pelagians. The Semi-Pelagians claimed that God knows what infants, taken by an untimely death, would have done, good or evil, if they had lived longer, and that this foreknowledge moves Him to grant the grace of Baptism to some rather than others. St. Augustine and St. Prosper regard this as absurd and say that God does not punish or reward merits or demerits that neither exist nor will ever exist, such as the foreseen merits or demerits in infants dying prematurely, if they had lived longer. They assert that foreknowledge, in order to punish or reward, must be absolute or of absolute futures. Thus, they deny that "He was taken away so that wickedness might not change his understanding" was said according to absolute foreknowledge, which is required for rewarding or punishing. Similarly, they say that absolute foreknowledge would be nullified if what is foreseen does not happen, and it is absurd for deeds that will not be done to be foreknown by this absolute foreknowledge, which is for rewarding or punishing. Otherwise, it is clear from the proof of the conclusion that St. Augustine recognizes simple foreknowledge of conditional future events in God.

You will insist: St. Augustine not only says that "he was taken away so that wickedness might not change his understanding" was not said according to absolute foreknowledge as we understand it, but also adds that it was said according to the dangers of this life. Therefore, God knew according to the dangers of this life that wickedness would have changed the understanding of the one who was taken away if he had not been taken away. But knowing something according to the dangers of this life is not knowing it certainly, but only conjecturally; not everyone who is in danger of sinning actually sins. Therefore, at least St. Augustine recognizes only conjectural knowledge of contingent future events in God.

Response: I distinguish the minor premise. Knowing it according to the dangers of this life precisely and abstracting from any divine decree is not knowing it certainly but only conjecturally, I grant the minor premise. Knowing it according to the dangers of life as they

are subject to the divine decree ordaining or permitting, I deny the minor premise. The fact that there are dangers in human affairs and various evils follow from them does not happen nor is it foreseen except by divine disposition, ordaining or permitting those dangers; and St. Augustine does not deny this in that place, although he does not explain it, because he is entirely focused on refuting the absurdity of the Semi-Pelagians, who wanted God to judge the merits or demerits that someone would have had if they had lived.

Objection 3: It cannot be said by what knowledge God knows these conditional future events. He does not know them by the knowledge of simple understanding, because this only concerns mere possibilities and necessities; nor by the knowledge of vision, because this only concerns what is, was, or will be, and is actually present in eternity, which does not apply to conditional future events. But according to the Church Fathers and all theologians, except the Molinists, there is no other knowledge in God except the knowledge of simple understanding and vision. Therefore [your argument is false].

Response: Thomists are divided on this matter. Some say that conditional future events are known by God through the knowledge of vision. To the argument against this, they distinguish: the knowledge of vision concerns only those things that will be and are actually present in eternity, as far as it is formally the knowledge of vision, I grant; as far as it is free and concerning approval, I deny. In this sense, it concerns all free and contingent objects, whatever they may be. Others say these are known by the knowledge of simple understanding, because just as there is a double knowledge of vision in God, one natural and necessary, namely the vision of the divine essence, and another free, namely the intuitive vision of creatures, so there is a double knowledge of simple understanding, one natural and necessary which concerns mere possibilities, and a free one which concerns conditional future events. And when it is objected that the knowledge of simple understanding is said by St. Thomas and theologians to be necessary, they respond that it is said so because it is chiefly occupied with mere possibilities, which God knows naturally and necessarily.

From these two opinions, choose whichever you prefer, as it is a matter of terminology. For whether you say it is the knowledge of simple understanding or of vision, it makes no difference, provided you do not say it is independent of the actual divine decree, as the Molinists imagine it to be.

You will ask whether God certainly knows all conditional future things?

Response: As for conditional future things revealed in Holy Scripture, it is clear from what has been said that God knows them certainly. As for other things not revealed but which

pertain to the governance of this world and have an order to those things which will actually happen, such as these: for example, if Peter had not entered the praetorium, he would not have sinned; if Judas had not carried the purse, he would not have betrayed Christ; or even disparate things like if Peter runs, John will sit; if a goat jumps, a tree will flower—these things are commonly held by theologians to be certainly known by God as well. This is because with His most perfect Providence, He must foresee what in some way contributes to His perfection and has connection or order with those things that are foreseen. Moreover, because by the very fact that they are supposed to be in some way future, they are decreed by God, for nothing is future, even conditionally, in our view, except by decree, and in the decree He certainly knows them.

Therefore, the difficulty remains concerning conditional futures according to possible combinations in the order of things, for example, if in a possible world an animal were hungry, it would use this food. If in another world a tree were to flower, it would produce so many fruits. However, in our judgment, the question should not be posed about conditional futures according to possible combinations, but about the combinations themselves, because, as I have already observed, by the very fact that futures are supposed, they are supposed to be decreed and known in the decree. Hence, rather it should be asked whether God determines all possible combinations in the order of things, which pertains to the matter of decrees. Some deny this, thinking it sufficient that God established nothing about them, but only concluded under the sole possibility, estimating each part of the contingency as probable. Thus John of St. Thomas *De Scientia Dei*, disp. 20, article 2, reply to the second argument. Others believe that God determined each of the possible combinations, because otherwise, God's will would remain suspended, and His knowledge, which depends on His decree, would not be sufficiently complete. Thus Anthony Goudin, in Treatise 2 on the Will of God, question 2, article 1, conclusion 3, concerning which perhaps in its proper place.

ARTICLE VI.
ON MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.

§ I.
The Status of the Question is Presented.

Note 1: In the previous article, we mentioned that according to the common consensus of theologians, God certainly knows future conditional events that depend on free will. The outstanding question, celebrated among all in the schools, concerns the medium through which God knows these events.

Thomists, consistent with their principles, say that God knows these in His subjective absolute decree and objectively conditional decree, expressed thus: "I will that this happen if such a condition is present." For example, "I will that the Tyrians be converted if the Gospel is preached to them." Just as there is no absolute future except from God's simply absolute decree, so there is no conditional future except from God's objectively conditional decree. Just as God knows absolute futures in His absolute decree, so too does He know conditional futures in His conditional decree. We now suppose and later will prove that such decrees are conditioned by the object and absolute on the part of the subject.

The Fathers of the Society, regarding it as a horrendous monster, enormous, subversive of liberty, and injurious to divine sanctity, abhor this view. But if pressed to assign another medium, it is hard to find someone to believe; they quarrel among themselves, some advocating for the supercomprehension of secondary causes, others for a future decree, others for a created will left to itself, others for formal truth, others for objective contention. This situation verifies what our Gonet noted from St. Thomas, Lecture 4 in Chapter 4 of St. Dionysius's "De Divinis Nominibus," that "those who know the truth agree in one opinion, but those who are ignorant are divided by various errors." Understand this as referring to less true opinions, for we do not wish to mark our opponents' opinions with censure.

Thus, the Fathers of the Society unanimously agree since the time of Luis de Molina that God does not know free conditional futures through any actual absolute decree but knows them prior to such a decree; hence, they call this knowledge "middle," either because, as they say, it mediates between the knowledge of simple intelligence and the knowledge of vision, partaking of both. It is necessary on the part of God, as it precedes His decree, just like the knowledge of simple intelligence, and is free on the part of the object, as it concerns future contingencies, like the knowledge of vision. Or because it pertains to conditional futures which hold a middle ground between merely possible and absolute futures, or finally, if it pleases the heavens, because it is a means divinely devised to crush the heresies of the Lutherans and Calvinists, as some boast.

Note 2: Middle knowledge, according to its proponents, is the knowledge by which God, before the actual decree that determines the conditioned future of free actions, explores and foresees with certainty what the created will, due to its innate freedom, would do if placed in such or such circumstances with an offered indifferent aid: whether it would consent and act well, or dissent and act poorly. With this foresight, if He wishes it to consent and act well, He decides to place it in those circumstances in which He foresees it will consent and offer it an indifferent concurrence; if not, He decides to place it in other circumstances. In such an absolute decree, they say, God certainly knows the future

consent; however, this certainty, clearly, does not come from the efficacy of the decree, but from the prior conditioned knowledge.

I said, before the actual decree determining the conditioned futurition: because these theologians do not hesitate to admit a general decree in God to concur with free causes, if they wish or when they want to determine themselves to act: for, they say, God does not foresee future consent under a condition unless through concurrence. Although we previously said that a conditioned future is that whose condition would not be fulfilled, this middle knowledge according to the minds of its authors abstracts from whether the condition is fulfilled or not, if, according to them, God through it should be guided in forming His absolute decrees, which are about futures whose condition is to be fulfilled.

Note 3: Regarding the origin and genesis of middle knowledge, its advocates again dispute among themselves. Some want it to be the fortunate and not sufficiently praised offspring of Molina, unheard of in the schools until then. Others, more cautious lest its novelty be condemned, argue that it is very ancient and derived from the Fathers themselves, as do modern followers like Suárez. However, concerning the truth of the matter, we say it is neither an invention of Molina nor derived from the Fathers, but from the Semi-Pelagians, as evident from the writings of Sts. Prosper and Hilary to St. Augustine, of which we will refer to several fragments below, and especially from the principle of Faustus of Riez, leader of the Semi-Pelagians: "Unless foreknowledge explores, predestination decrees nothing," which he asserts in Book 2 of "De Natura et Libero Arbitrio," chapter 3, and repeats elsewhere.

Note 4: The Semi-Pelagians, however, misused middle knowledge by claiming that through it, God foresaw in the human will the basis from which He would be moved to grant grace to some rather than others; they believed that God could not decree grace to one over another without an unjust acceptance of persons, unless there was at least some initial faith on the part of the human will that moved towards it: whether this initial faith was placed in bare nature, or in nature assisted by some internal help, I do not dispute here but elsewhere. And when pressed with the example of infants taken by untimely death, to whom the grace of Baptism is granted to some and not to others, they said that God had foreseen what good or evil they would have done had they reached adulthood, and was thus moved to confer the grace of Baptism to these rather than those. Modern proponents of middle knowledge reject this use, or rather misuse, of middle knowledge; they do not want the foreknowledge of a conditionally foreseen good work to be a motivating cause for God to grant grace to some rather than others, as is clear, they say, in the case of the Tyrians and Sidonians, whom God foresaw would convert if the Gospel were preached to them, yet He chose not to have it preached.

Note 5: Outside of the Society, there are few who defend middle knowledge. Among these few, Honoratus Tournely, a Parisian doctor, recently appeared in his lectures on God, question 16, article 5, presenting himself as uncommitted to any party. "We," he says, "setting aside all partisan zeal, will turn the matter both ways, subjecting each system to scrutiny, seeing what each entails, what difficulties it presents, what objections arise, and what responses are typically offered from each side, briefly and succinctly touching on them. This way, we will avoid the fault of those who, when they take it upon themselves to defend one opinion over another, so suppress and often distort the opposite that it is hardly recognizable by its own proponents."

Who would not then firmly believe that Tournely, according to his given word, truly setting aside partisan zeal, would present both the Molinist and Thomist systems equally and fairly according to their respective merits? But how far from the truth! The new recruit tries everything to overthrow the Thomistic school and raise a trophy for Molinism. If we are to believe him, "the arguments (of the Molinists against the Thomists) are most substantial both in number and weight"; on the other hand, Thomist arguments against the Molinists "often arise either from prejudices of a preoccupied mind or from ignorance of the system of middle knowledge. Enemies of middle knowledge invent monsters to more easily defeat it: arguments against middle knowledge from its inconveniences are vain and merely concocted, which might sell and gain traction among the unlearned masses, but not among discerning theologians." Objections against middle knowledge are "malicious, inept." The way Thomists reconcile freedom with divine decrees and grace is "complicated, obscure, vague, undetermined, bringing no light to our minds," in fact, "it further complicates and obscures the matter, and seems unsuitable, indeed more harmful, for explaining the concord of freedom with grace. It is proven false and fully refuted" by the history of the Auxiliis by P. Serry through another extensive history by P. Meyer. Know the lion by its claw. Moreover, he cautiously disguises the more robust principles of our school, and those he does mention, he weakens and undermines. Molinist responses he treats as if they were oracles from a tripod, while Thomist responses he dismisses as meager and cold; he praises Molinists everywhere, approves and supports them, but criticizes Thomists everywhere, disdains, disapproves, and with the utmost cunning, he almost always allows the Molinists to have the last word, so that, with the Thomists silenced, they appear victorious. Thus Tournely upholds his integrity. Thus, setting aside all partisan zeal, he turns the matter both ways.

Therefore, that this recent writer, contrary to the common and ancient sentiment of his school, has defected to the Molinists, we do not complain, as someone from our ranks already said, for everyone is free to defend opinions not yet condemned by the Church. But that he seems to proceed less sincerely than appropriate in this regard, pretending to be a Molinist thoroughly while claiming to be uncommitted to any side, perhaps under this

guise believing himself to have a license to dare anything with impunity for the Molinist school against the Thomistic, and by this cunning art, he gains greater authority for his boldness, cannot and should not be endured by any discerning Thomist. Therefore, no one should rightly be upset if I confront this theologian or pure Molinist with all my might, and pursue whatever he puts forth in the name of Molinists as his own.

§ II.

The deviations and evasions of Honoratus Tournely regarding the notion of middle knowledge are briefly corrected.

Middle knowledge is defined by Tournely, along with others, as "*the knowledge of conditionals independent of any absolute and efficacious decree, and prior to it.*" (Art. 5 § What is middle knowledge.) However, he coats this common notion of middle knowledge with so many embellishments, wraps it in so many equivocations, and restricts it with so many exceptions that it is hardly recognizable. You would think he is embarrassed to defend this cause openly.

I. Thus, the Molinian doctor wants the following to be removed from the system of middle knowledge: 1) that grace is preempted by free will; 2) that something should be attributed to the will from the sole forces of nature by which it distinguishes itself; 3) that preceding grace only moves the will morally and objectively, and not effectively through physical influence; 4) that the good work is partly from free will and partly from grace; 5) that free will operates by nature before grace cooperates. "With these excluded and rejected (and not otherwise), we do not refuse to defend and champion middle knowledge." That is, he does not refuse to defend a chimera that he has concocted for himself. (Q. 16 on the Knowledge of God, Art. 5 § School Opinions n. 4.)

Therefore, regarding the first point: in the system of middle knowledge, grace precedes free will in terms of the offer, but is preempted by free will in terms of causality; indeed, according to Tournely's definition of middle knowledge, before God actually wills that a man consent to grace, He sees him consenting by innate liberty: therefore, God's will or His grace is not the cause why a man consents, but the man's consent is the cause why grace cooperates or concurs. And from the second point, it follows that the consent of the will foreseen by God should be attributed to the sole forces of nature, and by this the human will distinguishes itself, as I will discuss below; for the offered concurrence, note well, does not determine the will to consent effectively by its own force, but concurs with the will to the effect once consent is given; hence, although the effect is partially from the concurring God, the consent of the will itself is not from God, but from nature.

Regarding the third point, it is merely an equivocation to avoid the disrepute of this opinion. The aid of preceding grace in the system of middle knowledge physically moves towards undeliberated acts of enlightening the mind and stirring the will towards good; but as for the deliberate consent of the will to the divine motion or stirring, it only moves morally. Thus, Tournely himself in his discussions on Grace, q. 9 art. 1, which he prudently concealed here to deceive. Regarding the fourth point, it is another equivocation. In the system of middle knowledge, the good work is partly from free will, partly from grace, not in the partiality of the effect, but in the partiality of the cause, just as the passive towing of a ship is partly from two horses partially pulling, not in the partiality of the effect but of the cause. Thus says Molina himself, thus commonly the Molinists, and most recently Livinus Meyer, a vehement defender of middle knowledge in his entire dissertation 1 on the Mind of the Council of Trent. Regarding the fifth, from the above it is clear that free will operates by nature before grace cooperates, because grace does not cooperate unless free will has first determined itself by nature.

II. Ibid. Tournely acknowledges Lessius admitting that grace can be called efficacious in the second act from the consent of the will itself: "Indeed," he says, "because grace plays the principal and most distinguished roles in good supernatural work, in our judgment, it is far more fitting and worthy to commend the power of grace that it should be stated plainly and absolutely that free will does not make grace efficacious in the second act." Let him then say by whom it is made efficacious in the second act, not by itself, not by intrinsic force, for that is abhorrent to Tournely along with the Molinists, therefore by another: but from whom else, if not from the very consent of the will? And this very thing which this doctor denies here, he openly teaches elsewhere. Indeed, in his treatise on Grace, q. 9 a. 2 n. 3, after explaining various modes of grace's congruity, speaking of the congruity as commonly upheld by the Fathers of the Society, he says: "If the congruity of grace is merely external and presupposes the use of middle knowledge, grace does not seem to be efficacious by itself, but by the consent of the will, at least as said, in the second act; nor does that opinion differ from that which Molina defends." Molina had previously taught that grace is efficacious in the second act from the consent or cooperation of the will. You see how Tournely plays and toys with his readers, denying and affirming the same thing as it suits his purposes. Is it intentional? I do not judge.

III. Ibid. he contends it is fabricated to incite envy to say that in the system of middle knowledge, grace is versatile and subject to free will. By versatile grace and subject to free will, we understand the divine concurrence to be indifferent and undetermined, flexible in either direction by free will. Such concurrence is essential to middle knowledge, through which God indeed explores what the created will would do under an indifferent concurrence offered by innate freedom: whether good or evil, prepared to concur in

whatever it decides to determine; and this phrase is common among defenders of this system: "I say," P. Annatus asserts in dis. 4 cap. 3 § 2 n. 58, "free causes require that if God wants to accommodate their freedom, he should offer them indifferent and undetermined concurrence, as if to say: I want to concur in one of the opposite acts; or: I want to concur in such a way that the freedom of such a cause is attributed to whether it is an act rather than not an act." Some, whom Tournely calls fabricated to incite envy, express this in the most formal terms: "It must be admitted," says Lessius in a defensive tract on Grace, c. 4 n. 16 cited by Serry in Schol. Thom. Vind. animadv. 37, "that God most certainly foresees to which action the created will is to determine itself and what concurrence it will have from the general hypothesis, IF I PLACE MY CONCURRENCE IN ITS POWER." And in c. 18. n. 4: "For the aid to be said to have efficacy in the second act, it awaits the consent of the will to WHICH IT IS SUBJECTED, so that this efficacy somehow depends on the use of the will." P. Chrystophorus Ortega in contro. 3. de Decreto disp. 2. q. 4. competition 3., presents God forming a decree: "I decree to concur in an action, even a depraved one or its opposite, or not to concur in it at the whim of the created will; that is, I externally prepare and SUBMIT my omnipotence for concurrence or non-concurrence, for the created will to use, just as with infused habits, which I emit adhering to supernatural acts." And in cert. 4. n. 6: "God by his decree applies and SUBMITS the activity of his omnipotence to the discretion of the created will..... And with it applied and SUBJECTED to his discretion, he uses the activity of omnipotence." And n., 7: "God SUBMITS the activity of his omnipotence to the discretion of the created will, and to its free DETERMINATION." These assertions were proscribed by Innocent XI on November 23, 1679.

IV. Ibid. § The fifth point, says that there is nothing falser, nothing more alien to the correct philosophy, nothing more absurd than to say that in the system of middle knowledge the will determines grace, since it itself is a certain determination. Let those we cited in the previous number respond to this rebuke. Let all who admit indifferent concurrence respond, because if it is indifferent, it needs to be determined, and all defenders of middle knowledge admit this. To add more, hear again from Annatus, there, number 60, introducing God as forming the object of middle knowledge: "If I wish to concur indeterminately or indifferently with the will towards an act or non-act, in these circumstances, it will happen according to its freedom that I concur determinately to the act." Hence, n. 68: "If anyone infers that in that concurrence of God and the creature to a single effect... God is not the cause of why one happens over another, but rather this should be attributed to the created will, we will not resist." Also hear from Platelius, a recent writer of the Society, chapter 4 on the Will of God § 2 n. 166: "This decree," he says, "about providing secondary causes concurrence in the first act... exhibits God's power indifferently to any free cause, leaving it full power to determine itself and use the power of God now committed to it, in the second act to either side of the contradiction as it pleases." What then does the new Molinist preach to us? But, he says, grace itself is a certain

determination. Indeed, preceding grace is a certain determination insofar as it morally excites the will determinately towards good; but this does not prevent God in the system of middle knowledge from presenting himself ready to concur with whatever the will determines, and this needs to be determined by the will. Moreover, Tournely himself says there, preceding grace determines the will, like a habit, e.g., of charity. But who does not know that the habit of charity habitually inclines the will towards its object, but must be determined by it to concur here and now with the act of love?

V. Ibid. He says in the system of middle knowledge it seems a fictitious hypothesis in which, given equal grace to two individuals, one consents and the other does not. Yet Molina admits this hypothesis in concord. q. 14 a. 13 disp. 12 § From the statements; and q. 23 a. 4 and 5 disp. 1 memb. 11 § Finally. This is admitted by Suarez, Bellarmine, a book of the Society on the Rationale of Studies at Lemosium tom. 1 tract. 6 cap. 23. Tournely himself did not deny it just before in § The first point. Indeed, if grace is not efficacious in itself but from something external, why would this hypothesis imply? But I suspect the escape that he soon hints at: "In the system of middle knowledge," he says, "he who consents always obtains greater grace from God in terms of the gift, though perhaps not greater in terms of aid; therefore, he consents because God, out of pure mercy, chose that grace for him, foreseeing that he would consent if it were given, which cannot be said of the other who does not consent." Well: therefore at least the hypothesis of equality of grace in terms of aid and moving power in two individuals, one of whom converts, the other does not, is not fictitious. That suffices for us. Moreover, while God through middle knowledge sees this one will consent to grace, which the other is foreseen not to consent to, at that time the grace is completely equal, because it is not yet about grace in terms of a gift, but that only comes later through an absolute decree: thus, God sees under completely equal grace one consenting, the other not: therefore, this hypothesis is not fictitious in the system of middle knowledge. Finally, observe the coherence of the arguments, when he argues against us from the reproach of the Jews over the Tyrians, he assumes completely equal grace on both sides, otherwise, he says, the reproach would be unjust; but when we argue against him from the hypothesis of equal grace, the hypothesis is fictitious; indeed, a convenient method of extricating himself from difficulties!

We will correct other fictions and dissimulations of Tournely as they occur. Thus, having set these premises in advance, we attack middle knowledge with every kind of argument.

§ III.
Middle knowledge is challenged by the authority of Scripture.

The Apostle in 1 Corinthians 4 states: "Do not go beyond what is written. One should not have an inflated opinion of one over another. For who makes you different from anyone else? What do you have that you did not receive? And if you did receive it, why do you boast as though you did not?" From this I argue as follows: According to the Apostle, the distinction between one person and another should be attributed not to human will, but to God, who differentiates one from another through His grace. Yet, middle knowledge assumes that one distinguishes himself from another, such as Peter from Judas, by his own will; therefore, it is flawed.

Let us suppose that Peter and Judas are graced equally in identical circumstances. God sees Peter consenting to this grace and thus distinguishing himself from Judas, who does not consent, not because of the grace, for it is equally and indifferently offered to both; therefore, it is due to the determination of his own will to accept the grace.

To confirm: if Peter consents to the grace under identical circumstances as Judas, this consent comes either from God granting it or from his own will. If the consent comes from God granting it, then before God decides to give this consent, this consent would not be forthcoming, nor could God foresee it as forthcoming, thus middle knowledge fails. If, however, Peter's consent comes from his own will, then he possesses what he did not receive and thus distinguishes himself from Judas, contrary to the Apostle's teaching.

Molinists twist and turn to extricate themselves from this argument. Response 1 by Tournely: Although the grace is assumed to be equal, the one who consents should not be said to distinguish himself from the other because he does not consent without grace, without which he could not act rightly. Yet, the distinction should always be ascribed to the nobler and principal cause.

Against the first response, the already given argument is reinstated: what is equal in two does not distinguish one from the other; this is self-evident. However, in the case of the argument, it is assumed that grace is equal in Peter who consents and Judas who does not. But it is peculiar to Peter that he consents to the grace; therefore, Peter is distinguished from Judas not by the equal grace, but by what he himself adds, namely his consent and the use of grace. For example, if a king provides equal weapons to Peter and Judas, and Peter wins by using his, while Judas loses by choosing not to use his; although Peter would not have won without weapons, he is not said to have received everything from the king, nor is he distinguished from the defeated Judas by the king's gift, but by his own effort of virtue. So it is in our case.

Against the second response, if it is said that Peter is only distinguished by grace and receives everything from it because it does not operate without his partial cooperation, it

can equally be said that grace is distinguished by Peter and receives from him, because it also does not operate without Peter's partial cooperation. Thus, the rights of Peter and grace would be equal, and as he is distinguished by grace, so it is distinguished by Peter, which is contrary to the Apostle.

What Tournely adds, that the distinction should be ascribed to the nobler and principal cause: firstly, I deny that in the system of middle knowledge, grace is the principal cause as if the will is its instrument, but rather, grace and the created will are two partial causes, as mentioned. In partial causes, each contributing its own, whether nobler or less noble, more or less contributing, retains its own praise for the degree of causality and influence on the effect. Secondly, granted that the distinction should be ascribed to the nobler and principal cause, not just in terms of dignity but also in terms of causality and influence, it would follow that the will rather distinguishes grace than grace the will: since in that system the will determines grace and not grace the will, and since distinction is chiefly made by determination, it follows not that grace distinguishes the agent from the non-agent, but rather the man, by his own consenting, distinguishes his grace from the grace of the non-consenting, making it fruitful in himself, which remains barren in another.

In response, the Jesuits of Douai in their Dictations of 1723 assert that only grace discerns by radical, not formal, distinction: "For," they say, "it is not without Titius acting that he consents to the grace which Caius resists; and it is solely by the good pleasure of God that He calls him in such a manner as He knows suits him, not the other."

Against the first point, this response remains refuted by what has been said. That which is equal in two does not distinguish, nor even radically, one from the other. And although this grace was given by the sole pleasure of God, knowing how it would fit to consent, it did not thereby grant consent but awaited it from the creature, about which it consequently boasts as its own. Therefore,

Against the second point, this response falls to the argument and clearly contradicts the Apostle when it admits that a consenting person formally distinguishes themselves through their own consent. Thus, that person could answer the Apostle who asks: "Who makes you different?" I distinguish myself formally at least and most significantly. "What do you have that you did not receive?" I have consent that I did not receive from grace, but from myself. But did God foresee your consent, and call you in a manner He knew you would consent? Even so, He did not give consent, nor is it any less mine, and in this, I boast and distinguish myself.

Furthermore, if God is the author of consent and distinguishes the consenting from the non-consenting by granting them grace in the circumstances in which He foresaw they

would consent, it can equally be said that He is the author of dissent regarding the dissenting, by granting them grace in circumstances where He foresaw they would dissent; something that cannot be claimed.

Father Annatus responds that the Apostle there does not speak of the supernatural gifts of divine grace, but of the natural gifts of wisdom and eloquence in which some excelled others in proclaiming the Gospel, and hence were puffed up and despised others.
However, I deny Father Annatus's assumption. Although the Apostle spoke these words on the occasion of those who boasted of natural gifts, his words are not restricted only to these but are general, and apply to any gifts, whether natural or supernatural; he makes no exceptions: "What do you have that you did not receive?" Thus, he intended to lay the foundation of total Christian humility and guard us against any vain glory, whether regarding natural or supernatural things. This is how interpreters understand it, including among the Holy Fathers, Ambrose, Theodoret, Anselm in Tirinus. Indeed, Saint Augustine in "De Praedestinatione Sanctum," c. 5, and "De Spiritu et Littera," c. 34, and the Second Council of Orange, canon 6, take this general statement of the Apostle specifically regarding distinction through grace. Indeed, it would be paradoxical in Christian religion that a man cannot boast about natural goods and can boast about supernatural goods, as if the supernatural were of his own and the natural were from God.

Following this authority of the Apostle, Saint Cyprian in Saint Augustine's "De Praedestinatione Sanctum," c. 3, says: "There is nothing to boast about when nothing is ours." And Saint Basil in Homily 22 on Humility says: "Nothing is left to you, O man, about which you can boast, for we live entirely in the grace and gift of God."

Many other places in Holy Scripture could be cited against middle knowledge, but, aiming for brevity, we note only these. The Apostle in Ephesians 1 says God chose us, not because we were going to be holy, but that we should be holy; 1 Corinthians 12: God works all things; Philippians 2: works to will: but if He chose us to be holy, therefore, before He chose, He did not know us to be holy, even with the aid of grace, to preempt Tournely's evasion. If He works all things and even the will itself, then He gives the will and consent; if so, how can He know the future before deciding to give it?

Tournely responds that He works to will because without the grace He freely grants, we do not want the good. But I ask: either grace determines my will to want and consent, or the consensus of the will determines grace to concur with me. If the first, we have our intended result, and God cannot foresee the future consent unless in the will to give that determining and efficient grace; if the second: therefore, the consent of grace is not from grace but from me.

§ IV.
The Views of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Regarding Middle Knowledge.

Leaving aside many Fathers whom we have praised in the previous section against middle knowledge, we primarily seek the mind of St. Augustine, because his doctrine in this matter, especially as conveyed in the books "On the Predestination of the Saints" and "On the Gift of Perseverance," represents the doctrine of the Church. This is in accordance with what Pope Hormisdas wrote to Possessor: "The Roman Church's views on grace and free will can be known from the works of St. Augustine to Hilary and Prosper." This is also evident from the fact that Clement VIII in the famous congregations on Grace ordered Molina's doctrine of middle knowledge to be weighed according to the mind of St. Augustine, as we saw in the preceding article.

I assume as certain that Sts. Hilary and Prosper, in their letters to St. Augustine, presented middle knowledge from the perspective of the Semi-Pelagians.

St. Prosper in his letter to St. Augustine states: "This is their (the Semi-Pelagians) definition and profession... That those who will believe, or who will remain in the faith which thereafter should be aided by God's grace, were foreseen by God before the foundation of the world and predestined to His kingdom, whom, being called freely, He foresaw as worthy of the election, and foreseeing they would depart this life with a good end... However, this purpose of God's calling (that is the decree that St. Augustine admitted), whether made before the beginning of the world or at the creation of mankind itself, speaks of a selection of those to be chosen and rejected... And to deny the fallen the care to rise again, and to give the saints an opportunity for tepidity... To remove all diligence, and take away virtues, if God's decree anticipates human wills; and under this name of predestination, introduce some kind of fatal necessity."

And lest you say there it only speaks of absolute foreknowledge, St. Prosper shortly adds: "And when among these, the multitude of countless infants is objected, who, except for original sin... having yet no wills, no personal actions, are distinguished by God's judgment so that before discerning good from evil, by being taken from the use of this life, some are made heirs of the heavenly kingdom through regeneration, others pass without baptism into perpetual death, such are said to perish or to be saved, as divine knowledge foresaw they would be in their later years, if they were preserved to an active age." Likewise, when they are pressed by the example of many nations to whom the Gospel was proclaimed and to others it was not: "Foreseen by the Lord to believe, and to each nation, times and ministries of teachers were so dispensed that the arising faith of good wills would occur."

Here in these two examples is most clearly foreknowledge of conditional futures prior to the decree.

Similarly, St. Hilary in his letter to Augustine says: "When it is said to them (the Semi-Pelagians) why it is preached to some and not others... they say, it is by divine foreknowledge, that at that time, and there, and to those, the truth was announced, or will be announced, when and where it was foreknown to be believed." They tried to support this with the testimonies of the Fathers, especially St. Augustine; hence immediately St. Hilary adds: "And this they prove not only by the testimonies of other Catholics but also by your earlier discussions of holiness... As is that which your holiness said in the dispute against Porphyry about the timing of the Christian religion, that Christ wished to appear to men, and have His doctrine preached among them, when and where He knew there would be those who would believe in Him."

Therefore, St. Prosper at the end of his letter explicitly asks St. Augustine to explain how the preceding decree over our wills (which the Semi-Pelagians did not want to admit) does not harm freedom; or rather, whether the decree rests on foreknowledge. Finally, to respond to the objection raised from his and other Fathers' testimonies: "I beg, that you would deign to explain... how through this pre-operating and cooperating grace, free will is not hindered. Then whether the foreknowledge of God remains according to the plan (that is, the decree), so that the very things which are proposed, are to be understood as foreseen; or do they vary by the kinds of causes and the types of persons; because the vocations are diverse, in those who would do nothing to be saved (that is, infants) it seems only the purpose of God exists; in those, however, who will act well, can the purpose stand by foreknowledge? Or indeed uniformly, although foreknowledge cannot be divided from the temporal distinction of the plan, is foreknowledge nevertheless supported by the plan... Also demonstrate how this can be resolved (here he touches on the objection drawn from the testimonies of the Fathers) that by revisiting the earlier opinions on this matter, almost all are found to hold a common sentiment in which they accepted God's purpose and predestination according to foreknowledge, so that for this reason God made some vessels of honor, others of dishonor, because He foresaw the end of each and under the very help of grace in which he would be in will and action foreseen?"

From all this, it is clear that Sts. Prosper and Hilary proposed middle knowledge, or the knowledge of conditional futures before the decree, to St. Augustine from the perspective of the Semi-Pelagians. Now it falls to us to prove that St. Augustine disapproved of it, not only in terms of abuse, or as far as it presents God with a motive for granting or denying grace—this the Molinists concede—but also that he disapproved of it in substance, that is, he taught that there is no knowledge in God of future contingents, both absolute and

conditional, independently of an absolute and actual decree, abstracting from the abuse or use to which it can be applied. We prove this in multiple ways from the books "On the Predestination of the Saints" and "On the Gift of Perseverance," in which the Doctor responds to Sts. Prosper and Hilary.

Prob. 1°: St. Augustine, in his book "On the Predestination of the Saints", chapter 9, responding to an objection raised by the Semi-Pelagians—derived from his previous statements in "Six Questions of the Pagans Against Porphyry" or Epistle 49, Question 2, where he seemed to suggest middle knowledge—states: "That statement of mine in the work against Porphyry, titled 'On the Time of the Christian Religion,' which you recall I made, was done so as to bypass a more thorough and laborious discussion on grace, not because it was irrelevant, but because I chose not to explain it there, where others could or might explain it." After citing what he had said in that work against Porphyry, he adds: "Do you see that I intended to speak of Christ's foreknowledge without prejudicing the hidden counsel of God or other causes, merely to suffice for refuting the infidelity of the pagans who had raised this question? For what is truer than that Christ foresaw who and when and in which places would believe in Him? But whether, once Christ was preached to them, they would have faith from themselves or would receive it as a gift from God—whether He merely foresaw them or also predestined them—I thought it unnecessary to inquire and discuss at that time. Thus, what I said—that Christ wished to appear to men and have His doctrine preached among them when and where He knew there would be believers—could also be stated as Christ wishing to appear and have His doctrine preached when and where He knew there would be those chosen in Him before the foundation of the world. However, because if it were said in this way, it would make the reader attentive to inquire into things which, due to the admonition of Pelagian error, must now be discussed more thoroughly and laboriously; I thought it sufficient at that time to say it briefly, setting aside, as I mentioned, the depth of God's wisdom and knowledge and without prejudice to other causes, which I thought should be discussed more opportune at another time."

And in the book "On the Gift of Perseverance", chapter 9, while explaining Matthew 11: "If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Tyre and Sidon," which is a primary foundation of the opponents and where they claim the mention of a conditional future occurs, St. Augustine says: "Certainly, we cannot say about Tyre and Sidon (what I previously stated in the mentioned work against Porphyry about the pagans, that Christ did not wish to appear to them because He foresaw they would not believe) and in these instances, we recognize that these divine judgments pertain to those causes of predestination, without the prejudice of those hidden causes, which I said were not addressed at that time." From this, St. Thomas in Summa Theologica Part 3, Question 1, Article 5, response 2, addressing the difficulty of why Christ did not come in earlier

centuries and referring to Augustine's response in "Six Questions of the Pagans," states that Augustine disapproved of this position in chapter 9 of "On the Gift of Perseverance."

It is most certain and clear that St. Augustine, in these cited locations, speaks of conditional futures. As for the last location, the opponents concede, and it is clear in both instances; he speaks of futures about which he had spoken in the frequently cited book "Six Questions of the Pagans," namely who would believe and who would not, if Christ appeared under these or other circumstances. It is also certain, either here he disapproves of the knowledge of conditionals that he had admitted in "Six Questions of the Pagans," as St. Thomas wants and is clear from his words: "We cannot say about Tyre and Sidon what we said about the pagans in 'Six Questions of the Pagans,' or at least he does not admit it unless it presupposes predestination or decree," because he wanted this to have been said by him at that time without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God. It is equally certain that St. Augustine in the earlier book "Six Questions of the Pagans" did not teach middle knowledge as to its abuse or that which would provide God with a motive for granting grace or performing a good work without grace; not only because this question was not dealt with against the pagans but also because it would have been erroneous and Semi-Pelagian. Yet, St. Augustine does not say that what he said there was erroneous, but only that he did not explain the deeper causes of this statement. Therefore, it is most certain and evident that St. Augustine in "On the Predestination of the Saints" and "On the Gift of Perseverance" disapproved of middle knowledge, not only as to its abuse but also as to its substance.

Tournely responds that St. Augustine nowhere revoked what he had written in "Questions of the Pagans" but merely explained and declared that he did not teach that the grace of faith was given by God in time to those whom He had foreknown from eternity would believe, whether from grace or from some pious natural disposition towards believing; rather, he wrote this without prejudice to the hidden counsel of God, that is, the predestination by which He decides to whom He will give the grace of faith.

To the authority of St. Thomas, Thomas himself responds by referring to the entire passage of St. Augustine, which consists of two parts. In the first part, St. Augustine says that Christ wanted to appear to people when and where He knew there would be those who would believe in Him. In the last part, however, he says that all those to whom He did not come would be foreseen by God as unbelievers if He had come to them. After quoting this, St. Thomas adds: "But St. Augustine, disapproving of this response, said in 'On Perseverance': 'Can we say that the Tyrians and Sidonians, upon seeing such miracles among them, would not have believed, or would have not believed, when God Himself attests to them that they would perform great acts of humility and repentance if such divine signs of virtue were performed for them.' It is clear from these words of St. Augustine that only the last part of the text quoted by St. Thomas is disapproved of, not the first. Therefore...

However, the first part of St. Augustine's earlier words from "On Predestination of the Saints" directly contradict this. For instance, St. Augustine says: "But whether those to whom Christ preached would have faith by themselves or would receive it as a gift from God? etc." With these words, he indicates that he does not acknowledge foreknowledge independently from the decree; for here, and often elsewhere, St. Augustine uses the term "predestination" in a broader sense, referring to any decree. Moreover, Tournely's response is more clearly refuted by what St. Thomas says in the second instance from "On Perseverance," where he expressly states that he cannot say about Tyre and Sidon what he said about the pagans in "Questions of the Pagans," namely, that Christ did not want to appear to those whom He foresaw would not believe; however, he did not say in "Questions of the Pagans" that God grants or denies the grace of faith based on the foresight of consent or dissent, which would be an abuse of middle knowledge among the Semi-Pelagians. Therefore, St. Augustine expressly disapproves of what he said in "Questions of the Pagans."

Against the second point, St. Augustine's retraction also affects the first part of his proposition taken from "Six Questions of the Pagans." For if, as St. Thomas acknowledges here, Christ did not want His Gospel to be preached to the Tyrians and Sidonians, whom He nevertheless knew would believe, then it cannot stand that he generally said in the first part of the proposition that He wanted to appear to those He knew would believe, since He knew that the Tyrians and Sidonians would believe but He chose not to appear to them.

Regarding the third point, in "On the Gift of Perseverance," chapter 17, responding to the question of St. Hilary, "Are those things foreseen by God also predestined by Him, so that foreknowledge is based on the decree?"—which is precisely the question of middle knowledge regarding substance—St. Augustine establishes as a principle and general rule that if our good works are not predestined by God, "He neither gave them nor knew that He would give them; but if He both gave them and knew that He would give them, He certainly predestined them." And in "On Predestination of the Saints," chapter 10, he says: "By predestination, God foreknew those things which He Himself would do." However, with this established general principle, middle knowledge, according to which goods related to the calling of the elect are foreseen by God but not predestined, cannot stand. To make this clearer, I argue thus: if Peter is placed in these circumstances, he will consent to grace rather than dissent, either by God's giving or by innate freedom of will; if it is by God's giving, according to St. Augustine's principle, it could not have been foreseen before or outside the decree, and thus there is no middle knowledge, at least concerning that consent. If it is not by God's giving but by innate freedom, then what is most conducive to salvation, namely, consenting to grace rather than rejecting it, will not be a gift of God but a fruit of free will; this is not only against St. Augustine but also against faith.

With these and many other principles of St. Augustine, which we omit for the sake of brevity, and some of which will be revisited later, especially concerning the drawbacks of middle knowledge, the adversaries are effectively countered.

1° They say that when St. Augustine rejects foreknowledge of good works that is prior to the decree, he is talking about absolute foreknowledge or of absolute futures, not conditional ones. This is the view of Tournely and his followers.
However, against this, firstly, this response clearly contradicts the texts of St. Augustine cited in the first proof, as we showed there. Secondly, St. Augustine, in teaching that foreknowledge of the future is founded on a decree, or by rejecting foreknowledge prior to the decree, either always spoke of absolute futures, never of conditional ones, or sometimes of conditional ones; if the latter is true, then our point stands, and the aforementioned response falls. If the former, then St. Augustine omitted responding to the main difficulty posed to him by St. Prosper at the end of his letter from the Semi-Pelagians, namely whether uniformly, that is in both adults and infants about whom there was a certain conditional future, foreknowledge is somehow based on a decree? Thirdly, the Molinists are misleading here by distinguishing between absolute and conditional futures, since in their principles, not even absolute futures are known to God in His actual decree, but either in the supercomprehension of causes, or in a future decree, or in formal or objective truth, or in His essence as the intelligible species in representing the infinite, as we saw in article 4 of this dissertation. Indeed, in that system neither the decree of concurring called the concurrence in the first act, nor the concurrence itself in the second act can be the reason for knowing determinately a free act whether absolutely or conditionally future, as frankly admits and proves P. Annatus in Disp. 4 on Middle Knowledge, Chap. 3 § 2, n. 62. "For," he says, "if taken in the second act, that concurrence is the very thing known" (for it is identified with the concurrence of the creature). "But if taken in the first act as the decree to concur, its supposition is indeed the reason without which nothing can be known as conditionally and freely future; but it is not the reason for knowing this future rather than that" (because it is a decree to concur at the whim of the created will and dependent on its determination). "Nor is there any other such reason: for such free futures, whether absolute or conditional, have nothing in them that is the reason for them to be seen determinately; therefore they are said to be seen in their present state which they either have if they are absolute, or would have, if they are conditional." And yet, take note, not only did St. Augustine say that goods foreseen by God are predestined by Him, but also that God foresees them in His predestination or decree.

2° They respond that St. Augustine in these and other places rejected middle knowledge in the Semi-Pelagians only as to its abuse.

But against this, 1° this response, like the previous one, is challenged based on what was stated in the first proof, see there; 2° it is refuted by the general principles of St. Augustine stated in the second and third proof. For if, according to St. Augustine, no good can be foreseen by God that is not predestined by Him, and only within that predestination, it is evident that middle knowledge regarding the substance does not hold, as this would imply foreknowledge of the future independent of and prior to the decree. 3° It is clear from the statements at the beginning of this section that middle knowledge, even regarding its substance and legitimate use in reconciling human freedom with divine decrees, was proposed to St. Augustine on behalf of the Semi-Pelagians: hence St. Prosper at the end of the letter asks St. Augustine to explain how such preoperating grace does not harm free will? as the Semi-Pelagians complained. Also, whether the purpose can stand through foreknowledge? Or conversely, is foreknowledge supported by the purpose? Which is essentially to propose middle knowledge not in terms of abuse but in terms of substance. Therefore, in his responses to Sts. Prosper and Hilary, St. Augustine either approved, omitted, or disapproved of middle knowledge as proposed and the Semi-Pelagian complaints about the impairment of freedom and fatal necessity: if the latter, we have achieved our aim. The second cannot be said without insult to such a great Doctor: if the first, let the opponents show where and how he approved. But to make this argument clearer,

Proof 4°. If St. Augustine approved middle knowledge as to its substance as now taught by the Molinian schools; I ask why he did not propose it to the Semi-Pelagians to quell their complaints and calm the scandals arising from his teaching: we see, as reported by St. Prosper above, that they complained that "all industry is removed and virtues taken away if God's decree (as St. Aug. taught) anticipates human wills", and "under this name of predestination a fatal necessity is introduced", and shortly before that "the very purpose of God's calling and the care of the fallen to rise again, and providing the opportunity for the saints to cool off". Why, I ask, in calming these complaints and solving these objections, did St. Augustine not use middle knowledge; for nothing was more expedient to remove those inconveniences, since it was devised for that purpose; yet it is evident and acknowledged by Tournely, Gabriel, Daniel, and other Molinists that he admitted it nowhere in responses to Sts. Hilary and Prosper; therefore, it is certain that St. Augustine did not approve it, or if he did, he is greatly to be blamed for omitting to remedy so many evils and scandals with such an easy and ready solution, neglecting to defend his cause and that of the religion, and fostering disputes in the Church out of a mere desire to argue, which is indeed unthinkable of such a great Doctor.

To this argument, which significantly pressures the opponents, Tournely responds by saying St. Augustine did not use middle knowledge against the complaints of the

Semi-Pelagians because he understood that he could not make any progress with them through it; for middle knowledge regarding substance, he says, and as Catholics defend, presupposes the necessity of grace that precedes the will, but the Semi-Pelagians denied that grace because they could not conceive how the freedom of the will could remain if it required preceding grace.

But against the first point, Tournely is refuted by his own leader, Molina, who, in the Concordia q. 23 a. 4 and 5 disp. 1, the last section, published in Lisbon, criticizes all the ancients and even St. Augustine himself for their alleged negligence. He claims that if the four principles he established, among which he places middle knowledge third, had always been clearly explained, perhaps the Pelagian heresy would never have arisen. He also suggests that many of the disturbances and defections to Pelagianism, triggered by St. Augustine's views and disputes with the Pelagians, could have been avoided, and the remnants of the Pelagians in Gaul, mentioned in the letters of SS. Prosper and Hilary, could have been eradicated. Therefore, according to Molina himself, St. Augustine would have benefited the Semi-Pelagians if he had used the middle knowledge as defended by Catholics against their complaints.

Against the second point, it is false that all Semi-Pelagians denied the necessity of the internal preceding grace, as defended by the Molinists. We will prove this elsewhere, but in the meantime, it is evident from their teaching that everyone was called gratuitously; it is certain, however, that not everyone was called through the external grace of preaching, exhortation, etc., thus, it must have been through internal grace.

Against the third point, assuming all Semi-Pelagians denied the necessity of the internal preceding grace as Molinists defend, they did not deny it because they believed it removed freedom. For who, unless deluded, could suspect that grace, given indiscriminately to all, left to free will, and awaiting the consent of the will as the defenders of middle knowledge claim, could slightly harm liberty? This is something the Semi-Pelagians, who were otherwise subtle and learned men, certainly never imagined. If they denied such grace (if they did deny it), it was not because it removed freedom but because they did not want to portray God as a respecter of persons, who, according to His own whim and without any motive from the person, would choose one and leave another. "They think that God is a respecter of persons if they believe that He has mercy on whom He wills without any preceding merits," St. Augustine says in letter 105 to Sextus. Therefore, if St. Augustine had declared that God decides nothing about the salvation of mankind absolutely unless He first explores what the will would do under the offered grace, and that this grace he said precedes the wills was not itself effectively and infallibly determinative but was indifferent, common to all and left to their free will, it is most certain that all Semi-Pelagians would have been satisfied on this point and would no longer have complained about St.

Augustine's view removing industry, removing virtues, taking away free will, and introducing fatal necessity.

Prob. 5: Catholic defenders of middle knowledge object against the absolute and antecedent decrees of the Thomists, which the Semi-Pelagians once objected against the decrees of St. Augustine, namely that they remove freedom and introduce fatal necessity: therefore, St. Augustine felt what the Thomists feel, and disapproved in the Semi-Pelagians what the Thomists disapprove in the Molinists.

First response of Tournely is that the Semi-Pelagians attacked the decrees of St. Augustine because they falsely believed that the preceding grace he required extinguished freedom. However, we have already said there was no basis for this objection if indeed St. Augustine did not require any other grace than the Molinistic one.

Second response of Tournely that this argument only implies that the Semi-Pelagians labored under a factual error regarding the mind and doctrine of St. Augustine, which they did not understand; indeed, St. Augustine nowhere admitted such decrees. However, Tournely does not realize, being too carried away by zeal to defend the Molinistic doctrine, that with this response, while attempting to excuse the Semi-Pelagians, he accuses St. Augustine. If the Semi-Pelagians were mistaken about the mind and doctrine of St. Augustine; if indeed the saint did not believe what they thought he believed; why did he not teach them, why did he not open his mind in the responses given to SS. Hilary and Prosper, who asked him about this matter, to thus settle the scandals and disputes arising from a false understanding of his doctrine? Therefore, according to Tournely, St. Augustine would be guilty of the same crime that the Apostle once reproached the pagan philosophers with, namely detaining the truth through injustice, necessary for establishing peace in the Church.

Final Proof: Why does Tournely exert so many futile efforts to draw St. Augustine, even unwillingly, to his side, and why do we linger so long in refuting him when we have opponents who admit their stance? The principal of the school, Molina himself, candidly acknowledges that the middle knowledge he teaches was not known, or better said, approved by St. Augustine, as is clear from the statements in the fourth proof. Also, in 1. p. q. 23. a. 4 and 5, after teaching that predestination in God did not exist without foreseeing what free will would do, he says, "Meanwhile, Augustine did not consider this under that sort of haze." Vasquez, in 1 p. disp. 97 c. 3 n. 19 and 20 at Comp. Salmantic., admits, "Indeed, I suspect the testimonies of SS. Prosper and Fulgentius (on the matter of grace) because they are the most diligent and exact disciples of Augustine, and they seem to follow an opposite view (to that which Vasquez himself holds)." This will be further proved later when we challenge middle knowledge for its novelty.

The doctrine of St. Thomas

1° The Holy Doctor never mentions middle knowledge, but only the knowledge of simple intelligence which contemplates mere possibilities, and vision which looks at the future under a supposed decree.

2° Whenever St. Thomas presents arguments that adversaries conglomerate about the concord of liberty with divine decrees, he never resorts to middle knowledge as an explorer of human liberty's consensus or dissent prior to the decree. Instead, with St. Augustine, he returns to the most efficacious power of the divine will. For instance, in q. 19. a. 3, he states, "Since the divine will is most efficacious, it not only follows that those things which God wants to happen, but that they happen in the way God wants them to happen; He wants some things to happen necessarily, and some contingently and freely"; similarly elsewhere.

3° He who denies the object of middle knowledge rejects middle knowledge itself: St. Thomas denies the object of middle knowledge. The minor premise: the object of middle knowledge is the future conditioned prior to God's actual decree; but according to St. Thomas, there is no future prior to God's actual decree. See q. 16. a. 7, also cited in a. 4 of this dissertation § 1 conclusion 5. It is not valid to claim that St. Thomas is speaking only of absolute futures, not conditional ones: the reasoning for conditional and absolute futures is the same, as will be evident in the following section.

4° He who teaches that creatures cannot be known by God immediately in themselves but only in His essence rejects middle knowledge. If middle knowledge were granted, God would not see man's conditioned future consent in His essence as having the potential to produce it, because from that nothing is said to be future, only possible; nor in essence as determined by decree, since it would be prior to that decree, but immediately in itself, as opponents contend. However, St. Thomas consistently teaches that creatures are not known by God immediately in themselves, but in His essence, as seen in q. 14. a. 5 and elsewhere. See the previous dissertation a. 4. Other principles of St. Thomas that overturn middle knowledge are referenced by authors; consult Gonet if you wish.

§ V.
Middle knowledge is attacked by various arguments.

The first fundamental argument: There is no object of middle knowledge: therefore there is no middle knowledge. The antecedent is proved. The object of middle knowledge according to its proponents is a conditional free future before God's decree actually exercised and independent of it: but before God's decree actually exercised and independently of it there

is no conditional free future: therefore. The minor, in which lies the difficulty, is proved. If something in contingent things were conditionally future before God's decree, it would have this either from itself, or by virtue of the condition, or from an indifferent offered concurrence, or finally from some other cause: but not from itself, otherwise it would not be a contingent future but necessary and natural; and moreover just as nothing can give itself existence, so neither can it give itself conditional future existence. Not by virtue of the condition: for either the condition is disparate, as in this proposition: "If you had struck the earth seven times, you would have struck Syria to destruction," and then it is more than manifest that this condition, namely the sevenfold striking of the earth, does not by its own power infallibly infer the future destruction of Syria: or the condition is related or pertinent; as if preaching is done there will be conversion; and then it is also manifest that such a condition does not render conversion infallibly future, since preaching often occurs without conversion, and otherwise it would follow that preaching alone would suffice for conversion; which is condemned in Pelagius. Not from the offered concurrence; because that general and indifferent concurrence does not have an infallible connection with the event, namely with consent, since it can stand with consent or dissent according to its authors. Not finally from some other cause, because all other causes are indifferent and undetermined to futurition or non-futurition prior to God's decree determining either, since they do not determine themselves independently of the determination of the first cause, otherwise they would not be second causes, but first, and the first would be second: therefore there remains only God's decree by which a contingent thing becomes conditionally future and as such is known by God.

The minor is confirmed 1°: An absolute future is that which is absolutely determined in causes to have existence in a subsequent time, as is clear from what was said above: therefore a conditional future is that which is conditionally determined in causes to have existence in a subsequent time. I subsume: but before the decree or determination of God, as the first cause, no other cause is determined to the futurition of any thing even under a condition: therefore.

The same minor is confirmed 2°: For a thing to be conditionally future is not an intrinsic denomination (for this cannot belong to a thing not yet existing) but extrinsic, consequently coming from some form extrinsic to the future thing: but not from a cause as able to produce it, for this denominates a thing merely possible; not from a cause as actually producing, for this denominates an existing thing: therefore from a cause as determined to give it existence under a condition. I subsume: but before God's decree no other cause is determined, as we have already said: therefore before God's decree nothing is conditionally future.

The same minor is confirmed 3°: Conditional futurition does not leave a thing in the state of mere possibility, but transfers it to the state of some futurition (for it mediates between possibility and absolute futurition). Likewise it is something real, something true and knowable, and finally it says some actuality which possibility does not say, namely an order to existence if the condition is posited: but 1° a thing cannot pass from the state of possibility to the state of some futurition through itself, nor through the divine will precisely as able, since this leaves the thing in the state of possibility: therefore through the divine will otherwise disposed than it was in that prior sign in which the thing was conceived as only possible; but it is disposed otherwise through its decree. 2° That reality, that truth and actuality which conditional futurition says cannot escape divine causality; but God causes nothing outside himself unless freely determined to it.

To this fundamental argument the adversaries respond variously. 1° Some say that something is conditionally future because it will be if. But this response is a most manifest begging of the question; for this is what we are asking, whence does a non-existent thing have that it will be rather than will not be, if a condition is posited which does not have from itself an infallible connection with it? Nothing else can be assigned than the decree, as we have proved.

2° Others respond that futurition does not say anything positive but a mere lack of existence, for which a decree is not required. But against this, if a future were constituted by the mere lack of existence, it would not be distinguished from the purely possible; and many things do not exist now which nevertheless are in no way future. They reply that a future is distinguished from the possible by the lack of existence with an order to existing. I infer therefore that it is not something purely negative. Moreover the argument returns, and this is what is asked, from what does a non-existent thing have that it says an order to existing, rather than to not existing? Nothing else can be assigned than the divine decree, as is clear from what has been said.

3° They respond, and more commonly, that between a conditional and an absolute future there is this difference, that the absolute indeed requires a decree actually existing in God; but the conditional requires a decree not that is actually, but that would be if the condition were posited (for they always want to be imported on the part of the condition a subjectively conditional decree which is not but which would be if the condition were posited: hence in that proposition, if Peter were in those circumstances he will do penance, it is always understood, they say, and if God wills to offer him his concurrence). But they prove their assumption by this argument. A cause ought to be proportioned to the effect, so that to an effect which is, a cause which is is assigned, to an effect which will be, a cause which will be, to an effect which would be if a condition were posited, a cause which would be if the condition were posited: but conditional futures neither are nor will be, but only

would be if the condition were posited: therefore it suffices if a decree is assigned to them not which is actually, but which would be if the condition were posited.

But against this, this response which Tournely urges q. 6 a. 3 near the end and in which the adversaries especially trust, is a mere evasion. Hence, I deny the difference brought in the first proposition between an absolute and a conditional future; and to its proof I distinguish the minor: conditional futures neither are, nor will be, etc., as to the actual exercise of the existence to which they are future, I concede the minor; they are not, nor will be, etc., as to the actual truth or nature of conditional futurition, I deny the minor. And in this there is a great hallucination of the opposing opinion. The solution is explained. It is indeed true that conditional futures are not actually, that is they do not exist in reality with that existence which they are sometime to have as futures, nor do absolute futures so exist: otherwise they would not be future, but present. For conditional futures so taken a cause should be assigned which would be if the condition were posited, just as for absolute futures so taken a cause should be assigned which will sometime be. Nevertheless they are actually as to the truth or nature of conditional or absolute futurition: for they are truly actually conditionally or absolutely future, and for that actual absolute or conditional futurition, which is not a being of reason, nor pure possibility, a cause should be assigned which is actually, and just as for absolute futurition the adversaries themselves in the objection assign an absolute decree actually existing, so for actual conditional futurition a conditional decree actually existing should be assigned. Hence, I argue ad hominem thus. Although absolute futures do not exist actually, because nevertheless they are actually absolutely future, for the truth of this absolute futurition you assign a cause which is actually, namely an absolute decree actually existing: therefore likewise, although conditional futures are not actually, because nevertheless they are actually conditionally future, a cause should be assigned to them which is actually, namely a conditional decree actually existing.

The second argument akin to the preceding, or a greater explanation of it. Middle knowledge is that by which God independently of a posited decree sees an infallible connection between the human will and this act rather than another given certain circumstances: but there is no such connection before God's posited decree, therefore there is no object of middle knowledge. The major is clear from the definition of middle knowledge. The minor is proved. There is no infallible connection between those things which are connected neither through themselves nor through another: but before God's posited decree the will is not infallibly connected either through itself or through another with this act rather than with another: therefore. Not through itself, for the will is indifferent to this or that; and otherwise if it were connected through itself with one act, it would be a natural and necessary connection, and thus a necessary future, which is against the hypothesis. Not through another: for what would this other be? not the divine will, because no decree is supposed in it by which it actually wills those to be connected; not

the decree if, or the offered concurrence if, for both are indifferent to this or the opposite act; not the circumstances, for these are disparate or contingent, and thus not infallibly connected of themselves with one act. Fr. Goudin pursues this argument at length.

The third argument by which the preceding ones are confirmed and various ways of speaking of the adversaries are exposed. The proponents of middle knowledge do not altogether deny that some decree of God intervenes in their middle knowledge, as we have already observed, but they explain it variously. Some, and more frequently with Vasquez, place the decree on the part of the antecedent or condition, thus e.g. if I will call Peter in such circumstances and if I will will to concur with him, he will consent. Thus Honoratus Tournely, and commonly more recent authors. Others less frequently with Arrubal place it on the part of the consequent or effect; thus e.g. if I will call Peter in these circumstances, I will concur with him and he will consent; but neither way of speaking satisfies: therefore.

As to the first it is proved. Either they understand concurrence indifferently offered under condition to consent or dissent, or concurrence determined to consent, similarly a conditional decree of concurring either indifferently to either part, or determinately to one part: but neither can be said: therefore.

The first part of the minor is proved. 1° In indifferent and indeterminate concurrence to consent or dissent, there is no connection more with consent than with dissent, therefore in it the future consent rather than dissent cannot be certainly seen, as we argued above. 2° Consent cannot be certainly seen as determinately future under a condition, unless all the causes are seen without which it would not be in reality, given the condition; since under the conditional state, it ought to be seen as so determinately future, that only the purification of the condition is lacking, for it to pass into the absolute state: but given the conditions, namely vocation and indifferent concurrence to consent or dissent, there would not be absolutely and in reality consent except through simultaneous concurrence determined to consent: therefore that it may be seen in the conditional state as determinately and actually to proceed if the condition is purified, that determined concurrence should be seen without which it does not proceed in reality, and thus indifferent concurrence does not suffice. The minor is clear, both because indifferent concurrence to either is not that through which a thing actually proceeds, but is offered antecedently that a thing may freely happen, and the opposite may be able to proceed: and because simultaneous concurrence by which a thing actually proceeds is identified with the operation of the second cause. Hence just as in the object of middle knowledge the determined influx of the creature should shine forth, so also the determined concurrence of God should be seen.

The second part of the first minor is proved: namely that it cannot be said that the offered concurrence is determined to consent. Given concurrence determined to consent on the

part of the condition the object of middle knowledge is destroyed, for then the object becomes necessary, but middle knowledge according to its authors is about contingent and free acts and objects: therefore. The antecedent is proved: 1° This proposition or consequence, which is the object of middle knowledge: If I will call Peter and concur determinately with him to consent, he will consent, reduced to the absolute state, e.g. I call Peter and concur determinately with him to consent, therefore he consents, is necessary: therefore posited in the conditional state it is a necessary conditional, just as if this absolute consequence: The sun shines, therefore it is day, is necessary; also the conditional consisting of the same terms: If the sun shines, it is day, is necessary. 2° Simultaneous concurrence determined to Peter's consent is identified with that consent, or at least is simultaneously influencing with it, for Peter does not consent without simultaneous concurrence, and God does not concur simultaneously except with Peter consenting: hence the sense of this proposition: If I will concur with Peter determinately to consent, he will consent, is this: If I will place my concurrence with Peter's consent there will be Peter's consent; or if concurrence identified with Peter's consent is given, there will be Peter's consent, and such will be the object of middle knowledge, than which, as is clear, nothing is more necessary, indeed altogether useless since it is to attribute to God such knowledge as children have simple and necessary.

As to the second way of speaking, it is also proved not to suffice: when they induce God saying: If I will call Peter, I will concur with him and he will consent; either God prior to the conferring of his concurrence sees the conditional consent of Peter or not. If the first, therefore the concurrence is uselessly applied that God may foresee the future consent of Peter: but if not first foreseeing Peter's consent, he applies his concurrence, or decrees it to be applied, either he will be held to subject the created will to himself, and determine it that it may infallibly will what he wills; and this will be to posit physical predetermination, from which the adversaries so abhor: or certainly he will concur rashly and fortuitously with the human will, and expose himself to the danger of frustrating both decree and concurrence, and his whole knowledge: for when two free causes concur simultaneously to the same effect, if one does not subject and subordinate the other to itself, or otherwise does not foreknow what the other will do, it proceeds by chance and fortuitously, joining itself to it, and is exposed to the danger of not attaining the effect, if the other does not will: therefore.

The fourth argument: The divine intellect knows nothing except what the divine essence represents to it. Nor do the adversaries deny this, for although they contend against us that God knows things other than himself immediately in themselves, yet they do not so understand as if God knew them through species drawn from them (for the divine intellect cannot be informed by created species), but through his essence immediately representing them in themselves, and not, as we say, mediately only in himself as in a cause previously

known: it is therefore agreed in both schools that the divine essence is the adequate species of the divine intellect; but the divine essence does not represent the object of middle knowledge, namely this act determinately future in these circumstances before the decree actually posited concerning its futurition: therefore. The minor is proved: What belongs to a thing neither through itself nor through another, in no way belongs to it: but to represent this act as future rather than not future before the decree does not belong to the divine essence through itself nor through another: not through itself, for it is of itself indifferent to represent this act or its opposite as future since either can equally be future: nor through another; for what would this other be which would determine the divine essence, indifferent of itself to representing this act as future rather than not future, from all eternity before the decree to this rather than to another mode of representation?

Nor can the adversaries say here what they are accustomed to say about conditional futurition, that it does not require a cause which is but which would be if, because it does not say something which is, but which would be if: this, I say, they cannot say here; because that representation, if any, was always actually as something existing in God; hence something existing should be assigned as the reason for that representation, namely either the divine essence itself, or something else contained in it; and since nothing such can be assigned except the decree, it remains that this determined representation does not belong to it except through the decree. Thus, with a few additions, the most learned Fr. Goudin.

These four fundamental arguments which the Thomists everywhere use Honoratus Tournely passed over in deep silence: prudently for himself, because he had nothing to respond: he had promised that, laying aside all party zeal, he would sincerely expound the merits of both systems. Where is his faith?

§ VI.
The most serious inconveniences of middle knowledge.

First inconvenience. Middle knowledge removes from God the nature of first cause and first mover. It is proved: it is of the nature of the first cause and first mover that it moves other causes, and none of them is moved except as moved by the first: but in the system of middle knowledge the second cause moves itself without being moved by the first, for it determines itself without being determined by God: therefore.

Tournely responds that the nature of first cause and first mover is preserved in God, because 1° He receives the power of acting from no other cause, while the rest have the power of acting from Him, and He conserves that power by continual influence; 2° because the second cause can do nothing without Him cooperating, while He can do absolutely all things without the second cause; 3° because His concurrence is universal, while the concurrence of the second cause is particular.

But against this, none of these things preserves in God the nature of first cause and first mover in causing and moving, which is what is at issue. And 1° from the fact that He conferred on the second cause the power of acting and conserves it, it follows that He is the first and immediate cause of this power, not however of its action. 2° That the second cause can do nothing without God cooperating, it follows that He is a co-cause, not the first cause. 3° That God's concurrence is more universal, it follows that He can do more than the second cause, not however that He is the first cause in causing and moving, of whose nature it is that the second cause is not moved except as moved by it. Thus e.g. although a father conferred on his son the power of carrying a burden, suppose also that he conserves it; although he carries that burden with his son, although finally his power extends more broadly than the power of his son, he will in no way therefore be called or be the first and immediate cause or first mover of his son's carrying, but only then if he moves and applies the son himself efficaciously to the burden.

Second inconvenience. Middle knowledge takes away from God the nature of universal cause, since in that system some being, namely the determination of the creature, escapes His causality: for it is not caused by prevenient grace, since this, as Tournely and other Molinists admit, moves only morally to determination: not by cooperating grace or simultaneous concurrence, both because then it would not be only simultaneous, but also previous, for a cause is prior, at least in nature, to its effect; and also because simultaneous concurrence does not act on the will to determine it, but only on the effect, it does not make us will, but makes when we will: as is clear in two simultaneously pulling a ship neither influences the other, but each partially on the passive pulling of the ship.

Third inconvenience. Middle knowledge curtails God's omnipotence and the supreme dominion which He has over our wills. It is proved: it is the constant doctrine of St. Augustine and of all, I think, who think catholically, that God can convert the wills of men to good in whatever circumstances: "Who," says the Holy Doctor in Enchiridion ch. 97, "would be so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot convert to good the evil wills of men which He wills, when He wills, where He wills?" Which he repeats many times and proves from this that God is omnipotent: but in the system of middle knowledge God cannot, while preserving freedom, incline the will to consent in those circumstances in which it is foreseen to dissent, nor can He certainly decree anything concerning our free acts, unless He first explores what we ourselves are going to will: therefore. If you say that God can place the will in other circumstances in which He will obtain consent; this now being granted, about which more later; at least in the prior ones He will not be able to obtain it, and thus He will not be able to convert the will to good when and where He wills, nor will He have dominion over the will itself, but only over circumstances.

But, says Honoratus Tournely after Fr. Daniel, how can it be that this knowledge which represents to God various and multiple ways which He can use to bend and overcome our wills when and where He wills, such as is middle knowledge, detracts from divine omnipotence and His supreme dominion over our wills?

But Tournely deceives in his usual manner and gratuitously invents to make a show: for it is as false as can be, what he supposes, namely that middle knowledge represents to God multiple ways by which He can certainly and infallibly as and when He wills bend our wills and determine them to consent; for it exhibits only according to its authors graces permitted to free choice, or means by which God only morally invites and excites the will to consent which He expects from innate freedom under indifferent concurrence, otherwise according to Tournely himself and all Molinists that consent would not be free, and the will would be passive to it.

Nevertheless as if he had given a decisive solution, the Molinist doctor, somewhat moved by the argument, continues thus: "For it is not from ignorance or from impotence that God uses that knowledge of conditionals to foreknow what man placed in these or those circumstances is going to do. Who is so mad and impious as to assert this?"

Indeed he would be mad and impious who would assert this; nor do we say that the Molinists positively assert it; but that it, as it seems to us, follows from their opinion. For, before God explores through middle knowledge what has pleased the human will from its innate freedom, He does not know what it is going to do: and after He has foreseen what it is going to do of itself, He cannot decree otherwise while preserving its freedom: that is, He cannot decree that it not consent in those circumstances in which He foresaw it would consent, nor that it consent in those circumstances in which He foresaw it would dissent; otherwise, as I have already said, according to that system, the consent would not be free. Therefore it seems that God uses this knowledge of conditionals from ignorance and from impotence.

Indeed it is not repugnant in that system that there be given a man whom God even by His absolute power cannot convert in any circumstance; for it is not repugnant from the nature of the thing that there be a man who in no circumstances wills to be converted; or to consent to prevenient graces moving only morally, for these either jointly or separately do not have an infallible connection with consent, nor will they ever by their own power overcome the resistance of the will. But grace efficacious per se which by its own power softens this obstinate heart and most invincibly converts it, the defenders of this system abhor as the destruction of freedom. It remains therefore that God does not have the most omnipotent power of inclining hearts, as St. Augustine says, or cannot turn the heart of man wherever He wills, as Scripture says, in a word is not omnipotent.

Fourth inconvenience. In the system of middle knowledge God is not more the author of good works than of evil works, against that of Trent sess. 6 can. 6: "If anyone says that God works evil works, just as good ones, not only permissively but also properly and per se, let him be anathema". It is proved: in the system of middle knowledge God is the cause of good works insofar as He places man in those circumstances in which He foresaw him using well the offered grace, and concurs simultaneously with him to the good work; but likewise He places him who acts badly in those circumstances in which He foresees him using badly the offered grace, and concurs simultaneously with him to the evil work: therefore.

Nor does it matter that God intends the good work and not the evil; because here it is not asked what God intends, but what He does; moreover although God does not intend evil, yet He often intends to permit it that He may elicit good from it. Nor does it matter that through moral graces He excites to good work, for from these God cannot be said properly to work good and be its properly called cause, because moral causality is improper and metaphorical. Add that God not rarely places His own, to prove them, among the gravest temptations in which there are lesser moral motives to good.

Fifth inconvenience. Middle knowledge takes away for the most part the necessity of prayer. It is proved: we ask from God what we believe to be given by Him and not what depends on us: "For the petition is derisory," says St. Augustine, "when that is asked from Him which is known that He Himself does not give, but it is in the power of man without His giving"; but what is chief in the business of salvation, namely consent to grace indifferently offered to all, in the system of middle knowledge is not from God, but from us: therefore we ought not ask it from God. What therefore will the Molinist ask from God? Not efficacious grace which makes us will, which takes away the heart of stone, which compels the rebellious will to itself, as the Church prays; for all this is his own, and God will be able to respond to him: Make grace efficacious yourself by consenting to it. This one thing therefore he will be able to ask, that God place him in those circumstances in which He foresaw him consenting to grace.

Tournely responds that the Molinists teach that grace is due to no one, but is conferred freely by God. Let it be so: but they also teach that it is offered to all; and although it were not offered, they would only have to ask for grace, not indeed the good use of grace which depends on them. He insists that the good use of grace is not so in the power of free choice that it does not need more abundant help to work well. But these too are words, and nothing more. For in that system, if I consent of myself to the offered grace, will not God infallibly concur with me to the good work for which grace will be offered, and did He foresee this through middle knowledge? And if for a further work I need more abundant help, is not this also offered? and granted it is not offered, I will ask that it be offered, not however that it be efficacious, not that it make me will and consent, for this is mine.

Hence, Sixth inconvenience. From what has been said it follows 1° that in the system of middle knowledge we ought not give thanks to God for that which is chief in the business of salvation, namely for our determination to good, which is elicited from our own store; 2° that we ought not rely on the hope of His grace alone, as the Church sings, but chiefly on our freedom; 3° that it is not necessary to fear so much for our salvation, nor to watch over it so anxiously, so carefully, since it is in our power to consent to grace offered to all at any time and make it efficacious; 4° finally, that the foundation of Christian humility is shaken, since one through consent to grace discerns himself from another not consenting, and can glory over him, as we argued above from the Apostle.

Seventh inconvenience. Middle knowledge paves the way for the chief error of the Semi-Pelagians, and renders ineffective the arguments of St. Augustine and Catholics against them. It is proved: the chief error of the Semi-Pelagians was that there are given in us the beginnings of faith and good will (whether however so that they did not admit some prevenient grace even internal, I do not dispute now), whence they inferred that God, from these beginnings of good foreseen, is moved to give us grace, not indeed as from merit properly so called, but as from occasion, as is clear from Cassian book of conferences ch. 13 and 16. Whence in ch. 14 he says: "God is ready from the occasion only of our offered will, to refer all these things". From which St. Prosper against the collator ch. 8 infers that this is some kind of merit: "For," he says, "the faith of him who asks, the piety of him who seeks, the insistence of him who knocks cannot be held to be of no merit": which if Cassian had positively asserted, St. Prosper would not infer by arguing: but although the defenders of middle knowledge deny that God is moved from foreseen consent to grace either as merit or as from occasion to give grace, yet they cannot deny that there is nothing absurd, nothing repugnant, indeed that it is fitting that God be moved by these at least as from occasion, as Cassian said, to give grace to those whom He foresees will spontaneously consent, rather than to others whom He foresees will abuse it: just as, e.g. in an artisan no one will think it absurd but most fitting, that he choose from instruments that one rather than others, by which he knows that under the same motion of his a far more perfect work will be done; for the good use of grace, say in Peter, is offered to the divine sight and this docility of Peter cannot not please Him, and therefore it is very fitting, or at least involves nothing absurd, that it move God to give grace to him whom He sees will cooperate so tractably and so spontaneously: therefore St. Augustine with other Catholics wrongly attacked the error of the Semi-Pelagians as most absurd, and their arguments hurled against them fall, once middle knowledge is admitted.

Eighth inconvenience akin to the preceding and more serious. The system of middle knowledge does not seem to depart sufficiently from the error of the Semi-Pelagians. I say this not asserting but arguing. It is proved: St. Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints ch. 2, places Semi-Pelagianism in this, that it as it were composes with God, so that

it vindicates part for man and part for God, and what is worse, man takes the first, gives the latter to God: "Willing," says the Holy Doctor, "that what he believes be from himself, man as it were composes with God that he may vindicate part of faith for himself, and leave part to Him; and what is more elated, he himself takes the first, gives the following to Him; and in that which he says belongs to both, he makes himself prior, God posterior": but the defenders of middle knowledge seem to think the same as to substance, and differ only in manner of speaking: therefore.

The minor is proved and 1° that they compose with God although a little differently than the Semi-Pelagians. For these so composed with God that they ascribed the beginning and end of good work to free choice, but intermediate works they attributed to God: the defenders of middle knowledge in any good work attribute part to God, part to man; inasmuch as they constitute God and man two partial causes by partiality of causality, each of which expends something from its own store, namely its own influx or concurrence, like two pulling one ship, as Livinus de Meyer, a most keen defender of middle knowledge, proves at length in dissertation 1 on the Mind of the Council of Trent.

But that they make man prior in good work, God posterior, is clear, because they say that God exhibits Himself ready to concur indifferently to this act or the opposite, but man determines this indifference and is the cause why God concurs to this act rather than to the opposite: see above, § 2 n. 3 and 4, the texts of many Molinists: but a cause is prior to that of which it is the cause: therefore in this which is here and now to concur to this act rather than to the opposite man is prior to God, and if it is a good work greater praise is due to man than to God, since God offers only indeterminate concurrence to good or to evil, but man determines it to good.

The adversaries respond that they depart from the Semi-Pelagians in two ways: 1° because they admit even to the beginning of faith concomitant grace and physically cooperating, which they did not admit; 2° that they require further prevenient and exciting moral graces which they did not admit.

To the first, I deny that the Semi-Pelagians did not admit concomitant grace or simultaneous concurrence; it is clear from these words of St. Prosper to St. Augustine: "Nor do they consider that they subject the grace of God, which they will to be the companion not the guide of human merits, even to those wills, which according to their imagination, they do not deny to be prevented by it", namely by offering not conferring. Nor was there any reason why they should deny simultaneous concurrence, provided it were granted to be determinable by the will to this act rather than to the opposite; for this being posited there always stands their chief dogma impugned by SS. Augustine, Prosper and Hilary, namely that man composes with God, vindicates part for himself, leaves part to God, and makes himself prior, God posterior, as St. Augustine says, or as St. Prosper says, "therefore

man is helped because he willed, not therefore because he is helped, does he will"; or, as St. Hilary says, "whatever beginning of will is from us". Since therefore these things, notwithstanding simultaneous concurrence, seem to follow from the adversaries' manner of speaking, they do not seem to depart sufficiently from the error of the Semi-Pelagians.

To the second, I respond that it is a longer discussion which we remit to the treatise on Grace. Meanwhile I briefly say 1° that the Semi-Pelagians at least some admitted some prevenient moral graces even interior: for they taught, Hilary witnessing in his epistle to St. Augustine, that all even the unworthy are called: but it is certain that not all are called by exterior vocation or preaching, therefore by interior; 2° there was no reason why they should reject prevenient moral graces even interior, for since these are subject to the determination and power of the will, these notwithstanding, their capital dogma stands, namely that the beginning of salvation is from us, and easily are all the difficulties which they suffered from St. Augustine's opinion, about fatal necessity, about the extinction of free will, the uselessness of prayer, etc., explained away; 3° granted that the Semi-Pelagians did not admit prevenient interior moral graces which the Molinists admit, these moral graces move the will to consent only objectively and through the showing of good, but do not effect it, but expect it from the free will itself, and thus do not prevent man from composing with God, attributing part to himself, part to God, and making himself prior, God posterior, consequently through these graces they are not sufficiently distinguished from the Semi-Pelagians.

In vain would this fourth proposition of Jansenius condemned be opposed here against the prior solutions: "The Semi-Pelagians admitted the necessity of prevenient interior grace for individual acts, even for the beginning of faith, and in this they were heretics that they would have that grace to be such that the human will could resist or obey it". For by the very fact that we acknowledge that only some Semi-Pelagians admitted prevenient interior moral grace for the beginning of faith, it stands that this proposition, even as to the first part, is false, because since it is indefinite it is equivalent to a universal. Moreover for the falsity of the whole hypothetical copulative, such as this is, it suffices that one part be false, as indeed the second part is. More about this elsewhere.

§ VII.
Middle Knowledge Is to Be Rejected by Its Very Novelty.

Truth is ancient, according to St. Augustine, while falsehood is novel and temporal. "O Timothy!" says the Apostle in 1 Timothy 6, "guard the deposit, avoiding profane novelties of words." Explaining this, Vincent of Lérins in Commonitorium I ch. 27 says: "What is the deposit? That which has been entrusted to you, not what you have invented; what you have received, not what you have devised; a matter not of cleverness but of doctrine; not of

private appropriation but of public tradition; something brought to you, not produced by you; wherein you should be not an author but a guardian." Scripture, the Fathers, and theologians offer many other statements against novel opinions. Therefore, any doctrine, especially in theological matters, that suffers from the vice of novelty deserves to be rejected.

Furthermore, the very proponents of middle knowledge openly profess that it is new in Catholic schools and unknown to the Fathers and ancient theologians. First, Molina himself in Concordia q. 23 a. 4 and 5 disp. 1 last section, Lisbon edition 1588, boasts of being its inventor: "I have been longer in this disputation than I had thought, but because this matter is of great importance and very slippery, and because this method of ours for reconciling free will with divine predestination has not been transmitted by anyone I have seen until now, I therefore thought it better to explain these things somewhat more fully." Likewise in the same place: "If these (namely the four principles for reconciling freedom with divine decrees, among which he places middle knowledge in third place) had always been given and explained, perhaps the Pelagian heresy would not have arisen, nor would so many faithful have been troubled by St. Augustine's opinion and the disputes with the Pelagians and defected to the Pelagians, and the remnants of the Pelagians in Gaul, mentioned in the letters of Saints Prosper and Hilary, would easily have been eliminated... and finally the disputes among Catholics would have been settled."

Tournely shows himself peculiar here when he attempts to wipe away this stain of novelty from his Molina: for he contends that Molina did not say that middle knowledge had not been previously given and explained, but rather his method of reconciling freedom with divine predestination, and "about this method," says Tournely, "not about middle knowledge, Molina adds 'if these had always been given and explained'"; and thus according to Tournely this will be the construction of Molina's text: "WHICH METHOD IF IT HAD BEEN GIVEN." The laws of grammar do not permit this. But an impotent zeal for defending middle knowledge draws him to this. Therefore Molina spoke not about his method of reconciling freedom, but about his four principles among which, as I said, he places middle knowledge, when he said: "If these had always been given and explained," as he was not ignorant of the first elements of grammar which he had undoubtedly taught. And he says not only "explained" but also "given": therefore middle knowledge was not given before; therefore he first gave it and brought it into the schools.

But even granting that Molina meant by these words his method of reconciling freedom with divine grace and predestination, and acknowledged it as new and invented by himself, as he indeed explicitly acknowledges in the previous words, Tournely does not thereby escape nor save his Molina. For what, I ask, is this method of reconciling freedom with divine grace and predestination according to Molina and the Molinists, if not middle

knowledge? The Molinists proclaim this both from pulpits and in the streets, and contend that without middle knowledge our freedom is finished. From which it follows that what Tournely asserts is utterly false, that Molina did not innovate in dogma but in the method of explaining it. For middle knowledge, if it exists, is a true dogma and foundation of the whole theological system concerning the most serious matters of God's knowledge, will and grace, and human freedom. And indeed it seems neither fair nor courteous that this recent writer should want to steal from his Molina the glory which not only Molina himself claims but which very many of his associates attribute to him, as will be clear from those to be cited presently.

2° Fr. Fonseca, envying the glory of discovered middle knowledge from Molina his disciple, in his Metaphysics which he published after Molina's Concordia, tome 3 book 6 ch. 2 q. 6 sect. 8, declares that middle knowledge was devised by him 30 years before, and gives this reason why he did not publish it before Molina his disciple: "This one thing," he says, "raised a scruple lest by this method something new might perhaps be introduced which would not agree in every respect with the common doctrine of the Fathers or with the diligent examination and accurate refinement of the scholastics; for there was no one who had openly, and as they say in terms, reconciled the freedom of our will with divine foreknowledge or providence in this way."

3° Vasquez, a most celebrated writer of the same Society, in First Part disp. 67 ch. 4, says thus: "That the ancient scholastics who have written until now mentioned only simple knowledge of vision and simple understanding matters little; for they neither disputed about nor mentioned anything at all about this knowledge under condition. What then if we posit another which they neither mentioned nor denied?"

4° Granado, another theologian of the Society, First Part tract. 5 disp. 3 sect. 2, attacks Suarez for confirming middle knowledge with testimonies of St. Thomas and ancient theologians: "I confess," he says, "none of these testimonies is very compelling"; and he adds: "Nor is it surprising if in the course of time something has been devised by more recent theologians."

5° Fr. Valentine Herice of the same Society, First Part tract. 1 disp. 7 ch. 1 num. 7 and 8: "The first patrons," he says, "of middle knowledge are from our Society. Among them the chief is Molina... then Fr. Peter Fonseca." But what is most amusing is that he contends that middle knowledge was revealed to his Society by a singular benefit of Providence against Luther's pestilential dogma about freedom. "In which matter," he says, "I humbly venerate divine Providence and acknowledge its singular benefit conferred on the teachers of our religion... and most learned writers of the same family..., whom it has flooded with heavenly light and illuminated with this knowledge by which the freedom of will can be defended against Luther and Calvin and other sectarians... Therefore just as Ignatius healed the poison of

disobedience, which men were drinking in, with singular obedience, so by this conditional knowledge the satanic dogma against freedom is utterly overthrown."

6° The Jesuit Tiphanius, chancellor of the University of Pont-à-Mousson, in his book On Order and on Prior and Posterior ch. 24 says "no other theologian before Molina had even in dreams thought about middle knowledge, nor had anywhere either supposed it or employed it for resolving any difficulty whether of Scripture or scholastic theology."

7° Fr. Henry Henriquez the Jesuit, Suarez's teacher, in that censure which he published in 1594 against Molina, speaks thus: "Against sound, firm and most accepted doctrine among the most holy theologians of all Spain, indeed of the whole world for many years and at this time, he (Molina) speaks irreverently and dangerously, blasphemously and shamelessly in the manner of heretics he wars against the most wise Fathers, and those opinions of theirs which theologians assert to be certain and undoubted, the author says are dangerous and are the occasion of many errors and take away the freedom of our will, and that neither by them nor by Councils was the truth about predestination, grace and freedom of will declared or plainly understood, before the author composed this book."

8° Finally John Mariana, another Jesuit, in the book On the Government of the Society which he composed while the congregations de Auxiliis were being held in Rome, speaks thus about Molina's system: "From this illustrious source (love of novelty) emanated those whirlwinds and storms by which our Society attempted to harass the most wise theologians of the Dominican family whom it ought rather to have venerated as high priests of purer doctrine than to follow the recent inventions of Louis Molina. This man's little book was brought from the examination of the theologians of the sacred Inquisition to Rome where now free will wrestles most fiercely against grace for the palm." What the Jesuit Fathers oppose to these testimonies of Henriquez and Mariana, you have refuted in Hyacinth Serry, more briefly in the work inscribed in French The Triumph of Thomism art. 6 § 3 and in his Apology § 10.

§ VIII.
Middle Knowledge Historically Attacked.

I enter this battle unwillingly, since I will not speak pleasing things, but I am compelled to it by false and injurious statements against our school which we read everywhere both in published books and public dictations. Therefore I use the right of defense and repel force with force, maintaining the moderation of blameless protection.

Concerning the Roman Censors

Clement VIII, harassed by the Society's requests, calls to Rome the case moved by our men against Molina's novel dogmas before the general Inquisition of Spain and ripe for judgment, orders congregations, and appoints censors to weigh Molina's opinions, placing over them the most eminent Cardinals Louis Madruzzo and Pompey Arigonius.

That these censors, with one or two exceptions, consistently condemned Molina's middle knowledge is clear from the following. In the congregation held March 6, 1598, they say: "The absurdities that follow from middle knowledge are too serious to be tolerated catholically." In the congregation of March 19, 1601: "It seems to be the same as that which the Massillians devised to eliminate effective grace of good will and to attribute to free will what they would subtract from grace lest they harm it: whence it indeed seems to have been attacked by Augustine... with the error of the Massillians." They define the same on October 29, 1604, and thus conclude: "And therefore it is most necessary that it be eliminated." See Serry book 2 ch. 2 and 18, and book 3 ch. 39.

The Jesuit Fathers formerly denied these things; now compelled by truth they concede them with Fr. de Meyer, but contend that these censors were hasty in rendering censure from which once given they stubbornly refused to withdraw, that they suffered from ignorance of Molina's matters and doctrine, that they were more than justly devoted to the Dominican party against the Jesuits.

But everyone knows these are the consolations of poor litigants, to speak ill of their judges when they lose their case. And indeed anyone will easily detect the poorly constructed and illiberally imposed calumnies, if they notice 1) that these censors were most serious men of whom some were archbishops, others bishops, others vicars or procurators general of orders, others doctors, and for ten continuous years performed the same office, by mandate of Clement VIII and later Paul V: which indeed the most fair Pontiffs would neither have mandated nor allowed, if they had known them to be such as their adversaries paint with such black colors; 2) that Fr. Bastida already then objected the same calumnies to Clement VIII from whom he suffered rejection; 3) that the Molinists have not always maintained the same manner of speaking about the praised censors for while less instructed they contended that their greater and better number had been for middle knowledge, they proclaimed them as most illustrious and learned men, most commended for probity, offices, experience, doctrine. Thus the Jesuit Sherlock under the pseudonym PAUL LEONARD On Middle Knowledge part 1 sect. 3, with whom agree Peter of St. Joseph Molinist and the Jesuit Ortega about Coronello secretary of the congregations; but now, when it is certainly established for them that all, except Bovio, went for Molina's condemnation, in the judgment of Livin de Meyer, they are destitute of all their virtue, and have crossed over into alien vices: so that good or bad affect toward the Molinist cause is

for some the most certain token of merit or demerit, indeed confers all merit or demerit. See more fully on this matter Thomism Triumphant art. 6 § 6 and its Apology art. 19.

Concerning Clement VIII

Fr. Livin de Meyer the Jesuit, pseudo-historian of the congregations, confesses that Clement VIII was at some time of mind adverse to Molina's doctrine, and contends that he finally inclined to his party; we say that he constantly persevered in it until death and that it was his intention to condemn it, unless he had been prevented by death: which will be clear from the following.

1° With the third examination of the Molinist cause completed, the censors offered the censure to Clement VIII, who showed the greatest offense of mind against Molina, both because of the trampled authority of the Holy Fathers and ancient theologians, and because of the novelty brought in to the supreme harm of the Church and he added, not without anger, that he would throw Molina into the prisons of the sacred Inquisition, if by chance he should happen to come to Rome; and when, with permission given to the consultors to speak, Bovio, who had once professed the Society, undertook Molina's defense, the Pontiff replied: "Father, all these reasons are trifles, and these responses which you offer are the same nonsense which we have already observed in Suarez." From the fifth relation of Pegna in Serry book 2 ch. 12.

2° When the Jesuits complained that many things had been attributed to Molina, and that nothing had been asserted by him which could be marked with Pelagianism, to quiet their clamors, and so that he might leave nothing untried for freeing Molina's reputation, if possible, the excellent Pontiff orders a fourth examination, at the beginning of 1601, in which it would be still more diligently inquired in what points Molina agrees with Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians. Bellarmine, foreseeing that this consonance would certainly be proven, attempted to divert the matter elsewhere, and said to the Pontiff that Pelagius could be understood in many ways; the Pontiff replied with offense Therefore do you wish to defend Pelagius himself? From the acts of Coronello and Diary of Pegna in Serry book 2 ch. 14.

3° When the duke of Sessa urged definition of the cause in the name of the Catholic King, the Pontiff called the head of the Society on December 31 and warned him of the proposal of condemnation to be given, that he should leave Molina undefended. From the Diary of Pegna in Serry book 2 ch. 24 and book 5 sect. 5 ch. 2. That this was the mind of the supreme Pontiff is testified even by the Society's writers Fuligatti and Pietrasanta book 6 Life of Bellarmine ch. 7, where they report that he replied to Cardinal Montalto saying that the Holy Pontiff could and wished to pronounce on this controversy: I do not deny he can and wishes, yet I pronounce that he will not define. Ibid.

4° When the Jesuits saw that Clement VIII had certainly determined to define the cause against Molina, they tried everything to deter him from his preconceived proposal. They ask for a general council to be gathered. They beg commendatory letters from everywhere in favor of Molina, they maintain in public theses at Alcalá that it is not of faith that Clement VIII is the Holy Pontiff and successor of Peter, and many other things which I pass over for love of peace. From Pegna and Lemos in Serry book 2 from ch. 25 to 30.

5° In all congregations of the fifth examination which the Holy Pontiff attended as president up to 68, on January 22, 1605, in which year he dies in March, some censure was always branded on Molina's doctrine by all consultors except one or two, the Holy Pontiff himself often attacked it, sometimes rebuked adversaries especially Valencia, because he had interpolated a passage of St. Augustine, about which see Thomism Triumphant art. 6 § 6 and its Apology art. 20: He published a Great Writing from the doctrine of St. Augustine against the Molinist doctrine, which he wished to be witness of his opinion on the controversial dogmas until death, since indeed according to secretary Coronello's report after the last session 68 he ordered both parties to respond whether that writing contained the true doctrine of St. Augustine. To which afterwards in the second congregation under Paul V the Dominican Brothers assented in all things, but the Jesuits resisted as to certain principal points, especially that grace had efficacy from God's omnipotence.

6° Finally the same is proved by the bitter complaints of Society writers against Clement VIII, namely that he was of ill will toward the Society, circumvented by the Spanish in favor of the Preachers, less skilled for the dignity of the argument, not sufficiently taught the mysteries of Molinist doctrine and especially of middle knowledge, and other similar accusations against the excellent and most learned Pontiff which are read in John Martinez de Ripalda, Annat, Paul Leonard. See Serry book 3 ch. 45 and book 5 sect. 6 ch. 5. But R.P.N. professor of the Society at Douai far surpasses all, in whose dictations we read these things: "It should not seem surprising that Clement VIII by private knowledge adhered to the Dominicans, since he was elevated to the Pontificate from their order." At these things, though I am silent, the stones will cry out.

On Paul V and his judgment to be passed against Molina.

After the death of Clement VIII and Leo XI being removed within a month of his election, Paul V from the Borghese family is elected Pope. He restores the Congregations, and after completing them, deliberates with 12 cardinals on March 8, 1606, about the judgment to be passed concerning the controversial matters.

I say therefore that in this council held on March 8, 1606, it was determined that a judgment was to be passed, and that against Molina.

The first part is proved: 1° from the mandate which Paul V gave the following day to the secretaries of the congregations, by which he ordered that the consultors separately put three things in writing: first, what was to be held by faith in this matter, what was to be condemned and by what reasoning; second, in what part Catholics differ from heretics in this matter; third, what method should be observed in the BULL, "which will have to be instituted, or apostolic constitution, and particularly whether mention should be made in the preface of the doctors who published books on this argument, and of both orders of St. Dominic and the Society." From the acts of Coronelli. Therefore it was determined to pass judgment and issue a bull.

2° The Holy Pontiff, having received toward the end of August the separate votes of the consultors, agreeing as one regarding the substance of the propositions to be condemned, except for one Bovius, on the following October 5 ordered by counsel of the cardinal general inquisitors that the Lord consultors should now convene together in the residence of the Archbishop of Armagh, and there all together "should carefully select which propositions they deemed should be condemned for settling the controversy concerning divine aids that had been discussed for so long: they should also carefully observe which things ought to be expressed in the bull, which ought to be touched upon, and reduce them to a true and apt form." Ibid. Therefore the same as before.

3° The consultors met nine times until November 19 and all signed the canons condemning Molinian doctrine elaborated by the Archbishop of Armagh, except for one Bovius the Carmelite, formerly professed in the Society, who separately presented his mind to the Pontiff through letters, in which he indicated nothing should be defined concerning the principal dogma about the efficacy of grace, and at the same time presented a specimen of the papal bull to be issued.

Having received these canons, the Pontiff commissioned two archbishops, of Armagh and Trani, and two secretaries to polish them again and arrange them in a more distinct method for the condition of the papal bull, yet to submit their lucubrations to the judgment of the others.

The Archbishop of Armagh drew up the example of the pontifical diploma beginning Gregis dominici distributed in three parts: the first consisted of a prologue; the second contained nine chapters of doctrine to be held; the third comprised 50 propositions of Molina to be condemned. Furthermore, the other censors with the secretaries, leaving untouched the prologue of the bull, concerning the second part all judged that the doctrine contained in said chapters was sound and Catholic, but obscurely delivered and beyond the mandate of Our Most Holy Lord. Note carefully that "beyond the mandate of the Pontiff" affects only the second part of the delineated bull, namely the nine chapters of doctrine to be held, not indeed the bull itself, as some adversaries less sincerely contend; for although the Pontiff

had ordered this in the first mandate of March 9, nevertheless he had not ordered it in the following ones, but had only signified about the propositions to be condemned. Moreover they judged the third part about propositions to be condemned less exact: wherefore the Archbishop of Armagh was mandated by the Pontiff either to polish his work himself or allow it to be polished by Gregory Coronelli: the most illustrious prelate agreed, and he himself corrected his lucubration with second cares, which Coronelli also corrected separately, who, leaving aside the chapters of doctrine to be defended, labored on the correction of the propositions to be condemned alone. His lucubration was approved by the censors, was accepted by the Most Holy Pontiff and preferred to the lucubration of the Archbishop of Armagh. Hence, on July 8, he ordered that copies of it be presented to the most illustrious cardinals that they might weigh the matter and form of the propositions to be condemned and state their opinion when asked. Therefore it clearly appears that it was decreed to pass final judgment and issue a bull; indeed the consultors were mandated to delineate it; for, independently of the terms of the Pontiff's mandates, for what purpose and by what authority would the censors, both those who deemed Molina should be condemned, and Bovius who favored him, have dared to delineate that bull and offer the delineated one to the Most Holy Pontiff, unless they had received this mandate from him? See more fully Th. Triomph. a. 6 § 7 and his Apol. art. 21.

The second part of the assertion, namely that this judgment was decreed against Molina, is proved: 1° it appears from what was just said that it was determined in the congregation of cardinals before the Most Holy Pontiff on March 8, 1606 that final judgment was to be passed upon matters controversial and discussed up to that point: but not against the Thomists, for the Jesuit Fathers do not say this: therefore against the Molinists for these alone were in the case with the Thomists.

2° The judgment to be passed was decreed against him whose condemnation the idea of the bull offered to the Most Holy Pontiff bore; otherwise the Pontiff would have protested that he who was being condemned was one he did not wish to condemn, and would not have ordered these writings to be polished again, but would have absolutely rejected them: but the idea of the bull offered to the Supreme Pontiff, and all the lucubrations of the censors, except Bovius, bore the condemnation of Molina: therefore.

3° When the rescript of Paul V first began to be published, by which the promulgation of judgment was suspended to another time, with the Dominicans being dismayed, the Spanish Jesuits sang triumph, holidays were granted to all students for three days, festive displays of flying fires, scenic actions, triumphal arches on whose front was inscribed in golden letters: Molina victor, and among these solemnities sacred services were offered in thanksgiving: whence, I ask, such sadness to the Dominicans, such joy to the Jesuits, from

the suspension of the promulgation of judgment, unless because these certainly predicted it unfavorable to themselves, those favorable to themselves.

4° The second condition of the peace established between the Dominicans and Jesuits through Philip III King of Spain was that both parties should supplicate the Supreme Pontiff with joined wishes for the definition of the controversy of aids. The Order of Preachers stood by the condition, as is clear from the suppliant booklet offered for this end to Paul V on June 12, 1612 by the general chapter convened in Rome. The Jesuits opposed on the contrary; the Dominicans repeated the same supplication many times to the Most Holy Pontiffs Gregory XV in 1620, Urban VIII in 1627, Innocent XI in 1681, and most recently to Benedict XIII, with the Jesuits always striving against it, demanding the judgment be wrapped in eternal silence, as was especially clear in these most recent previous years during the reign of Benedict XIII: by which argument indeed, even if others were lacking, it becomes clear which party was superior by right in the controversy, and whom the suspended judgment favors. See Th. Tri. and his Apolog. in the places cited above.

They object 1°: The Fathers of the Society after their Livinus de Meyer say that in Paul V's first mandate the censors were ordered to "turn their mind to truth alone and the worship and honor of the divine majesty, and setting aside human reasons, to put in writing what they deemed": but this does not suppose judgment passed but to be passed therefore; 2° on July 8 the Pontiff ordered that copies of the censors' lucubration be handed to the cardinals, that they might weigh the matter and form of the propositions to be condemned, and state their opinion when asked about them: therefore nothing had yet been defined; 3° in the last congregation of all the cardinals on August 28, 1607, the Pontiff inquired about the way of ending this controversy, and "whether it was expedient in these times especially to come to an apostolic definition": therefore nothing had yet been defined; 4° finally, three days after this congregation Paul V gave a rescript by which he ended the whole dispute, dismissing the consultors and parties to their own places, to whom he said: "He would at an opportune time promulgate his declaration and determination; and meanwhile he seriously enjoined that in treating this argument, no one should dare to mark the other party with any note or censure." From which it appears that the condition of both parties is equal, indeed rather better for the Jesuits, since Molina accused by the Dominicans emerged unharmed therefore the Dominicans, not the Jesuits, fell from the case.

For the solution of these little objections, note that we do not assert that in this congregation of cardinals on March 8, 1606, it was determined which and how many of Molina's propositions individually and with what censure were to be condemned, but only that it was determined that Molina's doctrine in general was to be finally condemned consequently to the deliberations held in the preceding congregations both under Clement VIII and under Paul V, in which it had always been marked with some censure. Hence

To the first, I distinguish the major: Paul V in his first mandate orders the consultors to put in writing what they deemed concerning Molina's doctrine to be condemned in general and absolutely, I deny, for they had constantly condemned it in all congregations; and thus considered, the Most Holy Pontiff had decreed it was to be condemned in the congregation of cardinals held on March 8, 1606, that they put in writing what they deemed concerning the three things stated in this his first mandate especially concerning the first, I concede. Since therefore for ten years there had been dispute about various propositions of Molina, and not all were worthy of the same censure, nor of the same moment, but some could be recalled to others as appendices or consequences, the Pontiff requires from the consultors that they note all these things distinctly and reduce them to a brief and apt form; wherefore he orders them that setting aside all human affection they put in writing what they deemed concerning these three things: 1° what was to be held by faith in this matter, what to be condemned and by what reasoning; 2° in what part heretics differ from Catholics; 3° what method could be observed in issuing the bull.

To the second, the solution is the same. Similarly to the first part of the third; and to the second part, I say that by "definition" is to be understood solemn, namely through promulgation; for the Pope's definition is not considered solemn and absolute unless promulgated.

To the third, I absolutely deny the antecedent, namely that the dispute was ended, rather indeed from the words of the pontifical rescript added it most clearly appears that its decision was suspended for the interim until the promised promulgation: hence I deny that the condition of both parties is equal, but what was superior by right in the process of the dispute, remains similarly in the same I utterly deny that Molina emerged absolved or unharmed, but only that his condemnation was delayed to another time: hence it is altogether false that the Dominicans fell from the case, but the judgment, not yet solemnly passed, yet promised, they still await and seek with all their wishes, and would that the Fathers of the Society would do the same: the case would be finished in short.

If you ask what was the cause why Paul V deferred the promulgation of the sentence to another time? I respond that the more likely cause was the exile which the Jesuits were suffering at that time from the senate of the Venetians because of the observance of the interdict laid on this state by Paul V. See Serry book 4 chapter 22.

They object moreover and principally: All that we have said in this § about the Roman censors, about Clement VIII, about Paul V and about his censure to be passed, rest on the acts of Pegna, Coronelli, Lemos and other prelates or theologians who were present at the congregations de Auxiliis but Innocent X declared in the general congregation of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition on April 23, 1654 that no faith was to be given to these acts nor could they be alleged by anyone. Therefore whatever arguments of fact can be deduced

thence against middle knowledge are of no weight: thus Honoratus Tournely with the Jesuit Fathers. This chief weapon of the adversaries in which they especially trust, crushed to its ultimate fibers with all its fortifications you have in Serry in preface 2 edit. § 12 and in book 5 sect. 1 chap. 5 and most recently in Thom. Triumph. a. 5 § 2 and in his Apolog. a. 7., so that it can seem wonderful that Tournely, who here appeals to Serry himself, objects this argument to us as if untouched. Therefore I will briefly dispatch it. Hence

I respond by distinguishing the minor: Innocent X declared that no juridical or legal faith was to be given to these acts, I concede: historical, I deny. Similarly that they could not be alleged by anyone in judgment to make certain and juridical faith, I concede; outside judgment for historical truth, I deny. That this is the true and genuine sense of the Innocentian decree anyone who knows the style and usage of the Roman curia in decrees of this kind will not deny. Thus Urban VIII, by decree given August 2, 1631, declared that to the declarations of the congregation of the Council of Trent "both printed and to be printed, and manuscript, no faith was to be given in judgment and outside by anyone; but only to those which shall have been furnished in authentic form, with the usual seal and subscription of the eminent cardinal prefect and secretary of the same congregation existing for the time." He issued a similar decree on August 11, 1632 concerning the declarations, decrees or decisions of the congregation of Rites. These decrees notwithstanding, even stricter than the decree of Innocent, the more illustrious interpreters of canon law, Fagnanus, Barbosa, Jordan, Lezana, Pignatellus, transferred the declarations or decisions of these congregations into their commentaries on canon law with unoffended foot and without anyone's reproof, although they lacked the seal and signature of the cardinal prefect and secretary, and were never published according to the prescription of law. And touching our very matter, after the decree of Innocent issued in the year 1654, Francis Macedo of the Order of Minors sent a prolific fragment of the oration of Clement VIII held on March 20, 1602, to the religious disputants inserted in the acts of Coronelli to the work which he published in the year 1667. Cardinal de Noris copied part of the same oration in 1672 in the Augustinian vindications, and yet the first work was approved by the supreme Roman inquisition, the second by the Venetian. Indeed the Jesuit Fathers themselves inserted excerpts from these acts after the Innocentian decree into their works; thus Fr. Annatus praised the idea of the bull delineated by Bovius, Fr. Germont the Memorial of Bastida, Livinus de Meyer the disputations of the Molinists held in the congregations, which nevertheless are all referred to in the acts of Coronelli and others whether prelates or theologians who were present at the congregations, to which acts Innocent declared no faith was to be given; so obvious is it to all that juridical not historical faith is to be understood, or, as Fagnanus secretary of the congregation of the Council and Lezana consultor of the Index say concerning the decrees of Urban VIII: "No faith is to be given: understand certain and undoubted; for at least they deserve probable faith, if they are referred by a trustworthy man." Fagnanus in 1 decret. de constit. cap. Quoniam, Lezana

in sum. Quæst. Reg. verb. Sac. Congreg. Indeed the Holy Pontiffs do not make truths but declare them; nor can they make what was done or said not to have been done or said, nor that a transcript conforming to its original be non-conforming, indeed nor can they declare this, unless they have seen the transcripts, examined them and compared them with their originals; which in the present case Innocent did not do, nor those who formed the decree in his name, since they speak not from sight but from hearing: "Since," they say, "both in Rome and elsewhere certain asserted acts are circulated in manuscript, and perhaps printed"; indeed they could not have done it, since they speak of acts which both in Rome and elsewhere, that is in whatever part of the world are circulated.

If you say before the decree of Innocent the acts of the congregations did not make juridical faith; therefore that decree would have been useless if it had only wanted to take away this juridical faith from them, leaving historical truth.

I respond by denying the consequence. For although before the Innocentian decree the acts of the congregations did not make juridical faith, some nevertheless attributed it to them or were said to attribute it, in order to traduce the Molinists, which to prevent the Most Holy Pontiff did not indeed take away from them the faith which they did not have, but declared what in reality they did not have and what some attributed to them, they did not have: and thus his decree was not useless. Just as the decrees of Urban VIII concerning the decisions of the congregations of the Council and of Rites about which above were not useless: for although decisions of this kind which were not in authentic form nor furnished with the seal and subscription of the cardinal prefect and secretary could not make faith in judgment according to the rules of law de fide instrum. cap. Si Scripturam and cap. Scripta; because nevertheless some either attributed it to them or could attribute it, the Pontiff prudently declared that they did not have it. And this he did with greater right, Innocent in our case because not only can transcripts not make juridical faith through defect of authenticity, but not even the originals themselves through defect of promulgation according to the prescription of law. See more about this argument if you wish in the cited authors.

Leaving now the decree of Innocent, the Molinists rise up against the praised acts from another direction. Therefore they object again that the first trumpeters of this bull and these acts were Saint-Amour and other Jansenists; at least no one dared to mutter about them while Paul V lived, or any of the consultors or cardinals who had been present at the last congregation on March 8, 1606 in which we say Molina's condemnation was decreed: therefore it is a fable equal to a dream.

I respond that the antecedent of this argument is false in every respect as Serry proved in preface 2 edit. of his Hist. § 6, and Th. Tr. a. 5 § 2, from which I excerpt these few things summarily. Saint-Amour was delegated to Rome by the Jansenists in 1652; in 1612, the

general chapter of the Friars Preachers offered to Paul V himself a memorial booklet for the promulgation of this so awaited sentence, and in it constant mention is made of the acts of the congregations. In 1620, Fulgentius Galluce general of the Augustinians transcribed in large part the acts of Coronelli which he placed in the library of the convent of Mount George where they are still preserved now. In 1622, D. Le Goulu general of the Feuillants transferred from Rome to France the Diary of D. Le Bossu consultor of the congregations; Peter of St. Joseph Feuillant Molinist saw it and suppressed it because, as he ingenuously confesses in his sweet Concordia disp. 4. sect. 4. n. 4., it openly favors the Dominicans. In 1630, D. Gibieuf priest of the Oratory praised the aforesaid acts in his work on Liberty dedicated to Urban VIII. In the same year, the Discalced Carmelites of Salamanca praised them. Similarly John of St. Thomas in 1637. Further, omitting Paul V himself, with whom the Dominicans praised both the sentence to be promulgated and the acts themselves: after 1637, Cardinal Antonio Zapata who had been present at the more secret congregation of March 8, 1606 was still living; for he died, according to the continuators of Ciaconius on May 6, 1638, at age 86, and what is most important he was living in Spain as prefect of the supreme Inquisition, where the Salamancans and John of St. Thomas openly praised the aforesaid acts. Mutius Vitellescus general prefect of the Society was living, who had played his parts in the congregations, according to Allegambe; for he was ruling the Society in 1640. Why could not others still have been living? Therefore it is most false that Saint-Amour and other Jansenists were the first trumpeters of the bull and acts, or at least that no one dared to mutter about these while Paul V lived, or any of the Consultors or Cardinals.

They press on: Natalis Alexander, Order of Preachers, to century 5 ch. 3 art. 8, says that those who accuse middle knowledge of Semi-Pelagianism are "either ignorant of Semi-Pelagian dogmas, or driven across by party zeal" but Paul V was not such: therefore.

I respond that Natalis Alexander retracted this in his letters to Fr. Daniel the Jesuit, letter 5, and asserts that this proposition of his was disapproved in Rome. See Th. Triumph. a. 6. §. 7. and his Apolog. a. 21 near the end.

They reply: The author of the bull which is attributed to Paul V reproves in Molina a proposition which Pius V absolved, by condemning its contradictory in Baius: therefore it is not from the Pontiff. They prove the antecedent: it reproves this proposition of Molina in his concordia: "In the state of fallen nature man can, with only the general concurrence of God, perform a good moral work which in order to man's natural end is a work of true virtue, referring it to God as it could and ought to be referred in the natural state". But the condemned proposition of Baius no. 76 is: "He thinks with Pelagius who acknowledges something naturally good, that is, which draws its origin from nature's powers alone". Therefore.

I respond 1° that these propositions are not contradictory, because they are not about exactly the same object; for the Baian one speaks of natural good work only; but the Molinian one about moral good work which is a work of true virtue.

I respond 2° that some Baian propositions according to the pontifical bull can be sustained in some sense thus many interpret it especially primates from the Society, Suarez tom. 1 on Grace prolegomenon 6 ch. 2; Vasquez in 1. 2. dist. 190. chap. 18 with Serry book 4. ch. 20.

Finally they urge: We excerpt all these things from Serry an unfaithful and fabulous historian, whose book was polished and corrected with the help of Quesnel, condemned by the Spanish Inquisition and whom meanwhile some vindicators of predetermining and Jansenian grace trust no less than the Turks their Koran. Thus modestly the professor of Douai in his Dictates of 1723. But miserable is not he who suffers but he who does injury dismissing therefore these inept insults, although he proves nothing of what he brings forth, nevertheless I will briefly respond to each thing.

To the first, that Serry is neither fabulous nor unfaithful as a historian, but on the contrary that the history of Fr. Livinus Meyer is unfaithful and fabulous Th. Triumph. a. 5. § 1. and Apolog. a. 7. invincibly proves especially because the history of Fr. Hyacinth Serry rests on most firm and altogether trustworthy testimonies, namely, the very acts of the secretaries of the congregations, writings of Cardinal Madrucci prefect of the congregations, various writings of the consultors, the Diary of D. Le Bossu consultor, the Diary and other writings of the most illustrious Pegna who played his parts in this cause in the name of the king of Spain, and many other moments of the same faith about which see Serry in preface § 6. and following. But what the professors of Douai babble about the implacable hatred with which Pegna burned against the Society, he refutes the calumny by the work which Pegna himself published against the edict of the Parisian senate by which they exiled the Jesuits from France for in that work he most keenly defends the rights of the Society, and extols it with immoderate praises: would thus the implacable enemy of the Society have extolled and defended it?

But the history of Fr. Livinus Meyer on the contrary is built on altogether weak and falling foundations, namely begged letters of commendation of princes and bishops, declamations and writings of the defenders of Molina himself, acts and testimonies of certain Jesuit Academies or in which Jesuits dominate and other moments of the same flour; and Serry in the fifth Apologetic book added to the second edition of his history everywhere and openly rebukes it of falsity and fully confutes it.

If you say that to this fifth Apologetic book of Serry Livinus Meyer opposed vindications of his history to which Serry fell silent.

I respond 1° Not here, as among quarreling women, is he to be judged victor who speaks last in many things the Fathers of the Society fell silent, and nevertheless therefore in these they do not confess themselves conquered.

I respond 2° Serry did not deign to respond to the Vindications of the History of Livinus Meyer for most just causes. 1° Because Fr. Meyer did not fulfill the condition which Serry had justly demanded: "If anyone," he says § 12. pref. 2 edit. of his history, "wishes to impugn this history of mine anew, it is permitted by me. Let whoever will attempt this remember, however, that he must deal with me from proved documents, and especially from the tablets of these congregations. If he acts otherwise, I will allow him to be fed by winds and fables, but I will not deem him worthy of the honor of a response; lest I seem to oppose the oracle of the wise man. Do not answer a fool according to his folly. For I think it is a kind of foolishness to wish to pronounce and define about historical matters otherwise than from their documents." Further the vindications of Livinus Meyer rest on those altogether unfaithful, weak, and falling documents as his vindicated work. 2° Because the aforesaid vindications are almost nothing else than a mere repetition of the prior history in which Meyer boldly and sometimes syllable by syllable recants the same dirges which Serry crushed to the roots, as if they were untouched, and, what is more worthy of indignation or laughter, not rarely adds this mendacious clause: "To these things the adversary has hitherto responded nothing". But if sometimes he seems to bring forth something new, which is rare, it either carries before itself the solution, or Serry anticipated it in his fifth apologetic book and in his other works written in French. All these things the Apology of Th. triumph. exhibits everywhere to the eye and is clear to anyone comparing both works.

Therefore Serry was silent to the vindications of Livinus Meyer, if however they should be called vindications, and not rather a naked transcription of the prior work already diluted; he was silent, I say, he did not fall silent as if he had nothing to respond, as the Molinists boast to nausea, but he was silent, because he had previously said more than sufficiently, and his response would have been useless and idle: he was silent, because the adversary brought forth nothing which merited further response.

To the second, I deny that Serry's book was polished and corrected with the help of Quesnel, about which see Serry himself book 5 sect. 1 chap. 1 where he does not indeed deny that his manuscript work, himself altogether unconsulted, fell into the hands of Quesnel, the typographer communicating, that he might learn from him, which is customary, whether he would easily find merchants of this merchandise, but he proves from the testimonies of Quesnel himself, and others, that nothing at all was added by him. Moreover given, which is false, that this work was printed by the care of Quesnel, is it therefore to be rejected? The Dutch daily take care to print books of Jesuits, are they therefore to be rejected? indeed, given that this whole history is the work of some

Jansenist, is it therefore to be condemned as false? Are all things which condemned authors write to be condemned? Jansenius wrote catholically on the Pentateuch and four Gospels, Arnauld for the faith of the Eucharist; and this is especially true where it concerns historical matters, whose faith rests not on the authority of the speaker, but on truthful and certain testimonies brought forth by him.

To the third, given that Serry's history was truly condemned by the Inquisition of Spain, as the adversaries narrate, for we receive this from them alone, I respond that it was condemned not because it contains false things, but because by the narration of certain facts, although true, it seemed injurious to the Holy Office and the Grand Inquisitor. This is clear from the very words of the censure, which the professor of Douai himself refers, where no note of falsity is branded, but, as he himself says, it is condemned, "as stuffed with various propositions scandalous, seditious, injurious to the Supreme Pontiffs, the Holy Office, the Grand Inquisitor, etc." Hence a most efficacious argument is drawn for the sincerity and veracity of this history, that discussed by rigorous examination of the inquisition, nothing false was found in it; for if the judges had found this, without doubt they would have branded it with the note of falsity. Moreover whatever may be about that censure of the Spanish inquisition, to which we are not bound, through all other provinces of the Church even in Rome the book runs unharmed, received with the applause of all the learned, except the Molinists, ON THE ANCIENT CENSURES OF LOUVAIN AND DOUAI, against Lessius and Hamelius Jesuits, pre-asserters of Molinian doctrine at Louvain; and various others looking to the present matter.

In the year 1587, on the ninth of September the university of Louvain struck with grave censure thirty-four propositions of Lessius and Hamelius especially about versatile grace and middle knowledge and other related matters. In the following year 1588, on January 20 the university of Douai instructed a harder censure against Lessius when asked for judgment by the most illustrious prelates of Cambrai, Mechlin and Ghent.

Many bishops and other most grave men approved these censures, and little was lacking that Lessian dogmas be condemned by decrees of synods: sending other witnesses, the Society itself makes faith of this matter in the Image of the first century book 6 chap. 4 p. 848: "With adversaries," it says, "incessantly urging our disgrace, the greater part of bishops, and certain colleges of canons had added their vote to the twin censures of the two universities. But the metropolitans of Mechlin and Cambrai were preparing a synod of bishops who would discuss our dogmas condemned by two faculties, and proscribe the same through all Belgium, as impious relics of the Massillians or Pelagius; and thus would brand the society with the mark of heretical depravity".

The University of Louvain firmly adhered to this censure up to these times, which it also very recently in 1723 declared on the occasion of the more recent censure of Douai: you

have the declaration in Th. Triumph. p. 86. Similarly the university of Douai declared that it adhered to its prior censure in 1648 and 1690: you have the declarations in Apolog. Th. Triumph. pages 79 and 80. To these add the university of Salamanca which condemned the same doctrine in 1587, in Prudentius de Monte-Major, and in 1593 in Molina: it is clear from its censures. See Th. triumph. a. 6. §. 4. and his Apolog. a. 12; Serry book 5 sect. 3 chap. 1. What should be thought about other universities, bishops and theologians, will be clear from the response of the adversaries.

Therefore the professor of Douai objects q. 5 on middle knowledge § 1 after Theodore Eleutherus or Livinus Meyer: 1° The most illustrious Nuncio sharply rebuked the doctors of Louvain immediately after he came to knowledge of its censure.

2° The faculty of Louvain was so unable to draw the Sorbonne to its parts as it had hoped, that the Sorbonnists who flourished with chief praise around these times, Duval, Isambert, Gamaches, etc., rejected physical predeterminations.

3° Various German universities of Trier, Mainz, Ingolstadt had disapproved the Louvain censure.

4° Outstanding theologians in Belgium and several bishops rose up against that Louvain censure as iniquitous and abusive, among others John Strienus bishop of Middelburg, Thomas Stapleton.

5° Lessius sent those propositions of his condemned by the faculty of Louvain to the Most Holy Pontiff Sixtus V with his apology: But the Pontiff, having convoked an assembly of cardinals after a long and profound discussion, called all those propositions articles of sound faith, and mandated to his nuncio Octavius Calatinus bishop to pronounce this his sentence and to order under pain of excommunication that no one condemn these same articles or mark them with any censure, as can be seen in the letters of Sixtus V printed by Macius 1588, July tenth.

6° Further the Douai censure was suspended and disapproved by the same votes of universities and theologians, the same rescript of the Pontiff, the same authority of the apostolic nuncio by which the Louvain one was. It is added that new dissensions having arisen at Douai in 1590, by a new edict sent to Douai the apostolic nuncio in 1594 vindicated the pristine liberty of teaching of the Fathers of the Society, prohibited under pain of excommunication that their controversial doctrine be marked with any censure..... And in 1722, the same faculty of Douai declared that the aforesaid censure was not to be adhered to.

7° Finally Molina's book on Concord was received in Spain where it was first made public right with the common vote and approval of almost all religious orders, the doctrine of middle knowledge and congruous grace was defended there in various universities, various universities there gave apt and undoubted vote for the book of Concord, none for physical predeterminations. At the same times the theological faculty of Paris approved the doctrine of the Society, rejected that of the Dominicans; seven German universities of Mainz, Würzburg, Ingolstadt, Dillingen, Vienna, Graz, Trier, and Pont-à-Mousson in Lorraine sent judgments for the same doctrine and censures against the opposite to Clement VIII at that time when the disputations de Auxiliis were being agitated. The university of Bologna in Italy also gave its vote for our opinion.

These things, I say, the professors of the Society at Douai simply narrating and asserting without any proof, as if for making faith the authority of the speaker alone sufficed. But that in these things almost as many words as there are falsehoods or dissimulations with which they feed the minds of eared youth, already long ago Serry proved with so many invincible reasons and testimonies book 4 Hist. from chap. 4 to 12, book 5 sect. 2, from chap. 4 to 11 and sect. 3 from chap. 3 to 8, and in other works written in French Thomisme Triomph. a. 6. §§. 3. 4. and 5, his Apology from art. 10 to 18 and as far as concerns the censures of Louvain and Douai, Assertion of the censure of Louvain and Douai by Steyaert opusc. tom. 1; likewise the recent work inscribed in French, Apology of R. P. Peter Soto and of the ancient censures of Louvain and Douai, etc., printed at Avignon 1738, from page 170 to the end, that it is wonderful that the obstinacy of the adversaries in rehashing these things has not yet been able to be broken. Therefore from these I will collect a few things, if not that the adversaries may be silent, at least that those deceived may be relieved of error, and the unwary may be forewarned, who do not have copies of the praised works. Therefore,

To the first, I respond that the nuncio only signified to the Louvainists, that if concord could not be entered into with the Fathers of the Society, they should commit the definitive sentence to the Holy See: he was exhorting the Fathers of the Society in turn not to rashly provoke the theologians of so learned an academy. Thus from the narration of the apostolic nuncio transmitted to Cardinal St. Severina in Serry book 1 ch. 4 and book 5 sect. 2 ch. 4. Is this to sharply rebuke the Louvainists?

To the second, I respond that it is false that the university of Louvain sent its censure to the Parisian that it might draw it to its parts, but that it might become aware of things done at Louvain, which office of urbanity it also showed to various bishops and to the university of Douai. Further this did not keep silent, because it was invited by the archbishops of Cambrai, etc., to say its opinion, but that kept silent because it was not invited, and besides at that time the most sad days of the barricades were being conducted in which it was

more incumbent on it to treat its own wounds than to cure others'. To Isaac Habert asserting the contrary in this no faith is to be given, 1° because he was a man medulously Molinist; 2° because he wrote this 60 years after; 3° because he brings forth an open falsity, while he says both academies of Louvain and Douai invited the Parisian, that it might do the same: They together invited the faculty of Theology of Paris to do as much, but it made refusal (DEFENSE OF THE FAITH, ch. 14). For it is certain that Louvain alone directed its censure to the Parisians, and this several months before the people of Douai adorned theirs. More in Serry book 1 ch. 3 and ch. 11 tom. 1 of the French defense. That the Sorbonnists at that time did not reject physical predeterminations will be clear below.

To the third, I respond that these three universities are nothing other than colleges of the Society, or at least the Jesuits fully dominate in them. Moreover these three universities did not bear sentence upon the Louvain censure nor upon the 34 condemned propositions of Lessius, but upon six antitheses in which Lessius had contracted his doctrine and that of the censure, as he himself narrates with Eleutherus: further the academy of Louvain complained of this synopsis of both doctrines artificially and unfaithfully conflated, in letters given to the people of Mainz on September 10, 1588; Serry book 1 ch. 3 and book 5 sect. 2 ch. 4 and other places cited there.

To the fourth, I respond that far more both bishops and theologians subscribed to the Louvain censure the Society itself makes faith in the image of the first century cited above. See Serry, ib. p. 688 Apol. Th. tr. a. 18.

To the fifth, I respond that this narration rests on the authority of Lessius alone actor and witness in his own cause, which the professor of Douai does not faithfully refer; for Lessius says: "The Pontiff received the propositions, and afterwards in consistory ordered them to be read before himself and the cardinals: which having been read the Pontiff, as he was an outstanding theologian, said he thought the same, and asked the most illustrious cardinals what seemed to them. Who approved the same propositions as articles of sound doctrine". You see Lessius does not say his propositions were approved by Sixtus after long and profound discussion, as the professor of Douai says; but immediately upon them being only read: which indeed savors of a fable that so many most grave difficulties be settled by a single glance.

But it is also maximally false that both the Pontiff and the nuncio called the Lessian propositions articles of sound faith: "I do not know," says Steyaert wittily, "how those who object these things have a sound head." Therefore they said only "controversies had arisen in or concerning certain articles of sound doctrine". These are the words of both decrees of both the Pontiff and the nuncio: by which is signified not more the doctrine of Lessius than of the Louvainists (for Lessius had sent their censure with his propositions to Rome, as he himself testifies in letters given to Coster December 13, 1587, and the Jesuits had previously

branded the doctrine of the Louvainists with Calvinism), but they signify only doctrine in general and its general heads, about Scripture, about grace, about predestination: as if it were said, controversy had arisen over certain heads of theology or Christian doctrine. Thus Rithovius responded in the Apologetic 1589 to Deckerius the Jesuit of Douai; thus also Lemos in the solemn congregation March 22, 1604, to Bastida objecting the same words of the Pontiff. Add that these words were not brought forth by the Most Holy Pontiff from his own opinion and by defining, but only by reciting and narrating as he had received from the apostolic nuncio; the thing is clear by itself: "Venerable brother," says Sixtus V.... "from your Fraternity's letters recently brought to us we have learned that controversies have arisen between the theologians of the university of Louvain and priests of the Society of Jesus in certain articles of sound doctrine."

Moreover that neither the Pontiff nor the nuncio ever defined or censured that the Lessian propositions were sound appears clearer than light from the words of both. For the Pontiff mandates to Basseus the nuncio that he send to him all writings and moments of both parts: "That," he says, "with the Holy Spirit as leader and author we may define those things, of which they ought to have certain doctrine"; then he orders both parties under proposed penalty of excommunication that they abstain from contentions. Octavius the nuncio having arrived at Louvain June 22, 1588, put the Pontiff's mandate into execution, received the moments of both parties and imposed silence upon all these matters under pain of excommunication, until they shall have been maturely defined by apostolic authority, in decree given at Louvain July 10, 1588 from all which things it is clear that neither the Pontiff nor the nuncio either disapproved the Louvain censure or approved Lessius's doctrine, but only ordered all things to be in suspense, until the Holy See should define them. Further the case thus brought to Rome was buried in silence: by what reason? uncertain. This one thing we know from Henriquez the Jesuit that Lessius sustained secret rebuke from the Pontiff, or at least another of the same opinion. For thus he himself book 1 On the Ultimate End chap. 12, defending gratuitous predestination speaks: "A certain learned man (more likely indicating Lessius with name concealed) preached the opposite in the academy of Louvain, with great scandal of the academy: and the matter having been brought to Pope Sixtus V, he sustained grave rebuke of his temerity". This other thing we know that the Jesuit Fathers from this time no longer dared to teach in their schools the first three propositions of Lessius about sacred Scripture condemned by the two academies. Further if it was declared by the Most Holy Pontiff and nuncio that they were sound doctrine, what prohibits them from being defended even now; it would indeed be most honorable for them to teach doctrine approved by the Holy See as sound.

Add to the heap, that the Louvain censure offered to the Most Holy Pontiffs Alexander VII, Innocent XI, Innocent XII and permitted to their judgment, always emerged unharmed, and no iniquity was found in it, as the praised Steyaert testifies, hostile enemy of the Jansenists,

third among those deputed from the academy of Louvain for this cause to Innocent XI in the assertion previously cited.

To the sixth, about the Douai censure I say the same as about the Louvain, as far as concerns the decree of the nuncio and the votes of universities and theologians. But as far as concerns the new dissensions arisen at Douai and the other decree of the nuncio, I respond that this new decree was never promulgated at Douai according to the formulas of law; nor by it, even if it was promulgated, are Lessius's propositions approved, nor is the university's censure condemned, but by it is only decreed "that to the assertors of either opinion remains their liberty of thinking and teaching,.... until through the Apostolic See, questions arisen about matters of this kind, are defined and determined". See Serry book 1 ch. 5 sect. 2 ch. 8, and the Apology of Soto n. 36. What the professor adds that the same faculty of Douai, that is four doctors in their recent censure given in 1722, declare that the ancient censure is not to be adhered to. I respond that this recent censure of 1722 already several times condemned by the bishop of Arras, was finally crushed by Vatican lightning July 18, 1729.

To the seventh, in it many things are heaped up cumulatively whose full refutation would demand a longer discussion; but, since with what facility they are asserted, with the same they can be briefly denied.

I say 1° about religious orders, that none either at the time of the congregations or at another, professed Molinism, but on the contrary almost all profess Thomistic doctrine, Thomas Triumphant broadly proves a. 4. §. 2. and his Apolog. a. 5. What can be opposed from certain letters which seem to assert that at the time of the congregations the Benedictines and Augustinians assented to Molina, is proved there from the testimonies of the most illustrious Pegna and D. Le Bossu consultor and others, that these letters were begged, and for various titles worthy of no faith; likewise from the letters of D. Cornexo abbot of St. James in Galicia, that they report only the sense of certain private persons, not of the order: moreover that these two orders now stand very far from the Molinian school everyone knows. See loc. cit. and Serry book 5 sect. 3 ch. 3.

2° About academies, it is already clear from what was said that Louvain, Douai and Salamanca, which hold not the lowest place among academies of the Christian world, marked with censure the opinions of Molina; but none of any name can be brought forth which adopted them; for what they narrate about seven German academies is worthy of laughter rather than serious confutation, since these seven academies are nothing other than colleges of the Society with title and rights of university; so that out of 50 subscribers, 40 Jesuits are numbered, who nevertheless, lest the fraud appear, concealed their possession. Besides these 7 academies with Pont-à-Mousson, which is also, as all know, a

college of the Society, condemned Calvinistic doctrine, not Thomistic exposed in badly sewn writing. See Serry in places cited, Thom. Tri. a. 6. §. 4. and his Apolog. a. 16.

To these eight universities of obscure name, Fr. professor adds two other most celebrated ones as favoring Molina at that time, namely Paris and Bologna. About Paris, the contrary is clear from two letters of Duval doctor and royal professor in the Sorbonne to DD. Crellius and Bossutius also Sorbonne doctors then living in Rome; in the first of which given January 20, 1602, the most learned Duval says: "I am distressed that someone staying in Rome has babbled that our academy wished to decree something in favor of Molina: for this is false.... But we will provide through our syndic, that meanwhile none of our bachelors defends anything about Molina's opinions in their theses." In the second given July 22, 1602, he says the dean and syndic of the faculty were unwilling to subscribe to the Molinian theses of Antoine Rose bishop of Senlis. See Serry book 2 ch. 26 and book 5 sect. 3 ch. 3, Thom. Tri. a. 6. §. 4. and his Apolog. a. 17. But if in times following then some departed from the Thomistic opinion, it does not hinder; for private opinions of some are to be distinguished from the doctrine of the whole order. But what was formerly, and what now is the doctrine of this academy, you have in loc. cit.

About the university of Bologna the Apolog. Thom. Tri. art. 15 clearly proves two things. First that the vote which is thrust forward is not of the university itself, but of some private persons, whose signatures were begged door to door: and this he proves both from the subscriptions themselves, which were not affixed in meeting of the academy, but separately and privately, and furnished with seal not of the university, but of private persons and because in the public tablets of the academy nothing about this matter is found. Second, that the writing to which certain doctors of Bologna subscribed, was lying that Molina's doctrine was approved by all universities of Spain, Germany and France, by all religious orders at Salamanca, Valladolid and elsewhere; that the very university of Louvain had retracted its censure; likewise that it exposes Thomistic and Molinistic doctrine vitiously and adulterinely these things are clear from its text. See in places cited. The same writing the Jesuit Fathers exhibited to other universities of Italy, from which they suffered repulse.

I will add for a crown that many prelates to whom Molina's doctrine became known in its origin, and the most outstanding theologians at that time not only external, but also of the Society, disapproved it. First the eminent cardinal Baronius disapproved it both in the Annals to the year 490, n. 36, and especially in the letter to D. de Villars, archbishop of Vienne; the eminent cardinal de Berulle according to Fr. Gibieuf, in epist. dedic. to Urban VIII; the eminent cardinal Quiroga, archbishop of Toledo, according to the eminent card. Baronius in his Commentaries and the Jesuit Henriquez in his censure of 1594; the bishop of Coria in his censure 1595; the bishop of Cartagena; the bishop of Mondoñedo in his censure 1596; the bishop of Lucinian; the bishop of Sitia in Candia, and almost all Belgian bishops

who gave their vote to the Louvain and Douai censures. Add the inquisition of Valladolid, indeed and the general inquisition of Spain. Among theologians, omitting now Estius, Gravius and other doctors of the universities of Louvain, Douai and Salamanca, Francisco Zumel, celebrated theologian, general of the order of Mercy also disapproved this nascent doctrine; Coqueus, Crellius, Le Bossu, Parisian doctors what about other doctors of this primary academy? It is clear from the letters of Duval just praised. John of Cartagena ord. Min., John of Rada procurator general of the Franciscans, Michael Salon Augustinian, and many others. From the Society, Mariana book on the Regiment of the Society chap. 4, Henriquez in book on the Ultimate End of man, but especially in two censures, one 1594, another 1597, in which he sharply rebukes the opinions of Molina, and in the last of which he adds, "the same care (namely of saying sentence above the book of Molina), has been committed to most learned men in Spain, to whom almost the whole doctrine of the book seemed to raise up the ancient errors of Pelagius and semi-Pelagians about the natural force of free will". And Francisco Macedo, distinguished Franciscan theologian who had professed the Society for 20 years and of which he was always most studious, says collat. 10, page 368: "With Henriquez almost all other doctors of Spain thought the same". See more in Thom. Tri. a. 6. §§ 2. 3. and 5. and in his Apolog. art. 9. 10. and 18.

§ IX.
The foundations of middle knowledge are overthrown.

Objection 1° with Tournely and other Molinists from Scripture, that famous passage Matthew 11: "Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes."

From which they argue thus: Christ rebukes the Jews in comparison to the Tyrians and Sidonians because they did not do penance having seen his miracles and heard his preaching, which the Tyrians and Sidonians would have done if they had seen the same miracles of Christ and heard his preaching; but this rebuke would have been unjust if God had known the future penance of the Tyrians in his absolute and efficacious decree from the hypothesis of Christ's miracles and preaching, and not prior to the decree through middle knowledge: therefore. They prove the minor: that rebuke is unjust to which a just response can be made; but in the opinion of the Thomists the Jews could have justly responded to this rebuke of Christ by saying: Lord, if you had efficaciously decreed our penance supposing Christ's preaching, just as you had decreed the penance of the Tyrians under the same condition, we would have done penance just as they would have done; therefore you unjustly rebuke us rather than them. This argument which the Molinists so extol, and which they use everywhere as sword and shield, the following prove to waver from every part. Hence

I respond 1° that the Apostle, in Romans 9, objects this very argument to himself; for when he had shown gratuitous predestination by the example of Jacob and Esau, and had said it is not of him who runs or wills, but of God who shows mercy, who has mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardens, immediately he objects to himself: "You will say to me then: Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?" As if he were saying: Why does God complain and rebuke me that being hardened I am not converted? if he wished to show mercy by giving grace as to others, I would be converted; for no one resists his will. Behold the very argument of the adversaries: but this the Apostle does not solve, as they do, through willing or not willing of free will, but chastises as arrogant. "O man," he says, "who are you to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, 'Why have you made me thus?' Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use?" From which it becomes evident that the Apostle thinks otherwise than the Molinists think, and that he did not recognize middle knowledge, otherwise he could and should have through it met the scandal and solved the difficulty by saying to the objector: Why do you complain? if you are not converted, as others are converted, it lies with yourself, you have like others sufficient grace whose efficacy depends on your free will. But not thus the Doctor of the Gentiles, solving this grave difficulty no otherwise than by exclaiming and recurring to the most omnipotent will of God.

I respond 2° by turning back the argument. According to the system of congruous grace, which the Fathers of the Society more commonly sustain, and which all according to their laws are bound to sustain, the Jews could have likewise responded to Christ rebuking them in comparison to the Tyrians: Lord, if you had placed us in other circumstances in which through middle knowledge you had foreseen us not going to do penance, we would have done it, just as the Tyrians would have done it whom you would have placed in those opportune circumstances, from the hypothesis that among them had been done the mighty works which were done among us, or more briefly, what is the same, if you had given us congruous grace, as you had decreed to give to the Tyrians, not otherwise than they, we would have done penance.

Tournely replies that in the opinion of the assertors of middle knowledge the response of the Jews would not be just, since in those circumstances in which they were nothing was lacking to them of those things which are necessary for conversion. But the Molinist doctor deceives or is deceived; for congruous grace was lacking to them, namely grace greater morally and in reason of benefit; but congruous grace is not less necessary in this system for conversion, than grace efficacious through itself in the Thomistic system. Therefore this argument which the Congruists so magnify, must be solved by them equally as by us, and by anyone thinking catholically about grace, since it is catholic truth that those who

are converted are prevented by grace whether physically, or morally, or congruously more powerful than those who are not converted.

I respond 3° Directly to the argument, I deny the minor. To the proof, I deny again the minor, and I say that in our opinion there was no cause of just excuse for the Jews in comparison to the Tyrians, that they did not believe and did not do penance, for two reasons: 1° because, although they did not have efficacious grace giving to act, or decree to it, they had at least sufficient graces giving power, but to one able to do that to which he is obligated and not doing it, it is sin to him; 2° because that they did not have efficacious grace was their fault, namely because they showed themselves more unworthy of it than the Tyrians would have shown themselves because of greater blindness, greater hardness and ingratitude. This reason is of St. Augustine on the Gift of Perseverance ch. 14 where he says: "The eyes were not so blinded, nor the heart so hardened of the Tyrians and Sidonians, since they would have believed, if they had seen such signs as these (the Jews) saw". It is also of St. Thomas 3 against Gentiles ch. 159, where he says "that, although someone through movement of free will can neither merit nor acquire divine grace, nevertheless he can impede himself from receiving it... And since this is in the power of free will to impede or not impede the reception of divine grace: not undeservedly it is imputed as fault to him who presents impediment to the reception of grace. For God, as far as is in him, is prepared to give grace to all; for he wills all men to be saved... But those alone are deprived of grace who present impediment to grace in themselves: just as when the sun illuminates the world it is imputed as fault to him who closes his eyes, if from this some evil follows: although he cannot see unless he be prevented by the light of the sun".

They press on: That a comparative rebuke be just, there must be equality between the extremes of comparison e.g. if Peter furnished with stronger and more apt arms conquers, but John instructed with weaker or more inept ones is conquered, the king would unjustly rebuke John in comparison to Peter that he did not conquer; but in the opinion of the Thomists there would not be equality in the Jews and Tyrians, since these would have had efficacious grace, those not: therefore.

The argument having been turned back about congruous grace as above, I respond according to both reasons given in the preceding solution: 1° I distinguish the major: that a comparative rebuke be just there must be equality between the extremes of comparison, as to duty and power of fulfilling it, I concede the major; as to actual fulfillment, I deny the major. For then there would be place for no rebuke. Further in the Jews and Tyrians there was equal duty of doing penance, equal power, since both had sufficient helps giving power in the example brought forward, arms hold themselves on the part of first act or power. 2° I distinguish the same major: there must be equality between the extremes of comparison, if the defect of equality does not come from the fault of that extreme to which requisites for

equality are lacking, let the major pass; if it comes from his fault, I deny the major. Thus John conquered would be justly rebuked, if he had refused arms equal to those with which Peter conquered. But now that the Jews did not receive helps such as the Tyrians would have received, was their fault, namely because of greater impediments which they placed to the reception of grace, as was said. What Tournely opposes to these partly remain solved from what was said, and will return below about decrees.

These are the common solutions among Thomists of this difficult argument and indeed most well-founded. Nevertheless it will not be tiresome to propose a fourth from our most wise Massoulié tom. 2 on Divine Grace dissert. 3 q. 6, because I hear it pleases not a few.

I respond 4° there was no reason for just excuse to the Jews, if indeed they did not have lesser helps than the Tyrians would have had, and by which these would have been really converted, although those were not converted by them, namely for this reason that greater was their resistance, which the same helps would not overcome, which nevertheless would have overcome the lesser resistance of the Tyrians. For although grace by its force or from the will of God is efficacious and not from the consent of man, nevertheless greater force of grace is required for overcoming greater resistance and opposition than for overcoming lesser, just as although heat is of itself combustive, nevertheless more active is required for burning wood more resisting combustion through excessive humidity, than less humid, namely for this reason commonly received in philosophy, that proportion must be preserved between cause and effect, and that a cause however efficacious it may be, nevertheless produces diverse degrees of effect greater or lesser according to diverse greater or lesser dispositions of the subject. Hence in the subject matter we commonly think and say, by how much graver temptation threatens, or more vehement passion urges, by so much more powerful grace is needed that it be overcome.

This way of explaining the efficacy of divine grace seems easy and apt for untangling the most intricate difficulties, and the praised Massoulié establishes it extensively from the principles of SS. Augustine and Thomas in cited q. 6 through four articles. Our Gonzales also seems to teach this whom our Bancel cites and follows q. 5 on Middle Knowledge a. 4. § 2; nevertheless it also suffers its own difficulties, and both Molinists and Anti-molinists rise up against it.

The Anti-molinists object 1°: This way of explaining the efficacy of divine grace seems to coincide with the way in which the Jesuit Fathers explain it, for it places it in a certain congruity, just as the praised Fathers explain: therefore.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: this way places the efficacy of grace in a certain congruity, the same as the Molinistic, I deny; far different, I concede.

It is explained: the congruity in which the Fathers of the Society place the efficacy of grace is that it is given accommodated to circumstances of person, place and time, in which it was foreseen to have effect from innate liberty, from which it happens that one consents to it, another equally hardened and sinner not consenting, and that through such consent he makes it efficacious, which by its force was not efficacious. For although they admit that grace is greater in reason of benefit in him who is converted, than in another who is not converted, because namely it is given from singular benevolence of God that it may be congruous, nevertheless they deny that it is greater physically or in efficacy of acting: hence they place the efficacy of grace not in the force of grace itself acting, but more in the consent itself of the will which subjects itself to grace; for they attribute to grace no true physical causality which precedes by nature the consent itself of the will and physically causes, nor consequently do they wish there to be infallible connection between grace and consent of the will from the force and efficacy of grace itself for they think both to be destructive of liberty.

But indeed the congruity in which the opinion, which we here expound, places the efficacy of grace, is situated in this, that to one more resisting and hardened stronger grace is given, which shakes him not in whatever way, but thoroughly by its force conquers and effects consent. Whence it follows 1° in that opinion that grace is efficacious of itself; 2° that it never happens that of two equally hardened with equal grace, one is converted, the other not; 3° that grace has true and physical causality in consent of the will; 4° that by its force and efficacy it has infallible connection with it: which all things repugn to the system of congruous grace of the Jesuits.

They reply: At least this way of explaining the efficacy of grace cannot stand without middle knowledge by which God explores the disposition of the will that he may confer on it greater or lesser grace; otherwise he could be deceived by giving lesser grace to the will, which would require greater for its greater hardening: therefore.

I respond by denying the antecedent: for that God be directed infallibly in the proportionate conferral of his grace, it is not required that through middle knowledge he explore what the will is or is not going to do from innate liberty, if such or such grace be conferred on it; but it suffices that on one part through knowledge of simple intelligence he know various degrees of his grace which he can confer; and on the other that through knowledge of vision he know the present disposition of the will, for which he selects a tempered degree of motion which can convert the will itself by its force and does convert it in fact.

The Molinists object from the contrary with Tournely q. 3 on Grace near the end and four doctors of Douai in their censure of 1722 proscribed by judgment of the Apostolic See, that

this way of explaining is Jansenian, because according to it sufficient grace is nothing other than grace inferior to cupidity: but Jansenius admitted such sufficient grace: therefore.

I respond by denying the assumption, I distinguish the major: according to this way of explaining sufficient grace is nothing other than grace inferior to necessitating cupidity, I deny the major; to non-necessitating cupidity, I concede the major. The minor having been distinguished to this sense, I deny the consequence. In this therefore Jansenius erred that he understood about cupidity by which the will would be necessarily carried away according to that saying of St. Augustine badly understood: "According to what delights more, it is necessary that we act". For according to this grace is not truly sufficient. But there seems no error, if it be understood as we understand about cupidity which the will serves from mere malice and full liberty: hence the example which Massoulié uses about fire and other causes physically acting and subjects passively resisting does not have complete parity. For although on both sides the cause acts more or less according to greater or lesser resistance of what is suffered, and in this there is parity, nevertheless there is disparity that a cause naturally and physically moving or resisting moves or resists necessarily, but grace and passion move freely. Grace indeed, because although it acts physically, nevertheless it causes not only the act, but also the mode of act namely liberty itself; passion, because it moves only morally, for God alone as author of our will can act physically in it. Hence in that system grace is truly sufficient even relatively, because the will can truly act with it, insofar as it can truly not follow contrary passion by which it is in no way necessitated. See our work inscribed in French: Letter to the Lords Doctors of the faculty of theology of the university of Douai. Moreover we propose this way of explaining only from abundance as probable, and insofar as it seems to us to save the rights of liberty and sufficiency of grace, without which we dismiss it: for the prior solutions altogether suffice, and on these, as more commonly received in the Thomistic school, we chiefly insist.

Objection 2° Tournely from the authority of St. Augustine; St. Augustine in the book on the Predestination of the Saints ch. 10 says God foreknows things which he does not predestine: "He can foreknow," he says, "what he himself does not do, like whatever sins"; therefore that knowledge is not supported by nor supposes God's decree, but knowledge which does not suppose God's absolute and actual decree is called middle knowledge: therefore.

I respond that the words of St. Augustine are not reported completely; for the holy Doctor says: "Indeed by predestination God foreknew those things which he himself was going to do but he is able to foreknow even what he himself does not do, like whatever sins". Further by the prior words the jugular of middle knowledge is sought. For I subsume: but God does all our good things, therefore he foreknows all our good things in his predestination or decree: which being posited middle knowledge falls. But what God does not do, as are sins,

he foreknows not in effective or approbative decree, but permissive; according to that other saying of St. Augustine on the Gift of Perseverance ch. 6: "Nothing happens (nor therefore can be known going to happen) unless what either (God) himself does, or permits to happen." See following obj. from St. Thomas.

Tournely presses on: St. Augustine book 11 on the Literal Interpretation of Genesis ch. 22 solving that question so often proposed by Pagans, why God created the Angel whom he knew would sin, responds: "Foreknowing him going to be evil by his own will, nevertheless he made him, not withholding his goodness in providing life and substance to the future noxious will, at the same time foreseeing how many good things he was going to do from him by his wonderful goodness and power". He moves the same question book 22 on the City ch. 1 about the Angel and first man, and dissolves it in the same way. From which the Sorbonne doctor thus argues: that foreknowledge of which St. Augustine speaks there is the very conditional knowledge through which God foreknows the Angel will operate badly if he were created: but God did not foreknow this in any efficacious decree (he should have said absolute) on his part, and conditional on the part of the object: therefore. He proves the minor: because that foreknowledge is such that with it standing God could not create the Angel but it cannot happen that with absolute knowledge of vision standing concerning the evil will of the Angel to be placed, God not create the Angel, since this knowledge necessarily presupposes the creation of the Angel: therefore God did not foreknow in any decree absolute on his part and conditional on the part of the object that the Angel would operate badly if he were created.

I respond by denying the first minor, and I say that God foreknows the conditionally future sin of the Angel in this decree subjectively absolute and objectively conditional: if I create the Angel, I will to permit his fall. To the proof, I deny the supposition of the minor: for we do not say that God foreknows by knowledge of vision the absolutely future sin of the Angel before he has decreed to create him, but only conditionally future, namely if he be created.

Tournely presses on again: St. Augustine book 1 to Simplicianus q. 2 says: "If God wished to have mercy even on them (namely who being called do not come), he could so call them in the way that would be apt for them that they would both be moved and understand and follow..... he whose mercy he has, he so calls him in the way he knows to be congruous that he not reject the caller". From which he forms this argument: God could not call those who do not come in that way which would be apt for them that they come, unless he certainly knew how they are to be called that they come: but that knowledge is not absolute knowledge of vision, because it is not concerned with those who are absolutely going to come, but who would come, if they were called in such a way, therefore it is conditional, and indeed before every predetermining decree, because it is supposed in God not to be the will of so calling them.

I respond by conceding the major and minor, I deny the consequence, and I say that that knowledge is knowledge of simple intelligence by which God knows in the treasures of his omnipotence infinite modes and graces, by which, if he wished, he would compel rebellious wills to himself.

Here Tournely stops quite jejunely from St. Augustine, but other Molinists press further both from the said book to Simplicianus and from other works of St. Augustine, and say: St. Augustine there to Simplicianus thus says: "Although many are called in one way, nevertheless because not all are affected in one way, those alone follow the calling who are found suitable for receiving it: those are elected who are congruously called... he whose mercy he has, he so calls him in the way he knows to be congruous for him that he not reject the caller... when therefore one is moved thus to faith, another thus, and the same thing often said in another way does not move, and moves another, moves one, does not move another, who would dare to say that God lacked a way of calling by which even Esau would apply his mind to that faith and join his will in which Jacob was justified?" And in the book on the Gift of Perseverance ch. 14 speaking of the Tyrians to be converted if they had seen Christ's miracles, he says: "From which it appears that some have in their very nature a divine gift of intelligence naturally by which they are moved to faith if they either hear words or see signs congruous to their minds". From which the Molinists infer that predestination and calling, according to St. Augustine, happens according to middle knowledge by which God, before he calls and predestines, foreknows and explores which modes, which circumstances are congruous for obtaining man's consent, and what man himself will will in these circumstances, especially since in the opinion of the Thomists it cannot happen that of many called in one way, that is with equal grace, one is converted, another not.

I respond by denying the consequence. For these authorities do not favor middle knowledge, because if God knows conditionally future consent from the congruity of means he knows it through that knowledge through which he knows what is congruous to each that he consent; but this he knows, as I already said, through knowledge of simple intelligence, and not through middle knowledge, whose unique object is free consent not foreseen in another than in its futurity and not in the congruity of grace for the defenders of middle knowledge do not say consent is foreknown future because grace is foreknown congruous; but on the contrary grace is foreknown congruous because consent is foreknown future in its objective truth. Therefore these authorities do not help middle knowledge at all.

I respond that it seems so to some looking at the bark of the words, but not reaching the legitimate sense, which, before I expound, I premise that it is wonderful and preposterous that the Molinists in asserting congruous grace place so much, indeed almost all force in

these books of St. Augustine to Simplicianus, which he wrote as a younger man, namely in the second year of his episcopate before the heresy of Pelagius and Semi-Pelagians had arisen; when it would be far more satisfactory to seek the mind of the holy Doctor concerning this matter from the books which he wrote after the heresies had arisen and directly against them as are On the Grace of Christ, On Correction and Grace, On the Predestination of Saints, On the Gift of Perseverance, letter 107 to Vitalis, letter 105 to Sixtus; especially since St. Augustine himself in the book on the Gift of Perseverance ch. 21 says that in these books to Simplicianus he "wrote making progress by God's mercy, but nevertheless did not begin from perfection"; and Bellarmine, distinguished ornament of the Society, book 2 on Grace and Free Will ch. 15 confesses that St. Augustine, when he wrote the books to Simplicianus, was still young, and had not yet found many things in this most difficult question, which later with greater diligence he investigated and found.

Nor does it hinder that the holy Doctor himself in book 2 Retractions ch. 1, likewise in the book on the Predestination of Saints ch. 4 and on the Gift of Perseverance ch. 21, refers adversaries to the books inscribed to Simplicianus, that they will perceive sound doctrine there; for St. Augustine does not say this universally about all things which he wrote in these books, but only about gratuitous calling to faith without previous merits, and about grace necessary for the beginning of faith, as is clear from his own words: "Let them see," he says, "whether in the later parts of the first book of those two which at the beginning of my episcopate, before the Pelagian heresy appeared, I wrote to Simplicianus bishop of Milan, anything remained by which it is called into doubt that the grace of God is not given according to our merits, and whether I did not there sufficiently argue that even the beginning of faith is a gift of God".

Wherefore concerning more difficult controversies of grace, namely in what medium God foreknows man's future conversion, by what force, how grace is efficacious, we can say about these books inscribed to Simplicianus before the heresy of Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, what the holy Prelate himself says about the writings of ancient Fathers in the book on the Predestination of Saints ch. 14: "What therefore is the need that we scrutinize their works, who before this heresy arose, did not have necessity to be versed in this difficult question for solving: which without doubt they would do, if they were compelled to respond to such things?"

These things being premised, now for understanding the objected texts it must be carefully noted that St. Augustine in these speaks only of external congruous grace or calling; it is clear both from his cited words: "When the same thing often said in another way moves, said in another way does not move"; and "if they either hear words or see signs congruous to their minds": and from various examples of external calling which he brings forth there, as that Nathanael believed at one sentence of Christ, the disciples believed with the miracle

done in Cana of Galilee, the disciples were terrified and wavered from the cross and death, the thief believed, many despised Christ working miracles who believed in the disciples doing such things, and similar things, in which St. Augustine mentions nothing besides signs, miracles and words.

Further it is more certain than certain that the holy Doctor never taught or thought that external calling was congruous and efficacious in the elect for this one reason, that it responded to their genius, propensity and natural affections; otherwise he would have taught pure and unalloyed Pelagianism, namely that external calling alone, setting aside internal grace, suffices for faith. Therefore St. Augustine must be understood about congruity which grace makes not nature.

Therefore the holy Doctor teaches and we with him that God according to the ordinary laws of his Providence, that he may dispose man to the reception of interior and efficacious grace, uses certain helps or exterior graces, such as are preachings, exhortations, reproofs, examples, miracles, etc., in which there is a certain external force of moving and persuading morally and objectively, and of which some are more apt and more congruous for moving certain men, according to certain natural dispositions of them and other circumstances; so that it often happens, as St. Augustine says and experience testifies, that "the same thing said in another way moves, in another way does not move, and moves one, does not move another."

But that these exterior graces from this precisely that they are tempered and congruous to genius, natural affections or other circumstances, obtain effect and work consent, without the help of interior grace efficaciously inclining the will, St. Augustine never dreamed, unless as I said, you wish him to have taught the most putrid heresy, ascribing salvation to external graces alone.

When therefore he said that of many called externally in one way some follow, others do not follow; likewise that the Tyrians would have believed having seen Christ's miracles, because in them the gift of natural intelligence was not extinguished, he said this without doubt without prejudice to that interior grace through which God makes this external calling congruous and works consent, and through which it happens in our opinion that of two equally called externally, one is converted, another not. Therefore the sense of his words is: Although many are called externally in one way, nevertheless because not all are affected in one way through grace, those alone follow the calling who are found, that is are made through grace, suitable for receiving it; and he calls his elect in the way he knows to be congruous for them that they follow, insofar as he perfectly knows the force and efficacy of his grace by which it happens both that the calling is congruous to them, and they consent. Thus our Lemos responded in the 2nd congregation before Paul V September 20, 1605, to Bastida objecting this place of St. Augustine from book 1 to Simplicianus q. 2.

And that this is his mind St. Augustine openly signifies in many places. Thus On the Predestination of Saints ch. 8 he says: "When the Gospel is preached, some believe, some do not believe; but those who believe with the preacher sounding externally: within they hear from the Father and learn... This is, it is given to them that they believe". And in the book On Correction and Grace ch. 14 he says external correction becomes salutary within, insofar as God "acts within, holds hearts, moves hearts, and draws them by their wills, which he works in them". Conformably to these St. Prosper in his poem on the ungrateful: "Let the Apostle run through the world; Let him preach, exhort, plant, water, rebuke, press on; Yet that by these efforts the hearer be advanced, Not the Teacher nor disciple, but grace alone Effects..."

But why do we seek the mind of St. Augustine elsewhere, when in that very place which is objected to us namely book 1 to Simplicianus q. 2 he openly declares it, and expressly asserts that external calling has from interior grace that it is congruous and efficacious; for when in that question he had attributed much to this external calling, thus he concludes it: "Who can believe, unless by some calling; that is unless he be touched by some testification of things?..... But who embraces in mind something which does not delight him? or who has in his power that either what can delight him occur, or that it delight when it has occurred? When therefore those things delight us by which we are perfected to God, this is inspired and provided by the grace of God, not acquired by our nod and industry or merits of works: because that there be nod of will, that there be industry of study, that there be works fervent with charity, he bestows, he grants: therefore we are ordered to ask, that we may receive". Hence in book 1 Retractions ch. 2 speaking of the two books to Simplicianus he confesses that he indeed attributed much to free will, yet so that in the end he referred all things to divine grace: "In the solution of which question," he says, "labor was indeed made for free will of human will, but the grace of God conquered. Nor could it be arrived at except that by most liquid truth the Apostle be understood to have said: For who distinguishes you? But what do you have that you have not received? which also the martyr Cyprian willing to show, defined this whole by the very title, saying: 'In nothing is to be gloried, when nothing is ours'". Which things indeed cannot be understood of congruous grace whether external or internal in the Molinistic sense, but of grace alone efficacious of itself, as we proved elsewhere.

To this solution, which is common among Thomists, Massoulié adds another according to the system proposed in the first argument, saying that the congruity of which St. Augustine speaks is situated in this that to the more hardened to be converted more powerful grace is to be conferred, lesser to the less hardened. From which it happens that although many are called in one way, nevertheless not all follow, because not all are affected in the same way, but some are more hardened than others and resist more; likewise that God so calls him whose mercy he has, as he knows to be congruous for him that he not reject the caller,

insofar as he confers on him grace which he knows to be stronger than his resistance. See more broadly the praised theologian q. 6 cited a. 4.

They press again from St. Augustine: The holy Doctor, in the same place to Simplicianus q. 2, says: "That we will God wished to be both his and ours, his by calling, ours by following"; On the Spirit and Letter ch. 33: "God acts by persuasions of things seen whether externally or internally, but to consent or dissent is of proper will"; and City of God 12 ch. 6 responding to the question which asks about two called by equal calling, equally affected in body and soul and struck by equal temptation, why it happens that one stands, another falls? he says: "What else appears, except that one wished, another did not wish to fall from chastity". Therefore according to St. Augustine grace has from our consent that it is efficacious, consequently not grace itself is foreknown of consent, but from consent itself foreseen grace is foreknown efficacious, consequently through middle knowledge.

To the first two places and similar ones, I respond that St. Augustine wishes nothing other than that calling is from God alone and not from us, but consent indeed is from us; but that it is so from us that it is not also from God himself operating it in us, St. Augustine does not say, rather on the contrary he affirms; On Correction and Grace ch. 2: "Let them understand," he says, "if they are sons of God, that they are acted upon by the Spirit of God, that they may do what is to be done, and when they have done it, let them give thanks to him by whom they are acted upon: for they are acted upon that they may act, not that they themselves do nothing". In the book on the Gift of Perseverance ch. 13: "We will, but God works in us even to will: we work, but God works in us even to work according to good will: this it benefits us both to believe and to say, that there may be humble and submissive confession and all may be given to God"; thus a hundred times.

To the third, similarly St. Augustine truly said there is no externally appearing cause why one stood, another did not, except the proper will of each; but that he who stood willed this, the holy Doctor does not deny to be from another latent cause, namely the grace of God which works willing itself, as he continually teaches with the Apostle. Finally it must seem wonderful to anyone that modern Molinists so pertinaciously contend that St. Augustine recognized and approved middle knowledge; when Molina himself their leader and the primates of the Jesuits freely confess that it was unknown to St. Augustine. See § 4 proof 4 and last, and § 7.

Objection 3° from other Fathers: St. Chrysostom homily 12 on the Epistle to the Hebrews says: "First we must choose what things are good, and then God introduces what are his; for he does not precede our wills, lest free will be harmed"; therefore before he decrees his good things, he explores our wills through middle knowledge. Hence homily 31 and 65 on Matthew he says "God then called (Matthew and Paul) when he knew they would consent".

St. John Damascene book 2 on Faith last chapter: "God indeed foreknows virtues and vices and those things which are from our free will, but does not predetermine them". Therefore he does not foreknow them in decree, but outside through middle knowledge: therefore.

To St. Chrysostom, I respond that he only wishes that God does not bestow habits of virtues on adults unless they prepare themselves for them, but that this preparation is also from God the holy Doctor does not deny, for when he says God does not precede our wills, he does not understand about all precedence, nor do the Molinists themselves so understand, for it would be Semi-Pelagian, but about necessitating precedence; hence he adds, lest free will be harmed. But when he says God called the Apostles when he foreknew they would obey, he must be understood when he foreknew he would work in them that they would obey; according to the rule of St. Augustine on the Gift of Perseverance ch. 19 about which above: "What prohibits us, when we read God's foreknowledge among some handlers of God's word, and it concerns the calling of the elect, to understand the same predestination?" And: "Unless you so understand the doctrine of Chrysostom," says Cardinal Toledo of the Society of Jesus (annotation 54 on ch. 5 of Luke), "I do not agree with him, but I think the contrary altogether true".

To Damascene, I respond with St. Thomas that Damascene names predetermination imposition of necessity, as is in natural things which are necessarily determined to one, which is clear from what he adds: "For he neither wills evil, nor compels to virtue". Nor can the adversaries understand about all predetermination, since they themselves do not deny that we are predetermined by God in some way at least morally.

They press on from St. Thomas: The holy Doctor on Truth q. 12 a. 10 both in the body and to 1 and 3, teaches that foreknowledge extends more widely even in good things than predestination: for he says predestination is only about those things which are done by God alone, and not about those which are done through secondary causes whether natural or voluntary, but about these there is only foreknowledge. And 3 p. q. 1 a. 3 to 4 he says that "predestination supposes foreknowledge of futures". Therefore.

To the first, I respond that the doctrine which is here thrust upon us as St. Thomas's, if understood crudely, is an open error; namely that good things which are done by us are in no way predestined and willed by God. Far different therefore is St. Thomas's sense. The holy Doctor there explains a certain division of prophecy by St. Jerome into prophecy of commination, of predestination, and of foreknowledge, so that, according to Jerome, prophecy of commination is prediction of the order of causes to effect, which order can be impeded, as is clear in Jonas's prediction of Nineveh's overthrow. Prophecy of predestination, prediction of those things which are done by God alone. Prophecy of foreknowledge, prediction of those things which are done by secondary causes, whether natural or free. Predestination therefore taken in this sense of St. Jerome, St. Thomas says

is not per se about those things which are done by us, but only per accidens and indirectly, insofar as they are from God, to 1 and to 4. From which it is clear that predestination, if taken more broadly, as we take it, is also of good things which are done by us.

To the second: St. Thomas there intends to prove that Christ would not have been incarnated if Adam had not sinned, and therefore that the predestination of the Incarnation supposes foreknowledge of Adam's sin. Hence when he says that predestination supposes foreknowledge of futures, he understands about futures which are not constituted through predestination, as are sins. Thus Cajetan, and after him others. Sylvius rightly adds that this text of St. Thomas, if well inspected, imports nothing more than that predestination supposes him who predestines to be foreknowing of futures.

For the solution of similar instances, whether from St. Thomas or from other Fathers, note that predestination is taken in two ways: strictly, for the decree specially ordaining rational creature to supernatural end; broadly, for any effective decree of some good. When therefore the Fathers sometimes say that foreknowledge extends more widely than predestination, they mostly take predestination in the first sense, according to which it is true that foreknowledge even in good things extends more widely than such predestination, because good things of the natural order are not made through it, but through decrees of natural providence, in which therefore they are known.

The moments from reason which Tournely objects are drawn from the impossibility and uselessness of decrees subjectively absolute and objectively conditional, from harm both to human liberty and divine holiness, from insufficiency of sufficient grace in our system. The first we will dissolve in the following §, the others in the following dissertation on Decrees of the divine will. What remain of lighter moment I will briefly dispatch. Therefore,

Objection 4° from reason: 1° God does not know conditionally future free things through knowledge of simple intelligence, because this is concerned only with possibles, nor through knowledge of vision, because this is concerned only with existents: therefore through middle knowledge. 2° The knowledge of God in Scriptures and Fathers is called wonderful: but there is nothing wonderful that God knows in his will what he has decreed to do for thus men know. 3° God certainly knows this conditional future: if I shall decree efficaciously Peter's consent, Peter will consent: but this he does not know in actual decree, since it is supposed not yet to be posited: therefore before decree through middle knowledge. Similarly God knows before decree this conditional future if God commands death to Christ, Christ will choose it; for this is true even in the prior sign to decree: therefore.

To the first, I respond it is a mere question of name, about which even Thomists are divided. Some recall the knowledge of conditionally future free things to knowledge of

vision; because, they say, although insofar as it is of vision, it looks only to existents, nevertheless insofar as it is free and of approbation, it looks to all free objects which say in some way order to existence. Others recall it to knowledge of simple intelligence, because, they say, just as there is given in God double knowledge of vision, one natural and necessary by which he sees himself, another free by which he sees creatures; so there is given double knowledge of simple intelligence, one natural and necessary which looks to merely possibles, another free which looks to conditional futures: but that it is commonly called by St. Thomas and Theologians necessary, is therefore because it is chiefly occupied about possibles. From these two opinions, choose which you wish, and call this knowledge by whatever name you wish it is the same, nor does it matter anything to the present controversy, provided you do not say this foreknowledge precedes decree, for about this alone the question is agitated.

To the second, I distinguish the minor: there is nothing wonderful that God knows in his will what he has decreed to do: stopping there, let it pass; other things being added, I deny. This therefore is wonderful in God's knowledge and proper to him alone that through it God knows all things in his essence as in cause, and since he is the free cause of all created and creatable things, as he wills and insofar as he wills, he sees all these things in the free decree of his will: whence it follows that this knowledge founded in decree is itself also cause of things, that it is eminently speculative and practical, that it is intuitive of things present in eternity without loss of their contingency and futurity, that it is measure of things and not measured by things, certain and infallible, universal and extending to all things.

To the third, I respond this conditional future: if I shall decree efficaciously Peter's consent, Peter will consent, is not a contingent future about which the question proceeds; but a necessary future, not by necessity of consequent, but of consequence, therefore known through knowledge of simple intelligence: just as in these propositions if I see Peter sitting, Peter sits; if God foreknows Peter will consent, Peter will consent, although the extremes are free, nevertheless the connection between them is infallible and necessary, and therefore pertaining to knowledge of simple intelligence. The same could be said about that other if God commands death to Christ, Christ will choose it, by reason of Christ's impeccability. Or it must be said that in it decree is involved on the part of the condition as supposed, for from this that Christ is impeccable, it implies that God imposes precept on him without at the same time decreeing to move his will to fulfillment of this precept.

They press on: From determining decree the consent of the will does not follow necessarily: therefore the connection between it and consent of the will is not infallible and necessary.

I respond by distinguishing the antecedent as before: from determining decree the consent of the will does not follow necessarily by necessity of consequent, I concede; by necessity of consequence, I deny: or consent does not follow necessarily, as if it were placed coactively and without liberty, I concede; does not follow necessarily in that way in which it is willed by God, I deny. For since God's will is most efficacious, if he wills Peter to consent freely, it follows necessarily that Peter will consent freely: just as if he foreknows Peter will consent freely, it follows necessarily that Peter will consent freely; if I see Peter freely sitting, it follows necessarily that Peter freely sits.

You will insist: From the given solution it follows that God's knowledge with respect to conditional futures has a necessary object which is against the hypothesis and which the Thomists deny. I prove the sequence: from efficacious decree to conditional future there is necessary consequence from what was said, therefore if that conditional future is known in that efficacious decree, the object of that knowledge will be necessary.

I respond by denying the sequence. To the proof I distinguish the consequent: if conditional future is known in efficacious decree, the object of that knowledge will be necessary, if decree enters on the part of the condition or antecedent and is part of the object, I concede, but we do not so dispose; if it is only the medium which God uses that in it he may infallibly know conditional future, as we dispose, I deny. Therefore according to us the object of conditional knowledge is precisely contingent conditional future, e.g. if the Gospel is preached to the Moors, they will be converted, where there is no necessary connection of consequent with antecedent. But decree is established by us as medium on the part of the subject, in which he may infallibly know this object or this connection of itself contingent of preaching of the Gospel with conversion of the Moors: and because decree is about conversion future contingently and freely, hence it happens, that although it infers that infallibly, nevertheless it does not take away, but on the contrary infers that it is future contingently and freely under such condition, otherwise it would not be efficacious.

What can be opposed about the truth of propositions about the future independently of decree or about the law of contradictories, we have anticipated above while treating of knowledge of absolute futures.

§ X.

Decrees in God are asserted to be subjectively absolute and objectively conditional.

Since we have proven up to this point that God does not know conditional future events through middle knowledge before a decree, but in the decree itself which is subjectively absolute and objectively conditional, determining the conditional futurition of things; and since our opponents vigorously attack decrees of this kind and deny they exist in God, it

remains for the completion of this famous controversy that we show by invincible reasons that they must be admitted. For which

Note 1°. A decree in God, which is also called predefinition and predestination (taking predestination in a broad sense), is nothing other than the free volition or efficacious and infallible determination of the divine will, yet gentle, concerning future events. It is twofold, absolute and conditional: absolute, which depends on no condition either on the part of the subject or on the part of the object, and is expressed absolutely through the word "I will," e.g., "I will create the world," "I will save Peter"; conditional, which depends on some condition and is expressed under that condition; and this again is twofold: conditional on the part of the subject, and on the part of the object.

Conditional on the part of the subject is when the person decreeing does not indeed have an actual will of doing such a thing, but would have it if a certain condition were placed: as when I say: "I would hunt if I were not a cleric"; "I would go to Rome if I were not gouty." Hence such a decree is only a velleity, by which indeed nothing is actually decreed, but is left to be decreed in the future if the condition is placed. Conditional on the part of the object only is when the person decreeing has an actual volition of doing something, yet the execution is suspended until a certain condition is placed: as when someone says "I will give a thousand florins to Titius if he takes my daughter as wife"; "I will give my horse to Caius if he meets me tomorrow."

Note 2° that absolute decrees concerning future events exist in God, no one denies; because God does nothing in time which He has not willed from eternity, since He does not begin to will something in time. But regarding our free acts there is a disparity between us and the Molinists, because according to us, the absolute decree certainly and infallibly determines and causes their futurition, consequently it is a suitable medium in which God certainly knows absolute futures. But according to the Molinists it is not a determining decree, but only of concurring with the act which God saw through middle knowledge that man would determine himself to by innate liberty, ready to concur with the opposite if man wanted to determine himself to this: hence the certainty of the future event is not derived from that absolute decree, but from middle knowledge, and thus that decree is not the medium in which God certainly knows absolute futures, but only a condition without which nothing can be known to be freely future, as Annatus says. See § 4 proof 2. Nor do the Molinists commonly assign it as a medium as we saw in article 4 of this dissertation. Sometimes however when pressed by arguments, they flee to it as an escape. See the cited § and elsewhere.

Moreover, it is certainly established that conditional decrees on the part of the subject do not exist in God, because since they involve the imperfection of potentiality and suspension, they are repugnant to God. Therefore the question is only about decrees that

are subjectively absolute and objectively conditional determining the conditional futurition of things.

I say: Decrees that are subjectively absolute and objectively conditional determining the conditional futurition of things must be admitted in God.

Proof 1° from Holy Scripture: God in the Holy Scriptures promises that He would do many things if certain conditions were placed: e.g., He promised Adam that his posterity would be born in original justice if he did not sin; He promised the children of Israel that He would lead them into and preserve them in the promised land if they observed the law; He promised David and Solomon that their sons would sit forever on the throne of Israel if they obeyed His commandments; likewise He promised Abraham that He would spare Sodom if there were ten just men in it, and many other similar things. Therefore when God made these promises, either He had the will to fulfill the promise when the condition was placed or not. If the first, we have our intent, for there is a will or decree absolute on the part of the subject and conditional on the part of the object. If the second, therefore God lied, promising He would do what He truly did not will to do.

Likewise many conditional future events are revealed as certain in Holy Scripture, e.g., that King Joas would have struck Syria unto destruction if he had struck the ground with arrows seven times; that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have converted if Christ had been announced to them; that King Zedekiah would live if he went out to the king of Babylon; that the eternal Father would send the Son ten legions of angels if He asked for them, and others. Either therefore the divine will was determined concerning these futures, given the condition, or not. If the first, again we have our intent: if the second, therefore these futures were also indeterminate and suspended, and could not be said in Holy Scripture to be certainly future if the condition were placed; since, while the divine will on which they depended remained indeterminate and suspended, they also remain indeterminate and suspended.

And do not say with Tournelius and other Molinists that these are affirmed to be certainly future under condition not from a decree that already existed, but from a decree that would have existed if the condition had been placed. For since between the decree and the condition there would be no connection from the nature of things, it cannot be said that the decree would have been placed, unless God Himself had decreed to place the decree thus, and so unless there were a decree of the decree, which is absurd. See § 5 of the preceding dissertation.

If you say moreover that in all these futures the condition depends not on God decreeing but on human will; but the opponents do not entirely reject conditional decrees, provided

the condition does not depend on the one decreeing; for they admit the decree of saving all men if they will it; the decree of concurring with man if he wills.

I respond 1° Given this, the arguments of the opponents largely collapse: for they can no longer object that decrees subjectively absolute and objectively conditional are new and useless; that no change follows in the creature which founds a relation of reason in God, as every decree implies: that conditional future cannot be the object of divine will, and others.

I respond 2° by denying the assumption. First, the condition required for the conversion of the Tyrians, namely to send them preachers, to perform miracles, depended on God alone. In other cases the conditions so depended on created will that equally at least in the opinion of the opponents, they depended on God's will since without His concurrence at least, none would have been placed.

It is proved 2° from SS. Augustine and Thomas. St. Augustine, as is clear from what precedes, says that God makes things future by predestining them, and that He knows these in His predestination; but the same reasoning applies proportionally to absolute and conditional futures: therefore just as God makes absolute futures by absolutely predestining them, so also conditional futures, by conditionally predestining them.

St. Thomas in 1 dist. 46 q. 1 a. 1 ad 2, here q. 19 a. 6 ad 1, and in 1 Tim. 2, recognizes in God an antecedent will of saving all men; and q. 23 de Verit. a. 3, that this will is sincere and of good pleasure; but according to St. Thomas this antecedent will is subjectively absolute and objectively conditional with a condition not depending on human will: therefore. The minor is proved: The holy Doctor in the cited place in 1 says: "Antecedent will can be called conditional, nor yet is there imperfection on the part of divine will, but on the part of the willed; which is not taken with all circumstances which are required for right order to salvation." The same here in a. 6 cited, so that according to St. Thomas the decree of saving all men should thus be understood in God: "I will save all men if this does not repugn the manifestation of my attributes, the order of my universal providence, the contingency and defectibility of men"; therefore.

It is proved 3° by reason. There certainly are many conditional futures as is clear from Holy Scripture, nor do the opponents deny it: but these are not except through decrees subjectively absolute and objectively conditional; for as we proved at length in § 5 of this article, conditional futures are not from themselves, otherwise they would not be free but necessary, contrary to hypothesis, and moreover nothing can extract itself from the mass of possibility and give itself some actuality, such as is order to existing under condition. Nor from the condition to be placed, since between it and the future there is no connection, or only contingent, as between the preaching of the Gospel and the conversion of the Tyrians, between striking the earth and the devastation of Syria. Nor from secondary

causes, for setting aside the decree or determination of the first cause, secondary causes are indeterminate and indifferent to positing or not positing the effect. Nor finally from a decree that would be if the condition were placed, because for actual futurition a cause must be assigned which is and not which would be: and moreover, as we were just saying, since between decree and condition there is no connection from the nature of things, it cannot be said that the decree would be placed if the condition were placed, unless it were so constituted in the divine will: therefore. See more in the cited place.

Likewise, God certainly knows conditional futures: but He knows them only in His decree subjectively absolute and objectively conditional; for He does not know them either in the supercomprehension of causes, or in decree as future, or in formal or objective truth, as we proved at length in what went before: therefore there remains only decree in which He knows them.

Objections are solved.

Obj. 1° Decrees subjectively absolute and objectively conditional in the Thomistic sense, 1° are new, of which namely there is no mention either in Holy Scripture or in the Fathers, and which were invented only at the beginning of the last century.

2° Are useless: for what does it contribute to God's perfection, governance of the world, or anything else, that God decree futures under a condition which will never be?

3° Are plainly illusory and nugatory; since they are about futures under a condition which depends entirely on the one decreeing, and which he establishes not to place: would he not be considered to be mocking and trifling, says Tournelius, who e.g. would say, I will give Peter 100 coins if he visits me tomorrow, yet he determines within himself to leave home early in the morning and not wait for Peter; or as others argue, if he says: I will give you a hundred coins if you fly through the stars.

4° Are contradictory for through them God wills and does not will the same object, e.g. He wills the betrayal of David by the Keilites; and does not will it, because He does not will David to remain with them. He wills the conversion of the Tyrians, and does not will it, because He does not will the Gospel to be preached to them.

I respond 1° all these things can be turned back against conditional decrees in the Molinistic sense, namely dependent on the consent of free will. 1° They are new and unheard of before Molina, except perhaps among Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians. 2° They are useless, illusory, nugatory, contradictory: because they depend on a condition intrinsically and from the nature of things repugnant, which namely cannot be fulfilled without that very thing which is promised; for when God according to them thus decrees: I

will give you my concurrence if you determine yourself; it is just as if He would say: I will give you light if you see this object; I will give you existence if you do this; which is altogether nugatory and contradictory, because God's concurrence is no less necessary for man to determine himself than light for seeing and existence for acting.

I respond 2° to each point. 1° These decrees are not new, but are founded in Holy Scripture, SS. Augustine and Thomas, as is clear from the first and second proofs. But if more recent authors have spoken of them more fully and distinctly than the ancients, they were driven to this by the question raised about the knowledge of conditionals. Indeed our Gonet shows these were formerly approved by the more illustrious writers of the Society, Suarez, Arrubal, Henriquez, and others.

2° They are not useless, because although they lack their ultimate effect, yet they are useful for many other things. 1° They contribute to the perfection of God's knowledge who without them would not know conditional contingent futures certainly, as we have proved more than sufficiently both here and in what precedes. 2° They contribute to the providence of the supreme and universal Governor of the whole universe, as I will say presently. 3° Through them secondary causes are ordered and inclined to certain effects, indeed some are sometimes produced; thus from the antecedent and conditional will of saving all men, sufficient helps for salvation are provided for all. 4° Through them are manifested the freedom of will, the defectibility and contingency of creatures, the dispositions of secondary causes. Thus through the decree of the conversion of the Tyrians, if the signs which were done among the Jews had been done among them, we know the Jews were harder and more obstinate than the Tyrians. 5° Finally divine promises are founded in them; for God could sincerely promise nothing under condition unless He truly so willed.

3° They are not illusory and nugatory. This is clear 1° from the very fact that they are useful; 2° because, although it is nugatory to will something under a condition intrinsically and from the nature of things impossible, such as that which the opponents imagine: I will give you a hundred coins if you fly through the stars, or even that which they themselves defend, I will give you concurrence if you determine yourself, as we saw in the first response, yet it is otherwise when the condition is only extrinsically and from accidental supposition impossible, as in our case. For it pertains to the universal Provider of the whole universe, who contains contrary causes among themselves, that He will certain things considered under one respect, which viewed according to another aspect He does not will, and thus that He will certain things under condition, which condition however for other reasons sometimes hidden, sometimes manifest, He does not will to be placed: for we must not measure the supreme Deity by our measure. Thus, e.g. He wills to overthrow the sinful Ninevites, whom repentant He wills to save; He wills to spare Sodom if there will be ten just

men in it, which, that condition not being fulfilled, He wills to destroy. Thus He wills the salvation of all if it does not repugn higher ends, but because it does repugn, He wills efficaciously only the salvation of some. Likewise He wills to save all, some through humiliations, afflictions, persecutions or martyrdom; this indeed He cannot will efficaciously unless He permit the sins of tyrants and persecutors, whom therefore He justly wills to damn. Thus finally He wills to save all if they finally persevere in good; and yet He does not give to all either efficacious or congruous grace necessary for final perseverance, and so of others. This objection therefore comes from the limited understanding of our mind which considers the supreme Deity in the manner of a particular agent, and cannot rise to the unlimited providence of the universal Provider, to whom it belongs to permit many evils whether physical or moral for higher ends known to Himself, and to order not only different but even contrary things among themselves: according to that of Ecclesiasticus 33: Look upon the works of the Most High, two and two, one against another.

4° They are not contradictory; because it is false that through them God wills and does not will the same object formally, but only materially the same, and this still in different ways, namely efficaciously and inefficaciously in which there is no contradiction. Thus He wills the salvation of all considered in itself, and this inefficaciously; He does not will the salvation of all considering all circumstances, and this efficaciously. He wills inefficaciously the conversion of the Tyrians if the Gospel is preached to them; He does not will it efficaciously, because for higher ends He does not will the Gospel to be preached to them: He wills inefficaciously to destroy the sinful Ninevites, He wills efficaciously to save the penitent Ninevites. Thus, e.g. a traveler has an efficacious will of giving money to a robber threatening death, and an inefficacious and conditional will of not giving, namely if the danger of death were not imminent.

Instance: Granted conditional decrees about things pertaining to this universe are tolerable, at least it is ridiculous and absurd to assert them about infinite combinations of possible things, like these: if in a possible world this animal were hungry, I will that it use food. If this possible tree were to flower, I would make so many of its flowers fruitful. If a bird were to sing in a possible world, a goat would leap there, and infinite other similar things.

I respond: Whether or not conditional decrees about combinations of possible things are given, does not pertain to the present question, in which we inquire only about conditional futures pertaining not to possible worlds but to this present one, consequently about decrees concerning them, and not concerning possibles. But whether conditional decrees in God about combinations of possible things are really given, consequently whether they are conditionally future, some deny, some affirm, as I already said in article 5 of this

dissertation near the end. But even if they were given, the following observation shows they would not be absurd and ridiculous. Therefore,

For a more efficacious and clearer solution of these objections it will not be irrelevant to note here briefly what our most learned Goudin observes and explains more fully, namely that conditional decrees are not to be considered as altogether separate from absolute decrees, but as contained in them. For there is one simple free determination in God concerning the whole collection of creatures, which is understood by the name of Providence, by virtue of which one thing is ordered to be absolutely, another to be conditionally, another not to be, and thus as it is variously compared to objects it takes on the nature of decree, now absolute, now conditional, now of volition, now of nolition, and in this one simple determination of all being He sees not only what will be absolutely, but also what would be conditionally.

The matter will become clear by example. Suppose an architect who conceives in mind the idea of a house to be built and has destined various parts of matter to various places of the house: he sees absolutely that the stone which will be in the roof will have such a figure, and that which will be in the foundation, such; he sees also that if that which will be in the roof had been to be placed in the foundation, it would not have had that figure which it will have, but another such; nor for this is there need of any special and separate determination by which he says, I do not will that this stone be in the foundation, but I will that if I were to will it to be in the foundation, it have such a figure, as the opponents imagine in God; for this seems idle and somehow absurd; but it suffices that he prudently and wisely decreed the whole house to be disposed in such a way that in this decree he sees what each part will be in its place, and what it would have been if it had been in another place. Thus the supreme Artificer of things freely determined a certain disposition of all being, which although it is absolute in itself, yet has the nature of conditional to objects viewed in another way: hence in it He certainly sees not only what will be absolutely future, but also what would happen in some other hypothesis: thus e.g. Genesis 18, God foretold to Abraham the absolute future destruction of Sodom, he asks whether it would be destroyed if at least twenty or ten just were in it? God responds that in this hypothesis it would not be destroyed, looking namely not to some idle conditional decree, such as the opponents imagine and attack, by which He would have thus separately established: I do not will to spare Sodom, yet I will that if there were ten just in that city, it would not perish; but looking to that eminent reason of His providence, according to which both that city was absolutely to be destroyed because there were not even so few just in it, and yet was not to be destroyed if there really had been. Which same holds place in all other hypotheses.

Conditional decrees thus explained are manifestly rational and worthy of God. Hence of their own accord fall what the opponents object; for they are not useless, nugatory or

contradictory, but manifestly contained in the very perfection and amplitude of the divine disposition embracing all things. Nor likewise are they new, but most ancient, since nothing is more ancient and more celebrated among the ancients than that God determined and knew all things in the reasons of His providence. These things, I say, the cited theologian more fully both here tract. 1 q. 2 a. 1; see if you wish.

Obj. 2°: There is no decree in God unless some change follows on the part of the creature: but from a conditional decree no change follows in the creature, since it is inefficacious unless the condition is placed which never will be: therefore. The major is proved: from any decree of God there results in Him a new relation of reason, but this cannot result from change made in God: therefore from change made in creatures.

I respond 1° this argument, which is proper to Vasquez and in his judgment inexpugnable, displeases his associates Suarez, Granada, Arrubal and others, and rightly, since they and he admit in God a decree of concurring with the creature if it wills; which decree operates no greater change than ours in the unwilling creature. 2° The major being freely granted, to the minor I respond that from the conditional decree there follows in the creature sufficient change to found a new relation of reason in God. For 1° through it the thing passes from the state of possibility to the state of some futurition, which is a certain objective or moral change. 2° Just as from an absolute decree there follows real absolute change, so from a conditional decree there follows conditional change; so that by virtue of it it would be really changed if the condition were placed: and either of these changes suffices that God be compared to creatures in another way than before, and that our intellect conceive in Him a new relation of reason. It can be added from the premised observation that real and absolute change truly follows from the conditional decree, because it is really comprehended, indeed is formally the same with the absolute decree by which things are produced in being, as was said.

Obj. 3° A conditional future since it does not actually exist, is not good, therefore it cannot be the object of divine will.

I respond that neither does absolute future actually exist in reality, and yet it is the object of divine will, for this therefore it suffices that it be good by present or future goodness. Nor does it matter that an object which is not actually colored but would only be, could not be the object of visual power. For there is disparity because visual power on account of its materiality cannot attain except an actually existing and present object; but will since it is a spiritual power can attain the future and absent provided it be objectively present and in some way future, as is clear from acts of hope and desire.

§ LAST

What should be thought about opinions other than ours and the Molinist view concerning the foreknowledge of conditional futures in God?

I respond that there is none which cannot be refuted from the principles laid down.

And first, that opinion of certain Scotists which says God knows futures in a concomitant decree, understood in a sense distinct from ours, you have exploded in article 4 of this dissertation § 2, immediately before the solution of arguments.

Another is the opinion which teaches that God knows futures in a decree either absolute or conditional of multiplying so many graces until the creature consents.

But 1°, according to this opinion, God will not be able to know either sins, or naturally good acts, or conditional futures whose condition will never be placed, but only those good acts for which grace is necessary.

2° Nor will He be able to know these certainly and distinctly; for in this battle of the will with so many multiplied graces, whence can certainty be had? Plainly uncertain what will be the outcome, uncertain which grace will win and when, all uncertain: whence therefore can God certainly foreknow whether and when man will consent?

You will respond that God certainly foreknows this from the moral infallibility which so many accumulated graces import; just as it is morally infallible that a just man among so many temptations to venial sins will sometimes sin venially, and that one who is attacked by darts from all sides will sometimes be wounded.

But against this: God knows with far greater certainty and distinction which grace in particular will have effect, than we know that a just man will sometimes sin venially, that one attacked by darts will sometimes be pierced. Otherwise it would follow that God only foreknows in general that man will be converted, but not in particular by whom and when. Which St. Thomas here q. 14 a. 6 o. rightly considers erroneous, saying: "Some erred saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general."

3° Finally that grace to which the will succumbs out of so many accumulated, either will obtain this by its own power, or what is the same, by the power of divine will, or from the innate liberty of human will which will rather consent to this than to other graces. If the first, therefore God in this His will of giving grace efficacious through itself knows this future consent, and this we intend: if the second, therefore He knows this future consent through middle knowledge, which we reject.

Another again is the opinion of certain more recent authors who say God knows conditional futures in the similar. But either in the similar God foreknew the conditionally future consent by virtue of His decree, or He expected it from the will. If the first, we have our intent; if the second, it is middle knowledge. Moreover in what similar could God know that the good Angels and penitent Adam would consent to grace?

Finally for a crown note that whatever we have said hitherto against the Molinists, is equally to be said against the Jansenists as far as concerns the state of innocence; for these admit middle knowledge for this state, just as the Molinists for both states. And these things about middle knowledge now suffice for our institute. As for other things which also regard it, especially arguments sought from injury to liberty and divine holiness, and from insufficiency of helps, seek below concerning decrees.

APPENDIX.
On the division of God's knowledge.

Although divine knowledge on God's part is unique, simple and unlimited, comprehending all things perfectly in a single act; yet on the part of objects, and according to our way of conceiving, it is variously divided.

1° Into primary understanding and attributal or scientific understanding, about which above.

2° Into speculative and practical knowledge: speculative is that which only contemplates things but does not effect them, such as that which concerns God Himself or possible things. Practical is that which not only knows but also effects its object. But evils, although they are not operable by God, nevertheless fall under His practical knowledge, just like good things, insofar as He either permits, or impedes, or corrects, or orders them, just as diseases fall under the practical knowledge of a doctor insofar as he cures them through his art.

3° Into necessary and free knowledge. Necessary is that which precedes God's free determination and concerns only necessary objects, as about the quiddities of things which cannot be otherwise. Free is that which supposes a decree and concerns objects depending on God's free will, such as existing or future things.

4° Into knowledge of simple intelligence and of vision, and this is the most celebrated division of all. Knowledge of simple intelligence is that which concerns those things which neither are, nor were, nor will be, that is about the quiddities of things in the state of mere possibility: it coincides with speculative and necessary knowledge. It is called of simple intelligence, not to exclude the respect of knowledge to the known, which inseparably

accompanies all knowledge; but to exclude the admixture of that which is outside the genus of notice, such as is the existence of things which knowledge of vision adds, or the order of will to known things which knowledge of approval adds.

Knowledge of vision therefore is that which is directed to those things which are, or were, or will be; hence it adds, as I was just saying, above knowledge of simple intelligence order to the physical existence of the object, as present in eternity in a way to be explained below. It is called of vision, the metaphor being taken from the bodily eye which is said to see things when it attains them as present to itself. But whether this division is adequate, or on the contrary there is given another knowledge mediating between those, which is called middle knowledge, is a most celebrated question in all theology, which we will try to weigh below with all its moments against Molina and the Fathers of the Society who assert this middle knowledge.

Knowledge of vision is subdivided into knowledge of approval and of disapproval. Knowledge of approval is that which concerns good things and supposes an approving decree of divine will concerning them. Knowledge of disapproval is that which concerns sins and supposes a decree of divine will concerning them, not approving, but only permissive. And according to this division, God is sometimes said in Scripture to know and not know evils or sins, not to know by knowledge of approval, to know by knowledge of disapproval.

The End.
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